

ALL THE  
ORATIONS  
OF  
DEMOSTHENES,  
PRONOUNCED  
TO EXCITE THE ATHENIANS  
AGAINST  
PHILIP King of MACEDON.

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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH;

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BY  
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MDCCLVII.



ALL TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

JAMES



CHARLES

TRANSITION

Philip King of Macedonia.

WITH A JUST RESPECT.

AND

SINCERE GRATITUDE.

INSCRIBED

THOMAS LELAND

HIS LORDSHIP.

THE SECOND BUTLER

MOST OBLIGED,

AND

MOST OBLIGED SERVANT.

THOMAS LELAND

TO  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
**J A M E S,**  
LORD VISCOUNT  
**CHARLEMONT, F. R. S.**  
THE FOLLOWING  
TRANSLATION  
IS,  
WITH A JUST RESPECT,  
AND  
SINCERE GRATITUDE,  
INSCRIBED,  
BY  
HIS LORDSHIP'S  
DUTIFUL,  
MOST OBLIGED,  
AND  
MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,  
THOMAS LELAND.

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THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

J A E S



CHARLEMONT, E. R. S.

THE FOLLOWING

TRANSLATION  
PREFACE

WITH A JUST RESPECT

AND

SINCERE GRATITUDE

TO  
for justice, humanity, and va-  
lour, yet in many instances, dege-  
nerate and corrupted; to warn them  
of the dangers of luxury, treachery,  
and bribery; of the ambition and per-  
fidy of a powerful foreign enemy; to  
recall the glory of their ancestors to  
their thoughts; and to inspire them  
with



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# P R E F A C E.

**T**O animate a people renowned for justice, humanity, and valour, yet in many instances, degenerate and corrupted; to warn them, of the dangers of luxury, treachery, and bribery; of the ambition and perfidy of a powerful foreign enemy; to recal the glory of their ancestors to their thoughts; and to inspire them



with resolution, vigour, and unanimity; to correct abuses, to restore discipline, to revive and enforce the generous sentiments of patriotism and public spirit:—These were the great purposes for which the following Oration was originally pronounced. The subject therefore may possibly recommend them to a BRITISH reader, even under the disadvantages of a translation, by no means worthy of the famous original. His candor may pardon them; or sometimes, perhaps, they may escape him, if he suffers his imagination to be possessed with that enthusiasm, which our orator is of all others, most capable of inspiring; and will, for a while, interest himself in the cause of Athens.

To the history of Greece, I must suppose he is no stranger. Yet, tho' it may not inform him, his memory may



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may possibly be assisted, by a summary review of the affairs and interests of that country; particularly of those divisions, which had a long time subsisted between its principal states, and on which Philip justly grounded his hopes of success, in his attempts upon their liberties.

These states were **L A C E D E M O N**,  
**A T H E N S**, and **T H E B E S**.

The first, famous for her antient kings, had acquired new splendor under the reign of Lycurgus. The wisdom of the constitution which he established, and the exact obedience paid to his laws, preserved the state from those domestic divisions which prevailed in other places; and the remarkable temperance of Sparta, the severity of her discipline, her public spirit, and concern for the liberty and

happiness of other communities, made her long revered as the parent of Greece. Her constitution, however, was not without its faults. Her government favoured of the humour of her inhabitants, who extended the same harsh severity to their allies, which they used towards each other. Besides, they were devoted to arms; and their constitution required continual wars for the preservation of it. This made their government distasteful, and favoured the ambition of the Athenians their rivals, who, tho' a more ancient people, had for many years, (thro' their weakness or disorders) lived without any thought of command.

Athens was originally governed by kings; the last of whom sacrificed his life to the good of his country; and upon his death, the Athenians took occasion to abolish the royalty, and instituted their perpetual Archons, which

were changed to a decennial, and afterwards to an annual magistracy. The state, however, was not compleatly settled, until Solon, by his wise laws, restored the love of labour and husbandry, opened a way for commerce, taught his countrymen to enrich themselves, and found means to subdue their licentiousness by the rules of justice, order, and discipline. Athens, thus reformed, was in a fair way of growing great and illustrious, when one of the citizens found means to seize the supreme power. The struggles of the Athenians for liberty, against the successors of this man, was one occasion of the Persian war: the glorious exploits of which are too well known, to need a recital. The victories of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, the chief honour of which, the Athenians assumed to themselves, determined the character of that people; inspired them with the highest notions of glo-



ry and honour, and at last prompted them to set up for sovereign umpires of Greece.

Sparta was willing to resign to them the command of the sea: but they would be absolute in all. And as they had delivered Greece from the oppression of the Barbarians, they thought themselves entitled to oppress her in their turn. They called themselves protectors of the Grecian cities, but behaved like their lords; till at last, Sparta, urged by the complaints of several states, against the violence of Athens, began the famous Peloponnesian war, which was carried on with various success, twenty-seven years. The unhappy expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, first shook their power; and the victory of Lysander at Aegos-Potamos, entirely overthrew it.

By

By this event, however, Greece only changed her masters. Sparta resumed the superiority; but her new reign lasted only thirty years. The Spartans were possessed with such a prejudice in favour of their own form of government, that they attempted to abolish Democracy every where: and while they imposed their thirty tyrants upon Athens, established a government of ten, in other states, composed of men devoted to their interest. Thus they became more absolute, but at the same time more odious. Their prosperity made them presume too much upon their strength. Their forces were lent to support the pretensions of the younger Cyrus. Their king, Agesilaus, was sent into Persia; where the great king could not put a stop to his progress, but by bribing the Greeks, and by that means, raising up enemies against Sparta.

The

The Greeks readily hearkened to his solicitations. The Athenians, at the head of the malecontents, resolved to hazard every thing for liberty ; and without reflecting on their late miserable condition, presumed to affront that state which had reduced them to it. They knew so well, to make a right use of the oversight the Spartans had committed, in provoking the great King, that, joining their force with the Persian fleet, they defeated them, and rebuilt their walls : nor did they lay down their arms, till the Lacedemonians were obliged by a solemn treaty, to restore the Grecian cities to their liberty. For altho' the Lacedemonians pretended a voluntary generosity in this affair, yet it appeared by the consequence, that fear only had obliged them to it ; as they took an opportunity, some time after, to oppress Thebes, tho' expressly comprehended in the treaty. This raised the

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the states of Greece against them. The Athenians, (who always harboured the most inveterate hatred and jealousy of them, and had lately been particularly provoked by an attempt of one of their generals to seize their port) set themselves once more at the head of the confederacy; and took upon themselves the whole expence of the war; in which their arms were crowned with victories by sea and land, at Corinth, Naxos, Coreyra, and Leucas. Thus were the Spartans obliged to renew the treaty, and the cities of Greece again restored to an entire independency.—These bold efforts of the Athenians, to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain their former sovereignty, are frequently extolled in the following Orations, as the glorious effects of their concern for the liberties of Greece.

And



And now the peace was just concluded, and the Greeks had the fairest prospect of enjoying it, when on a sudden, the Thebans started up, and asserted their claim to sovereign power.

Thebes had from the earliest ages, been ranked among the most considerable states. The natural slowness and heaviness of the inhabitants, had however, prevented them from aiming at any pre-eminence. In the Persian war, they even had the baseness to join with the Barbarians. And in order to screen themselves from the resentment of the Athenians on this account, they afterwards attached themselves to Lacedemon; and continued firm, thro' the whole course of the Peloponnesian war. They shifted sides however, sometime after, and had some contests with the Lacedemonians. The seizing of their citadel, and the recovery of it out of  
the

the hands of the Lacedemonians by Pelopidas, had created a mutual hatred between these two states. And the Thebans, naturally hardy and robust, and grown experienced since the Peloponnesian war, (from which time their arms had been constantly exercised) now at length began to entertain thoughts of commanding. They refused to accede to the treaty negotiated by the Athenians, unless they were acknowledged chief of Boeotia. This refusal, not only exposed them to the resentment of the King of Persia, (who was at that time particularly concerned that the Greeks should be at peace) but raised Athens, Sparta, and indeed all Greece against them. The Lacedemonians declared war, and thinking them an easy victory, now that they were deserted by their allies, marched their forces a considerable way into the Theban territory. Now it was, that Epaminondas

das

das first shone out in all his lustre. He put himself at the head of the Thebans, and met the enemy at Leuctra; where he gave them a total overthrow. He then marched into Peloponnesus, and had well-nigh made himself master of the city of Sparta; relieved some people who had been oppressed by the Spartans; and by his justice and magnanimity, his extensive abilities, and zealous concern for his country, promised to raise the Thebans to the most exalted degree of power and dignity; when in another engagement with the Lacedemonians at Mantinea, he fell, as it were, in the arms of victory.

The death of Epaminondas, and the peace which ensued, slackened the zeal of the principal powers of Greece, and rendered them too secure. The Athenians, particularly, (when they saw the fortune of Lacedemon at the lowest ebb, and that on the part of Thebes,

Thebes, they were freed from all apprehensions by the death of the general, the soul of their counsels and designs,) were now no longer upon their guard, but abandoned themselves to ease and pleasure. Festivals and public entertainments engaged their attention, and a violent passion for the stage, banished all thoughts of business and glory. Poets, players, singers and dancers, were received with that esteem and applause, which were due to the commanders who fought their battles. They were rewarded extravagantly, and their performances exhibited with a magnificence scarcely to be conceived. The treasures which should have maintained their armies, were applied to purchase seats in their theatres. Instead of that spirit and vigour which they exerted against the Persian, they were possessed with indolence and effeminacy; they had no further concern about the affairs of

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war,



war, than just to keep a few foreign troops in pay; in short, treachery, corruption, and degeneracy overspread the state.

But while they were sinking into this condition, they found themselves unexpectedly engaged with a very formidable enemy, PHILIP, King of the MACEDONIANS, a people hitherto obscure, and in a manner, barbarous: but now by the courage, activity, and consummate policy of their monarch, ready to lay the foundation of a most extensive Empire.

Philip had been sent early into Thebes, as an hostage, where he was so happy as to improve his natural abilities, by the instructions of Epaminondas. The news of his Brother Perdiccas being slain in a battle with the Illyrians, determined him to fly to the relief of his country: he eluded  
the

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the vigilance of his guards, and escaped privately to Macedon; where taking advantage of the people's consternation at the loss of their king, and of the dangers they apprehended from an infant reign, he first got himself declared protector to his nephew, and soon after, King in his stead: and indeed the present condition of the Macedonians, required a Prince of his abilities. The Illyrians, flushed with their late victory, were preparing to march against them; the Paeonians harraſſed them with perpetual incursions; and at the same time, Pausanias and Argæus two of the royal blood, pretended to the crown; the one, supported by Thrace, the other by Athens.

Under these circumstances, Philip's first care was to gain the affections of his people, to raise their spirits, to train and exercise them, and to reform their military discipline. And now he

began to discover those abilities, which afterwards raised him to such an height of power, and which were not to be expected in a prince of the age of twenty-two years.

The chief motive of the Athenians, in supporting the pretensions of Argæus, was the hopes of getting possession of Amphipolis, a city bordering on Macedon, which they had long claimed as their colony. It had sometimes been in their hands, sometimes subjected to Lacedemon, according to the different changes of fortune of these states. After the peace of Antalcidas, the Greeks acknowledged the pretensions of the Athenians; and it was resolved, that they should be put in possession of this city at the common charge. Probably the People of Amphipolis refused to submit to their old masters; for the Athenians were obliged to dispatch Iphicrates thither, with

with forces. But the Kings of Macedon now began to dispute it with them. Perdiccas made himself master of it; and Philip would very gladly have kept it in his own hands; but this could not be done, without weakening his army, and incensing the Athenians, whom his present circumstances required him rather to make his friends: on the other hand, he could not think of suffering them to possess it, as it was the key to that side of his dominions. He therefore took a middle course, and declared it a free city: thereby leaving the inhabitants to throw off their dependance on their old masters, and making it appear to be their own act. At the same time, he disarms the Paeonians by the force of presents and promises; and then turns his arms against the Athenians, who had marched to the assistance of Argaeas. A battle ensued, in which Philip was victorious. By the death



of Argaeas, who fell in the action, he was freed from that dispute; and by his respectful care of the Athenians, when he had them in his power, he so far gained upon that people, that they concluded a peace with him. He now found himself strong enough to break with the Paeonians, whom he subdued; and having gained a compleat victory over the Illyrians, he obliged them to restore all their conquests in Macedon. He also shut up the entrance of his kingdom against Pausanias: but having provided for the security of it; in the next place, he thought of making it more powerful and flourishing.

The re-union of Amphipolis, he considered as the principal means to this end; and therefore, under pretence of punishing some wrongs, which he alledged against that city, he laid siege to it. The moment they perceived

ceived their danger, the people of Amphipolis sent two of their citizens to Athens to solicit succours: but in order to prevent any opposition on the part of the Athenians, Philip gave them the strongest assurances, that his sole design was to put them in possession of it the moment it was in his power: they therefore suffered him to make a conquest of it. But instead of performing his promise, he proceeded to take from them Pydna and Potidaea, with which he purchased the friendship of the Olynthians, whom it concerned him at that time to oblige; the golden mines of Crenides fell next into his hands, and contributed greatly to his successes.

The Athenians could not but be alarmed at the progress of this prince. His vigilance and activity, his policy and insincerity, now began to appear dangerous; and councils were held to

deliberate upon the measures proper to be taken. But although the Athenians were possessed with delicacy and sensibility, and entertained magnificent ideas of virtue and its duties, yet they wanted application, constancy and perseverance. The good qualities which had long been the boast of that people, were now disappearing, while their faults increased. Hence it was, that they easily suffered themselves to be lulled into a false security. Besides, they had enough of difficulty to support their jurisdiction in other parts, and to bear up against a considerable revolt of their allies,

This revolt produced the war called the social war; which lasted three years, and was succeeded by the Phocian or sacred war, so called, because begun from a motive of religion. The Phocians had plowed up some ground adjoining to the Temple of Apollo at Delphos,

Delphos, which their neighbours exclaimed against as sacrilege, and was so judged by the council of Amphictyons, that venerable assembly, composed of representatives from the principal states of Greece, who sat twice every year at Delphos and Thermopylae. They laid a heavy fine upon them; but instead of submitting to the sentence, the Phocians alledged, that the care and patronage of the temple belonged anciently to them, and encouraged by Philomelus, one of their principal citizens, took up arms to assert their claim. The several states of Greece took part in this quarrel, as their interests and inclinations directed. Athens and Sparta, with some other of the Peloponnesians, declared for the Phocians. The Thebans were their principal opposers: and were assisted by the Thessalians, Locrians, and other neighbouring states. At first Philomelus had some success; but  
in



in the second year of the war, the Thebans gave him a signal defeat, and he himself was killed in the pursuit.

In the mean time, Philip took no part in this war. He was well pleased that the parties should exhaust their strength; and also had an opportunity of securing and extending his frontier without interruption, by taking in such places as were either convenient or troublesome to him. Of this latter kind, was the city of Methone, which after some resistance he took and demolished, annexing its lands to Macedon. During the siege, he was in imminent danger of his life; having lost one of his eyes by an arrow. But it was not long before Philip had a fair opportunity of engaging as a party in the Phocian war. The Thessalians, a people susceptible of all impressions, and incapable of preserving any; equally forgetful of benefits and injuries;

ries; ever ready to submit to tyrants, and to implore the assistance of their neighbours to free them from slavery; had sometime since been governed by Alexander of Pherae, the most detestable tyrant ever known in Greece. He was dispatched by Tisiphonus, Lycophron and Pitholaus; who seized the government, and became equally intolerable. So that the nobility of Thessaly, with the Aleuadae, descendants from Hercules, at their head, declared against them, and implored the assistance of Philip. This prince, willingly sacrificed the hopes of extending his conquests in Thrace to the honour of assisting the Aleuadae, who were of the same race with him; and of imitating Pelopidas in giving liberty to Thessaly. He had also long wished to have the Macedonians considered as a Grecian people, and as he thought no opportunity could be so honourable and favourable, as to affect an interest of  
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the affairs of Theſſaly, he readily marched againſt the tyrants, and ſoon diveſted them of all their authority.

But Philip's apparent danger from the wound which he received at Methone, emboldened Lycophron to reſume the ſovereign power. The Phocians, (who after the death of Philomelus, had renewed the war with all imaginable vigour under Onomarchus) eſpouſed the cauſe of this tyrant: who had engaged the Theſſalians to obſerve a neutrality; and they in return ſupported him with all their power. Philip therefore, now became involved in the general quarrel. At firſt, the Phocian general gained ſome advantages over him; but he afterwards had ſuch ſucceſs, as enlarged his views, and inſpired him with new hopes and expectations. He thought of nothing leſs than the conqueſt of Greece; and under pretence of marching againſt the  
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the Phocians, made a bold attempt to seize the famous pass at Thermopylae, which he justly called the key of Greece. This roused the Athenians from their lethargy. At the first news of his march, they flew to the pass; and prevented his design, as he did not think it prudent to force his way.

We may reasonably look on his retreat from Thermopylae as the aera of Philip's hatred to the Athenians. He saw that they were the only people in Greece capable of defeating his projects, or of giving him uneasiness in his own kingdom: he therefore provided himself with much diligence, a fleet composed of light ships, which might disturb their trade, and at the same time, enrich his subjects by bringing in prizes. He also increased his army; and projected the destruction of the Athenian colonies in Thrace. At the same time he practised very successfully



cessfully at Athens itself; and by large appointments, secured some eminent orators, to charm the people with delusive hopes of peace, or to frighten them with expensive estimates while they pretended a zeal for the defence of the state.

In a democratical government like that of Athens, ELOQUENCE was the sure means of recommending its possessor to the attention and regard of his fellow-citizens, and of raising him to all public honours and advantages. The gradual improvements of literature, had introduced and perfected the arts of moving and persuading; and perhaps the disorders of the state, contributed to make them more important; called forth a greater number of public speakers, and opened a larger field for their abilities. Many of those orators, who about that time took the lead in the Athenian assemblies,

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blies, are lost to posterity. The characters however of the most eminent have been transmitted, or may be collected from the writings of antiquity.

DEMADES, by his birth and education, seemed destined to meanness and obscurity: but as the Athenian assembly admitted persons of all ranks and occupations, to speak their sentiments; his powers soon recommended him to his countrymen; and raised him from the low condition of a common mariner, to the administration and direction of public affairs. His private life was stained with those brutal excesses, which frequently attend the want of early culture, and an intercourse with the inferior and least refined part of mankind. His conduct as a leader and minister, was not actuated by the principles of delicate honour and integrity: and his eloquence  
seems

seems to have received a tincture from his original condition. He appears to have been a strong, bold, and what we call a blunt speaker; whose manner, rude and daring, and sometimes bordering on extravagance, had oftentimes a greater effect than the more corrected stile of other speakers, who confined themselves within the bounds of decorum and good breeding.

**HYPERIDES**, on the contrary, was blessed with all the graces of refinement: harmonious, elegant and polite; with a well-bred festivity, and delicate irony: excellent in panegyric; and of great natural abilities for affecting the passions. Yet his eloquence seems rather to have been pleasing than persuasive. He is said to have been not so well fitted for a popular assembly, and for political debates; as for private causes, and addressing

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ſing a few ſelect judges. And even here, when he pleaded the cauſe of a woman, for whom he had the tenderſt paſſion; he was obliged to call the charms of his miſtreſs to the aſſiſtance of his eloquence; and was more indebted to theſe for his ſucceſs than to his own powers.

LYCURGUS had all the advantages which birth and education could afford for forming an orator. He was the hearer of Plato, and the ſcholar of Hocrates. He ſeems to have been particularly affected by the charms of poetry, and the polite arts; nor was he leſs remarkable for diligence and attention; yet his influence in the aſſembly, ſeems like that of PHOCION, to have ariſen rather from a reſpect to his character, and the general opinion of his virtue and integrity, than from his abilities as a ſpeaker.



AESCHINES was an orator, whose style was full, diffusive and sonorous. He was a stranger to the glowing expressions and daring figures of Demosthenes, which he treats with contempt and ridicule. But though more simple, he is less affecting: and by being less contracted, has not so much strength and energy. Or, as Quintilian expresses it, *carnis plus habet, lacertorum minus*. But if we would view his abilities to the greatest advantage, we must not compare them with those of his rival. Then will his figures appear to want neither beauty nor grandeur. His easy and natural manner, will then be thought highly pleasing: and a just attention will discover a good degree of force and energy in his stile, which at first, appears only flowing and harmonious.

But

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But all the \* several excellencies of his countrymen and cotemporaries were at least equalled by DEMOSTHENES. His own, no age or nation could attain to. From him, critics have formed their rules; and all the masters in his own art, have thought it an honour to imitate him. To enlarge upon his character, would be to resume a subject already exhausted by every critic both ancient and modern. Let it be sufficient to say, that energy and majesty are his peculiar excellencies. From the gravity of Thucydides, the pomp and dignity of Plato, the ease and elegance, the neatness and simplicity of the Attic writers, he formed a stile and manner admirably fitted to his own temper and genius, as well as that of his hearers. His own severity determined him to the more forcible

\* *Nihil Lysiae subtilitate cedit; nihil argutiis & acumine Hyperidi; nihil lenitate Aeschini & splendore verborum.*

*Cic. de Orat.*

methods of astonishing and terrifying, rather than to the gentle and insinuating arts of persuasion: nor did the circumstances and dispositions of his countrymen admit of any but violent impressions. As many of those to whom he addressed himself were men of low rank and occupations, his images and expressions are sometimes familiar. As others of them were themselves eminent in speaking, and could readily see thro' all the common artifices of oratory; these he affects to despise: appears only solicitous to be understood; yet, as it were without design, raises the utmost admiration and delight; such delight as arises from the clearness of evidence, and the fullness of conviction. And as all, even the lower part of his hearers, were acquainted with the beauties of poetry, and the force of harmony; he could not admit of any thing rude or negligent; but with the strictest attention

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laboured those compositions, which appear so natural and unadorned. They have their ornaments; but these are austere and manly, and such as are consistent with freedom and sincerity. A full and regular series of diffusive reasoning would have been intolerable in an Athenian assembly. He often contents himself with an imperfect hint: a sentence, a word, even his silence is sometimes pregnant with meaning. And this quickness and vehemence flattered a people who valued themselves on their accuteness and penetration. The impetuous torrent that in a moment bears down all before it; the repeated flashes of lightning, which spread universal terror, and which the strongest eye dares not encounter, are the images, by which the nature of his eloquence hath been expressed.

As a statesman and as a citizen, his conduct was no less remarkable. If



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the fire of his eloquence seems at some times abated, his judgment and accuracy and political abilities are then conspicuous. The bravery with which he opposed the passions and prejudices of his countrymen, and the general integrity of his character (to which Philip himself bare witness) are deserving of the highest honour: and whatever weakness he betrayed in his military conduct, his death must be acknowledged truly heroic.

The reader will observe, that the Oration, entitled, *On the Halonesus*, is not admitted into the following collection. Some critics ascribe it to \* Hegesippus, an Athenian orator, of inferior

\* In the oration on the Halonesus, the speaker takes notice of his having been the manager of a prosecution against Calippus, on account of an illegal motion made by this man in the assembly, relative to the boundaries of Cardia. Hegesippus was the person who conducted this prosecution. And this circumstance, Libanius mentions, as having (together with the difference of style) induced the critics to ascribe this oration, not to Demosthenes but to Hegesippus.

inferior character. But however this may be, it is certainly entirely different from those compositions of Demosthenes, which are confessedly genuine. That he really wrote an † Oration so entitled, the authority of the antient writers confirm, I think sufficiently. But one would be tempted to believe, that the passages which they have quoted, had been taken up by some old scholiast, and inserted in a performance of his own.

Hegefippus. To this we may add another circumstance of the like nature. The speaker observes that he went on an embassy to Macedon, in order to obtain an explanation and amendment of some articles in the treaty concluded between Philip and the Athenians. Hegefippus was at the head of this embassy; nor was Demosthenes at all concerned in it; as appears from the oration of this latter *περί τῆς Πάσης.*)

† Aeschines, in his oration on the embassy, mentions two particulars in that of Demosthenes on the Halonesus, neither of which are found in the oration now extant. The first is, that Demosthenes treated Philip's ambassadors with great severity, and insisted that they were really sent as spies. The other, that he recommended to the Athenians by no means to submit their disputes with Philip to the decision of an umpire; for that no one impartial mediating state could be found thro' Greece, so totally were the minds of all men corrupted by the Macedonian.

As to the translation now offered to the public; the author has no doubt but that it will meet with all due indulgence from the ingenious and judicious reader. His sentence must determine its fate; and to him it is implicitly submitted.

But one would be tempted to believe that the passages which they have quoted, and been taken up by some old school, and inserted in a portion of his own.

ARCHONSHIP OF ARISTOCRATS. To this we may add another circumstance of the nature. The former observes that we want on the one hand, a more certain and settled constitution and amendment of some articles in the treaty concluded between England and the Americans. Hegelberg was in the head of this embassy; and was Demosthenes at all concerned in it; he appears from the nature of his last

of Archimedes, in his oration on the embassy, mentions two particulars in that of Demosthenes on the Helonians, neither of which are found in the oration now extant. The first is that Demosthenes treated Philip's embassy does with great severity, and asserted that they were totally unworthy. The other, that he recommended to the Athenians by no means to submit their disputes with Philip to the decision of an umpire: for that we are not to suppose that the minds of all were corrupted by the Macedonians.

As to the translation now offered to the public, the author has no doubt but that it will meet with all due indulgence from the rigorous and judicious reader. His sentence must determine us late, and to him it is

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## INTRODUCTION

## THE FIRST

## ORATION against PHILIP:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of ARISTODEMUS,

In the FIRST YEAR of the HUNDRED and SEVENTH  
OLYMPIAD, and the NINTH of PHILIP'S  
REIGN.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**WE** have seen Philip opposed in his design of passing into Greece, thro' Thermopylae; and obliged to retire. The danger they had thus escaped deeply affected the Athenians. So daring an attempt, which was, in effect, declaring his purposes, filled them with astonishment: and the view of a power, which every day received new accessions, drove them even to despair. Yet their aversion to public business was still predominant. They forgot that Philip might renew his attempt; and thought they provided sufficiently for their security, by posting a body of troops at the entrance of Attica, under the command of Menelaus a foreigner. They then proceeded to convene an assembly of the people, in order to consider what measures were to be taken to check the progress of Philip.

lip. On which occasion Demosthenes, for the first time, appeared against that prince; and displayed those abilities, which proved the greatest obstacle to his designs.

At Athens, the whole power and management of affairs were placed in the people. It was their prerogative to receive appeals from the courts of justice, to abrogate and enact laws, to make what alterations in the state they judged convenient; and in short, all matters public or private, foreign or domestic, civil, military, or religious, were determined by them.

Whenever there was occasion to deliberate, the people assembled early in the morning, sometimes in the forum or public place, sometimes in a place called Pnyx, but most frequently in the theatre of Bacchus. A few days before each assembly there was a Προπαρα or Placart fixed on the statues of some illustrious men erected in the city, to give notice of the subject to be debated. As they refused admittance into the assembly to all persons who had not attained the necessary age, so they obliged all others to attend. The Lexiarchs stretched out a cord dyed with scarlet, and by it pushed the people towards the place of meeting. Such as received the stain were fined; the more diligent had a small pecuniary reward. These



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*Lexiarchs* were the keepers of the register, in which were enrolled the names of such citizens as had a right of voting. And all had this right who were of age, and not excluded by a personal fault. Undutiful children, cowards, brutal debauchees, prodigals, debtors to the public, were all excluded. Until the time of Cecrops, women had a right of suffrage, which they were said to have lost, on account of their partiality to Minerva, in her dispute with Neptune, about giving a name to the city.

In ordinary cases, all matters were first deliberated in the senate of five hundred, composed of fifty senators chosen out of each of the ten tribes. Each tribe had its turn of presiding, and the fifty senators in office were called *Prytanes*. And according to the number of the tribes, the Attic year was divided into ten parts, the four first containing thirty-six, the other thirty-five days; in order to make the Lunar year compleat, which according to their calculation contained one hundred and fifty-four days. During each of these divisions, ten of the fifty *Prytanes* governed for a week, and were called *Proedri*: and of these, he who in the course of the week presided for one day, was called the *Epistate*: three of the *Proedri* being excluded from this office.

The

144  
210  
—  
354  
three



xlvi INTRODUCTION.

*The Prytans assembled the people : the Proedri declareth the occasion ; and the Epistate demandeth their voices. This was the case in the ordinary assemblies : the extraordinary were convened as well by the generals as the Prytanes ; and sometimes the people met of their own accord, without waiting the formalities.*

*The assembly was opened by a sacrifice ; and the place was sprinkled with the blood of the victim. Then an imprecation was pronounced, conceived in these terms. May the Gods pursue that man to destruction, with all his race, who shall act, speak, or contrive, any thing against this state ! This ceremony being finished, the Proedri declared the occasion of the assembly, and reported the opinion of the senate. If any doubt arose, an herald, by commission from the Epistate, with a loud voice, invited any citizen, first of those above the age of fifty, to speak his opinion : and then the rest according to their ages. This right of precedence had been granted by a law of Solon, and the order of speaking determined entirely by the difference of years. In the time of Demosthenes, this law was not in force. It is said to have been repealed about fifty years before the date of this oration. Yet the custom still continued out of respect to the reasonable and decent purpose for which  
the*

## INTRODUCTION. xlvii

*the law was originally enacted. When a speaker had delivered his sentiments, he generally called on an officer appointed for that purpose, to read his motion, and propound it in form. He then sat down, or resumed his discourse, and enforced his motion by additional arguments: and sometimes the speech was introduced by his motion thus propounded. When all the speakers had ended; the people gave their opinion, by stretching out their hands to him whose proposal pleased them most. And Xenophon reports, that night having come on when the people were engaged in an important debate, they were obliged to defer their determination till next day, for fear of confusion, when their hands were to be raised.*

*Prorrexerunt manus, saith Cicero (pro Flacco) & Psephisma natum est. And to constitute this Psephisma or decree, six thousand citizens at least were required. When it was drawn up, the name of its author, or that person whose opinion had prevailed, was prefixed: whence, in speaking of it, they called it his decree. The date of it contained, the name of the Archon, that of the day and month, and that of the tribe then presiding. The business being over, the Prytanes dismissed the assembly.*

*The*

The reader who chuses to be more minutely informed in the customs, and manner of procedure in the public assemblies of Athens, may consult the *Archæologia* of Archbishop Potter, Sigonius, or the *Concionatrices* of Aristophanes.

PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.

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**H**AD we been convened, Athenians! on some new subject of debate, I had waited, until most of the usual persons had declared their opinions. If I had approved of any thing proposed by them, I should have continued silent: if not, I had then attempted to speak my sentiments. But since those very points on which these speakers have oftentimes been heard already, are at this time to be considered; though [A] I have  
B arisen

[A] *Tho' I have arisen first, &c.* Demosthenes was at that time but thirty years old, which made it necessary for him to apologize for his zeal in rising before the other speakers: and the ingenious turn which he gives it, not only prevents any unfavourable impression on the minds of his



arisen first, I presume I may expect your pardon: for if they on former occasions had advised the necessary measures, ye would not have found it needful to consult at present.

First then, Athenians! these our affairs must not be thought desperate; no, though their situation seems entirely deplorable. For the most shocking circumstance of all our past conduct, is really the most favourable to our future expectations. And what is this? That our own total indolence hath been the cause of all our present difficulties. For were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honour of our state demanded, there were then no hope of a recovery.

In the next place reflect, (you who have been informed by others, and you who can yourselves remember) [B] how great a power the

his hearers, but engages their affection, and excites their attention, by the tacit promise of better counsel, than they had hitherto received.

TOURREIL:

[B] *How great a power, &c.* It has been already observed in the preface to these orations, that Demosthenes takes many occasions of extolling the efforts of Athens to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain that sovereignty which they lost by the victory of Lysander at Aegospotamos. These efforts he every where represents

as



the Lacedemonians not long since possessed ; and with what resolution, with what dignity you disdained to act unworthy of the state, but maintained the war against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention these things ? That ye may know, that ye may see, Athenians ! that if duly vigilant, ye cannot have any thing to fear ; that if once remiss, not any thing can happen agreeable to your desires : witness the then powerful arms of Lacedemon, which a just attention to your interests enabled you to vanquish : and this man's late insolent attempt, which our infensibility to all our great concerns hath made the cause of this confusion.

If there is a man in this assembly who thinks that we must find a formidable enemy in Philip, while he views on one hand, the [c]

B 2

numerous

as high instances of magnanimity and public spirit : though revenge and jealousy had no less share in them. The victories which the Athenians gained over Sparta at Corinth, Naxos, etc. and which he here alludes to, happened about twenty-four years before the date of this oration ; so that he might well appeal to the memories of many persons present.

[c] *The numerous armies, &c.* The number of Philip's forces at that time amounted to twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse ; a great army compared with those  
of

numerous armies which surround him; and on the other, the weakness of the state thus despoiled of its dominions: he thinks justly. Yet let him reflect on this: there was a time, Athenians! when we possessed Pydna, and Potidaea, and Methone, and all that country round: when many of those states now subjected to him were free and independent; and more inclined to our alliance than to his. Had then Philip reasoned in the same manner, "How shall I dare to attack the Athenians, "whose garrisons command my territory, "while I am destitute of all assistance!" He would not have engaged in those enterprizes which are now crowned with success; nor could he have raised himself to this pitch of greatness. No, Athenians! he knew this well, that all these places are but [D] prizes, laid between the combatants, and ready for the conqueror: that the dominions of the absent devolve naturally to those who are in the field; the possessions of the supine to the ac-

of the Greeks. At their march to Marathon, the Athenians could not assemble more than ten thousand forces.

TOUR.

[D] but prizes, &c. His hearers were of all others most devoted to public games and entertainments, and must therefore have been particularly sensible of the beauty of this image.

tive



PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.

5

tive and intrepid. Animated by these sentiments, he overturns whole nations ; he holds all people in subjection : some, as by the right of conquest ; others, under the title of allies and confederates : for all are willing to confederate with those whom they see prepared and resolved to exert themselves as they ought.

And if you (my countrymen !) will now at length be persuaded to entertain the like sentiments : if each of you, renouncing all evasions, will be ready to approve himself an useful citizen, to the utmost that his station and abilities demand : if the rich will be ready to contribute, and the young to take the field : in one word, if you will be yourselves ; and banish those vain hopes which every single person entertains, that while so many others are engaged in public business, his service will not be required ; you then (if heaven so pleases) will regain your dominions, recal those opportunities your supineness hath neglected, and chastise the insolence of this man. For you are not to imagine, that, like a God, he is to enjoy his present greatness for ever fixed and unchangeable. No, Athenians ! there are, who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those seemingly the most attached to his cause. These are passions



common to mankind ; nor must we think that his friends only are exempted from them. It is true they lie concealed at present, as our indolence deprives them of all resource. But let us shake off this indolence ! for you see how we are situated ; you see the outrageous arrogance of this man, who does not leave it to your choice whether you shall act, or remain quiet ; but braves you with his menaces ; and talks [E] (as we are informed) in a strain of the highest extravagance : and is not able to rest satisfied with his present acquisitions, but is ever in pursuit of farther conquests ;

[E] *And talks, (as we are informed) &c.* The success which had hitherto attended Philip's arms, must naturally have inspired him with those designs which he afterwards executed against the Athenians : and resentment of their late opposition at Thermopylae might have made him less careful to conceal them, at least in his own Court. This the orator represents as *arrogant and extravagant menaces* : not that a man who had so just a conception of the weakness of the Athenian politics, and the vigour and abilities of their enemy, could really believe such designs extravagant and romantic. But it was part of his address sometimes to avoid shocking the national vanity of his countrymen. After all their losses and amidst all their indolence, they could not entertain a thought so mortifying, as that the conquerors of Persia and the arbiters of Greece could ever see their liberty essentially affected, or their power and glory entirely wrested from them by a king of Macedon.

and

and while we sit down, inactive and irresolute, incloses us on all sides with his toils.

When therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigour? When roused by some event? When forced by some necessity? What then are we to think of our present condition? To freemen, the disgrace attending on misconduct, is, in my opinion, the most urgent necessity. Or say, is it your sole ambition to wander through the public places, each enquiring of the other, "what new ad-  
"vices?" Can any thing be more new, than that a Man of Macedon should conquer the Athenians, and give law to Greece —— "Is  
"Philip dead? [F]——No, but in great dan-  
"ger."——How are you concerned in those rumours? Suppose he should meet some fatal stroke: you would soon raise up another Philip, if your interests are thus regarded. For it is not to his own strength that he so much

[F] *Is Philip dead, &c.* These rumours and enquiries of the Athenians were occasioned by the wound Philip received at Methone, the year before, and which was followed by a dangerous fit of sickness.——Longinus quotes this whole passage as a beautiful instance of those pathetic figures, which give life and force and energy to an oration.

TOURREIL.

The English reader will find the remark in Sect. 18. of Mr. Smith's translation.

owes his elevation, as to our supineness. And should [G] some accident affect him, should fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the state, than we ourselves, now repeat her favours; (and may she thus crown them!) be assured of this, that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of the confusion, you will every where be absolute masters; but in your present disposition, even if a favourable juncture should present you with [H] Amphipolis, you could not take possession of it, while this suspense prevails in your designs and in your councils.

[G] *Some accident, &c. If he should die.* This is plainly the sense of it: but it must be express'd covertly as Demosthenes has done, not to transgress against that decorum which Cicero says this orator made his first rule. For there were certain things which the ancients presumed not to express but in terms obscure and gentle; that they might not pronounce what were called *verba male ominata*. They did not dare to say to any person, *If you should be killed; If you should die*: they concealed as much as possible the melancholy and odious idea of an approaching, or even of a distant death. The Greeks said *εἰ τι πᾶσι*; the Romans, *si quid humanitus contingat*. OLIVET.

[H] *Present you with Amphipolis, &c.* They had nothing more at heart, than the recovery of this city. So that the author here gives the last and most heightening stroke to his description of their indolence. TOURREIL.

And at the same time by artfully hinting at such an event, as possible, he rouses their attention, and enlivens their hopes and expectations.

And



And now, as to the necessity of a general vigour and alacrity ; of this you must be fully persuaded : this point therefore I shall urge no farther. But the nature of the armament, which, I think, will extricate you from the present difficulties, the numbers to be raised, the subsidies required for their support, and all the other necessities ; how they may, (in my opinion) be best and most expeditiously provided ; these things I will endeavour to explain.——But here I make this request, Athenians ! that you would not be precipitate, but suspend your judgment 'till you have heard me fully. And if at first, I seem to propose a new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I am delaying your affairs: For it is not they who cry out “ instantly! this moment !” whose counsels suit the present juncture, (as it is not possible to repel violences already committed, by any occasional detachment) but he who will shew you, of what kind that armament must be, how great, and how supported, which may subsist until we yield to peace, or 'till our enemies sink beneath our arms, for thus only can we be secured from future dangers.——These things, I think, I can point out: not that I would prevent any other person from declaring his opinion,



opinion,——Thus far am I engaged: how I can acquit myself, will immediately appear: to your judgments I appeal.

First then, Athenians, I say that you should fit out fifty ships of war: and then resolve, that on the first emergency you will embark yourselves. To these I insist that you must add transport and other necessary vessels sufficient for half our horse. Thus far we should be provided against those sudden excursions from his own kingdom, to Thermopylae, to [I] the Chersonesus, to [K] Olynthus, to whatever places he thinks proper. For of this he should necessarily be persuaded, that possibly you may break out from this immoderate in-

[I] *To the Chersonesus.* The year before, Cerfobleptes, unable to defend this country against Philip, had put the Athenians in possession of it. Cardia, one of the chief cities, refused to acknowledge these new sovereigns, and had recourse to the protection of Philip, who, under pretence of supporting them, carried his arms into the Chersonesus.

TOUR.

[K] *To Olynthus.* Philip had already committed some acts of hostility against this state, but had not as yet formed the siege of Olynthus, or taken any measures tending to it: for in such a case Demosthenes would not have touched so lightly upon an enterprize, which he afterwards dwells upon so often, and with so much force.

TOUR.

dolence,

dolence, and fly to some scene of action: as you did to [L] Euboea, and formerly, as we are told, to [M] Haliartus, and but now, to Ther-

[L] *To Euboea, &c.* Monf. Tourreil translates this passage thus: *et qu'il risque de retrouver en vous ces mêmes Athéniens qu'il rencontra sur son chemin en Eubée*, etc. (for which there is no warrant in the original) and taking for granted that all the expeditions here mentioned were made against Philip, he endeavours to settle the date of this to Euboea by conjecture. But it does not appear from history that Philip carried his arms into that island, before his attempt on Thermopylae. In the three succeeding olympiads orations there is not the least mention of such a thing, tho' there is a particular recital of his expeditions in the third, and tho' afterwards the orator inveighs loudly against his hostile attempts in Euboea. I apprehend therefore, that the Expedition hinted at in this place was that which the Athenians made about seven years before in favour of the Euboeans against Thebes: when in five days they brought an army into Euboea, and in thirty obliged the Thebans to come to terms and evacuate the island: (according to Aeschines.)—Demosthenes mentions this in other places; particularly about the end of the oration on the state of the Chersonesus: where he quotes part of the speech made by Timotheus to encourage the Athenians to this expedition.

[M] *To Haliartus.* Tourreil refers this to some action which he supposes might have happened in Boeotia in the course of the Phocian war: and in which the Athenians might have had their share of the honour. But from the text it should seem that the event alluded to must have happened at some considerable distance of time, and have descended to the orator by tradition.—About forty years  
be-

Thermopylae. But altho' we should not act with all this vigour, (which yet I must regard as our indispensable duty) still the measures I propose will have their use: as his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are prepared: (and this he will know, for there are too [N] too many among ourselves, who inform him of every thing) or if he should despise our armament, his security may prove fatal to him; as it will be abso-

before this oration, when Thebes and Sparta began to quarrel, Lyfander, the Spartan general, threatened the Thebans with a very dangerous War, and began with laying siege to this city of Haliartus. The Thebans applied for aid to the Athenians, which they readily granted, (though the Thebans had just before pressed for the utter demolition of their state) and obliged Pausanias to raise the siege, after Lyfander had been killed.——I apprehend, that this is the expedition here alluded to. It was the more remarkable as the Athenian power was then at the lowest ebb. “ You Athenians! (says Demosthenes in his oration on the crown) “ at a time when the Lacedemonians had the absolute command both at sea and land; “ when Attica was quite encompassed with their commanders and their garrisons; when Euboea, Tanagra, “ all Boeotia, Megara, Aegina, Cleone, and the other “ islands were in their possession, when the state had not “ one ship, not one wall,——*Ye marched out to Haliartus, etc.*

[N] *Too many, &c.* He glances particularly at Aristodemus and Neoptolemus. As to Aeschines, he had not been with Philip till six years after.

lutely



lutely in our power, at the first favourable juncture, to make a descent upon his own coasts.

These then are the resolutions I propose, and these the provisions it will become you to make. And I pronounce it still farther necessary to raise some other forces which may harass him with perpetual incursions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty thousands of foreigners ; of [o] those armies which

[o] *Those armies which, &c.* In the Greek it is ἐπιστομαίαις δυνάμεις. — Instead of enumerating the various senses in which the commentators interpret this expression, I shall copy an observation on it by the Abbé D'OLIVET, whose Interpretation I have followed. —  
 “ I have without any refinement chose a plain expression,  
 “ which seems to hit the thought of Demosthenes directly, and to paint strongly the bitter ridicule of the  
 “ passage. It was usual for the Athenians, upon any  
 “ emergency, to write to all quarters to demand soldiers.  
 “ They were answered, that in such a place such a  
 “ number would be provided : from another place, so  
 “ many more might be expected. But in the end it appeared, that these were by no means so many effective  
 “ men. There were great abatements to be made from the  
 “ numbers promised, and we find besides from this oration, that these foreigners were not paid at all, or ill  
 “ paid ; so that these grand armies were no where complete, but in the *letters* written to demand them on one  
 “ part, and to promise them on the other. If I am not  
 “ mistaken,



which appear so magnificent on paper ; but let them be the natural forces of the state : and if you chuse a single person, if a number, if this particular man, or whomever you appoint as general, let them be entirely under his guidance and authority. I also move you that subsistence be provided for them. But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance of this body : how are these points to be settled ? —I now proceed to speak of each of them distinctly.—The body of infantry therefore—But here give me leave to warn you of an error, which hath often proved injurious to you. Think not that your preparations never can be too magnificent : great and terrible in your decrees ; in execution weak and contemptible. Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be moderate ; and add to these if you find them not sufficient.—I say then that the whole body of infantry should be two thousand : of these, that five hundred should be Athenians, of such an age as you shall think proper ; and with a stated time for service, not long, but such as that others may have their turn of duty. Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To these you are to add two

“ mistaken, this is, what Demosthenes calls, *δυναμεις*  
 “ *ἐπισολιμαίαις*, armies which exist only in letters.”

hundred

hundred horse, fifty of them at least Athenians; to serve in the same manner as the foot. And for these you are to provide transports.—And now, what farther preparations?—Ten light gallies. For as he hath a naval power, [P] we must be provided with light vessels, that our troops may have a secure convoy.

But whence are these forces to be subsisted? this I shall explain, when I have first given my reasons, why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have advised that we should serve in person. As to the numbers, Athenians! my reason is this: it is not at present in our power to provide a force able to meet him in the open field: but we must harass him by depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first. We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious army, (for such, we have neither pay nor provisions) nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have proposed that citizens should join in the service, and help to man our fleet; because I am informed that some time since, the state

[P] *As he hath a naval power.* In consequence of his engagements with the Thessalians, he commanded their "ports and ships,

main-

maintained a body of auxiliaries at [Q] Corinth, which [R] Polystratus commanded, and Iphicrates, and Chabrias, and some others; that you yourselves served with them; and that the united efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces, gained a considerable victory over the Lacedemonians. But ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates; while our enemies have arisen to an extravagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail off to [s] fight for Ar-

[Q] At *Corinth*. This was in the same war which he alludes to in the beginning of the oration, (Sec. 2.) Corinth was appointed as the place of general rendezvous for the Greeks who confederated against Sparta.

[R] *Which Polystratus commanded*. Instead of Polystratus, which is a name little known in history, Monsieur Turreil proposes to read Callistratus, who according to Xenophon and Diodorus was colleague to Iphicrates and Chabrias, in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mountney has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities; so that it is probable this is the true reading.

[s] *To fight for Artabazus*. He here alludes to an affair which had happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this general when

Artabazus, or any other person : and their general follows them : nor should we wonder at it ; for he cannot command, who cannot pay his soldiers. What then do I recommend ? that you would take away all pretences both from generals and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domestic forces with the auxiliaries, to be as it were inspectors into the conduct of the commanders. For at present our manner of acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, “ are you at peace, Athenians ? ” the answer would immediately be, “ by no means ! we [T] are engaged in a war with Philip.

prospect of success in that enterprize, suffered himself to be corrupted by Artabazus a rebellious Satrap of Asia, and assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares received a reward proportioned to the service ; but this action raised the indignation of the Athenians ; as he had not only deserted the cause of the republic, but also incensed the king of Persia. Demosthenes however, here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey him : [or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay.] TOUR.

[T] *We are engaged in a war with Philip.* So the Orator affects to speak. Though I apprehend it does not appear from history, that they were at that time *directly* at war with him. They had indeed joined with the Phocians, and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy. Thus far they were engaged against each other, though neither of them, as principals in the quarrel. The



Philip. Have not we chosen [u] the usual generals and officers both of horse and foot ? And of what use are all these, except the single person whom you send to the field ? the rest attend your priests in their processions. So that, as if you formed so many men of clay, you make your officers for shew, and not for service. My countrymen ! should not all these generals have been chosen from your own body ; all these several officers, from

Athenians indeed might have made some attempts to recover Amphipolis ; they certainly made some ineffectual preparations to relieve Potidaea and Methone : and after Philip's attempt on Thermopylae, did station some forces upon their frontiers, to oppose him, in case he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form.—But of this I shall speak more hereafter.

[u] *The usual Officers.* In the text they are mentioned particularly. Ten Taxiarchs, *Σταρχαί* or generals, and Phylarchs, and two Hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year ; and each of these [originally, when all went to the field,] had the command for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number of commanders. *I never* (said he) *could find but one general,* (meaning Parmenio,) *but the Athenians can get ten every year.* Antiently the people upon extraordinary occasions chose a Polemarch, to determine, when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The Taxiarch commanded the infantry ; the Phylarch, the cavalry of his tribe. The whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was commanded by a general of horse, or Hipparch.

FOUR.

your

your own body, that our force might be really Athenian? and yet, for an expedition in favour of [x] Lemnos, the general must be a citizen, while troops engaged in defence of our own territories, are commanded [y] by Menelaus. I say not this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever this command had been intrusted, surely he should have derived it [z] from your voices.

[A] Perhaps you are fully sensible of these truths; but would rather hear me upon another point; that of the supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds. To this I now proceed.—The sum therefore necessary for the maintenance of these forces, that the sol-

[x] *In favour of Lemnos.* When in the social war, the revolted invaded it with a fleet of an hundred sail.

TOUR.

[y] *By Menelaus.* Monsieur Turreil says, that this Menelaus was the brother of Philip by another marriage. But though Philip and his brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians would have trusted one so nearly allied to their enemy. OLIVET.

[z] *From your voices.* The regular method of chusing all officers. However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander in chief. TOUR.

[A] *Perhaps you are fully, &c.* It is not impossible but that the people might have been struck with the freedom and candour of the orator; and given some marks of their approbation.

diers may be just supplied with grain, is somewhat above [B] ninety talents. To the ten galleys, forty talents, that each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty minae. To the two thousand foot, the same sum, that each soldier may receive ten drachmae a month for corn. To the two hundred horse, for a monthly allowance of thirty drachmae each, twelve talents. And let it not be thought a small convenience, that the soldiers are supplied with grain: for I am clearly satisfied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself will supply them with every thing else, so as to compleat their appointment, and this without any injury to the Greeks or allies: and I myself am ready to sail with them, and to answer for the consequence with my life, should it prove otherwise. From what funds the sum which I propose may be supplied, shall now be explained. \* \* \* \*

[B] *Ninety talents.* The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to 187*l.* 10*s.* by Prideaux, to 188*l.* 6*s.* by Arbuthnot, to 193*l.* 15*s.* It contained sixty minae, and each mina, one hundred drachmae. By the computation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recommends to be supplied, were to last one year. MOUNTENEY.

[Here

[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raising the supplies, and proposes it to the people in form, in the name of the orator.]

[c] These are the supplies, Athenians! in our power to raise. And when you come to give

[c] *These are the supplies, &c.* Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the Archonship of Themistocles. But it appears to me, as well as to the other interpreters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic; and therefore, I could not prevail upon myself to separate them. TOUR.

The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic. He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes; but that there was another oration since lost, which began with the same words; for he observes that the former part is plainly imperfect of itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and that naturally and consistently.

I must confess (with all submission to these authorities) that although I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that these two parts are one oration. In the first place, I cannot think that the first Philippic would end abruptly, if this second part was away: for we find in the first part, all that the orator proposes to speak to in the beginning; and it concludes (not unlike a speech in parliament) with a motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised, for the maintenance of such



give your voices, determine upon some effectual [D] provision, that you may oppose Philip,

and such forces. And as to the manner in which the second part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that; as Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner: (see his letter to Ammæus)——It might also be observed that in the beginning of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change their conduct, and act with vigour, Demosthenes says expressly, that he intends to speak no more on that subject: and yet this second part is entirely taken up with it: and lastly, there are some passages in the second part, which I suspect do not agree to the particular time, when the first oration against Philip was pronounced: (and I imagine that some editors were sensible of this, by their placing the Olynthiac orations, before this which is called the first Philippic) these passages I shall take notice of as they occur.

As to any similitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no more than what runs through all these orations, and may be accounted for, from the similitude of the subject, without joining them.——But if this second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of Olynthus, (for this city was taken the year before the Archonship of Themistocles) how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it?——It had just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation; and as it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have kept it out of view on purpose. Though perhaps he does hint at it obscurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe by and by.

[D] *Effectual provision.* In the Greek it is——*ἀνὰ τὴν ἐμὴν*

Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by actions. And in my opinion, your plan of operation, and every thing relating to your armament, will be much more happily adjusted, if the situation of the country which is to be the scene of action, be taken into the account; and if you reflect, that the winds and seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of Philip's conquests; that he watches the blowing [E] of the Etesians, and the severity of the winter, and forms his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our forces. It is your part,

*ἀπὸν ἀπὸν ἡσποτονισαί*—*chuse those things which may be agreeable to you.* I own I do not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best, would of consequence enable them to oppose Philip effectually. Perhaps it might be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them against following the bent of their inclinations.——If we should make a very small alteration in the text, and for *ἀπὸν* read *ἀπὸν*—*those things which may be sufficient for your purposes*; I apprehend the sense would be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty to translate after this reading.

[E] *Of the Etesians.* Winds which blew regularly every year at the rising of the dog-star; when the Greeks were obliged to retire from action, on account of the excessive heats, and which, as they blew from the North, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon; or sending any forces to those parts, which were the seat of Philip's wars at first.

then to consider this, and not to carry on the war by occasional detachments, (they will ever arrive too late) but by a regular army constantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and the adjacent islands; in which there are ports and provisions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in abundance. As to the season of the year, in which we may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in no danger from the winds, either upon the coast to which we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours where we may put in for provisions—this will be easily discovered. In what manner, and at what time our forces are to act, their general will determine, according to the junctures of affairs. What you are to perform, on your part, is contained in the decree I have now proposed. And if you will be persuaded, Athenians! first, to raise these supplies which I have recommended, then, to proceed to your own preparations, your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly to confine your forces, by a law, to that service which is appointed to them; reserving the care and distribution of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining into the conduct of  
the



the general ; then, your time will be no longer wasted in continual debates, upon the same subject, and scarcely to any purpose ; then, you will deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues. For his arms are now supported, by seizing and making prizes of those who pass the seas.—But is this all ?—No.—You will also be secure from his attempts: [F] not as when some

[F] *Not as when some time since, &c.* If this be really a part of the first Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Thermopylae: (else the orator could not have distinguished them into those which happened *some time ago*, and that committed *lately*) Now I cannot tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility, with the other parts of Philip's conduct, at that time. There was a peace subsisting between him and the Athenians, which he affected to observe, and so far does he appear from making any open and professed attack upon them, that in the taking of Potidaea and Pydna, he would not act as principal, but as ally to the Olynthians ; and when the cities were taken, dismissed the Athenian garrisons, with all imaginable respect and honour ; and upon all occasions, courted and cajoled the Athenians. This then is one of those passages, which I suspect do not agree to the particular time, when the first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose, that this which I call the second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, (and which was spoken to engage the Athenians, to defend the islanders and the cities of the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip) then all the difficulty vanishes. The Hostilities  
here



26 PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.

some time since, he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains : not as when he surprized your vessels at Geraſtus, and ſpoiled them of an unſpeakable quantity of riches : not as when lately, he made a deſcent on the coaſt of Marathon, and carried off [G] our ſacred galley : while you could neither oppoſe theſe inſults, nor detach your forces at ſuch junctures as were thought convenient.

And now, Athenians ! what is the reaſon, (think ye) that the public [H] Feſtivals in honour of Minerva and of Bacchus, are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot

here mentioned agree very well to a time of open war. Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus was taken, that the Athenians declared war againſt Philip in form ; and we find that immediately upon this, he attacked them and their tributary ſtates with ſuch fury, that they were ſoon glad to ſue for peace.

[G] *Our ſacred galley.* There were two of theſe appropriated to religious ceremonies, [and all extraordinary emergencies and occaſions of the ſtate] the Paralian and the Salaminian. Harpocration underſtands here the Paralian.

TOUR.

[H] *Feſtivals, &c.* For the Panathenaea and Dionyſia, (as theſe feſtivals are called in the original) I refer the reader to Potter, and other writers on the antiquities of Greece.

of

of men of eminence, or of persons less distinguished : (festivals, which cost more treasure than is usually expended upon a whole navy ; and more numbers and greater preparations, than any one perhaps, ever cost) while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegasæ, that to Potidaea. The reason is this : every thing relating to the former, is ascertained by law ; and every one of you knows long before, who is [I] to conduct the several entertainments in each tribe ; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that when any accident alarms us, first, [K] we appoint our Trierarchs ;

[I] *To conduct, &c.* In the original it is *who is the Choraegus*, (that is the citizen who provided the music, of which each tribe had a band) *and the Gymnasiarch*, (he who presided over the wrestlers, and provided what was necessary for that entertainment.)

[K] *We appoint our Trierarchs.* The rich citizens who were obliged not only to command, but to equip a vessel of war, at their own expence (either severally, or jointly) for the service of the public. As this was an office of great expence, it was allowed to any one who was nominated,

rarchs ; then we allow them the EXCHANGE ; then the supplies are considered. These points once settled, [L] we resolve to man our fleet with strangers and foreigners ; then, find it necessary to supply their place ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are failing to defend, the enemy is already master of : for the time of action, we spend in preparing : and the junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irresolute measures. These forces too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raised, when put to the proof, plainly discover their insufficiency. By these

nominated, to point out some citizen richer than himself, and to desire he might be substituted in his place, provided he was willing to exchange fortunes with that citizen, and then to take upon him the office of Trierarch. This is what Demosthenes calls *allowing the exchange*, [which in its nature must have occasioned confusion and delay.]

For a fuller account of these Trierarchs, &c. I refer the reader to Potter's *Archæ*.

[L] *We resolve to man our fleet with strangers, &c.* *Μετοχοί*, which I translate *Strangers*, were those foreigners who were permitted to sojourn at Athens, on certain conditions.

This whole passage is an exact description of the proceedings of the Athenians in defence of Olynthus, and of the event. I had it in view, when I observed that possibly we might find some obscure allusions to that affair.

means,



means, hath he arrived to such a pitch of insolence, as to send [M] a letter to the Euboeans, conceived in such terms as these.

\* \* \* *The LETTER is read.*

What hath now been read, is for the most part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very agreeable in the recital. But if by suppressing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themselves could be prevented, then the sole concern of a public speaker should be, to please. If, on the contrary, these unseasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it is shameful, Athenians, to deceive yourselves, and by deferring the consideration of every thing

[M] *A letter to the Euboeans, &c.* This letter has not descended to us. It is probable from the context, that he expressed in it a contempt for the Athenian power, and insisted how little dependance the Euboeans could have on that state. And if this be so, it confirms an observation, which I made before (see a note on page 5.) viz. that the Athenians had as yet given Philip no remarkable opposition in Euboea.—The letter must have been written, when Philip began to raise commotions in that island, in order to make himself master of it. I am induced to think, both from history and Demosthenes, that he did not make any attempts of this kind, so early as the first Philippic, and therefore, that this is no part of that oration.

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disagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the same absolute authority, with which a general leads on his forces: that the course of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their measures. But you, Athenians, although [N] possessed of the greatest power of all kinds, ships, infantry, cavalry, and treasure; yet to this day, have never employed any of them seasonably; but are ever last in the field. Just [O] as barbarians engage at boxing, so you make war with Philip: for when one of these receives a blow, that blow engages him: if he is struck in another part, to that part

[N] *Possessed of the greatest power, &c.* They could then command three hundred ships of war, and those capable of engaging a navy of double that number; they had twenty thousand foot, and two thousand eight hundred horse: and their revenue amounted to above twelve hundred talents. TOUR. and MOUNT.

[O] *As barbarians, &c.* The learned reader will find a beautiful passage in Aulus Gellius, (l. 3. c. 27.) where on the contrary, a man of true prudence who engages in the business and dangers of the world, is compared to a skilful boxer, who is ever attentive to defend himself and annoy his adversary. TOUR.

his

his hands are shifted : but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist—— for this, he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, you resolve to send forces thither ; if in Thermopylae, thither ; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, [P] no wise provisions ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise, in execution, or already crowned with success. This might have formerly been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted.

It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition. For were he to sit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you, who, I think, would be unmoved [Q] at those trans-

[P] *No wise provisions, &c.* I have followed the reading which Mr. Mounteney adopts Περὶ τῶν προπαρασκευασμάτων, &c. instead of ἑτοιμασμάτων.

[Q] *At those transactions, &c.* The taking of Pydna and

transactions, which have branded our state with the odious marks of infamy, cowardise, and all that is base. But as he still pursues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly, he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me it is astonishing, that none of you [R] looks back to the beginning of this war, and considers that we engaged in it to chastise the insolence of Philip ; but that now it is become

and Potidaea, and Amphipolis, may warrant what the orator here says. Yet I would chuse to apply it to their suffering Olynthus by their misconduct to fall into the power of Philip.

[R] *Looks back to the beginning, &c.* I shall trouble the reader but with one argument more, in favour of my suspicion, that this is no part of the first Philippic. The passage I now quote, I cannot think, is applicable to the transactions of the Athenians and Philip, before his attempt on Thermopylae: when (from the time of Argæus's death) they acted against each other only indirectly ; and instead of punishing Philip, the Athenians could not even prevail upon themselves to defend those dominions which they claimed as their own.—But it is a very exact description of what happened after their declaration of war against Philip, which succeeded the taking of Olynthus: for this declaration was made from a sense of the danger of Philip's growing power, a resentment of his infractions, and a resolution to reduce him: and yet they were quickly obliged to defend themselves against farther attempts.

a de-

a defensive war, to secure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating these attempts is manifest, unless some power rises to oppose him. But if we wait in expectation of this, if we send out armaments composed of empty galleys, and those hopes with which some speaker hath flattered you ; can you then think your interests well secured ? shall we not embark ? shall we not sail, with at least a part of our domestic force ; now, since we have not hitherto ? but where shall we make our descent ?——Let us but engage in the enterprise, and the war itself, Athenians, will shew us where he is weakest. But if we sit at home, listening to the mutual invectives and accusations of our orators ; we cannot expect, no, not the least success, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole be not present, the favour of the Gods, and the kindness of fortune attend to fight upon our side : but when we send out a general, and an insignificant decree, and the hopes of our speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike our allies with deadly apprehensions. For it is not, it is not possible for any one man to per-

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form



form every thing you desire. He may promise, and harangue, and accuse this or that person : but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a general who commanded a wretched collection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated ; when there are persons here, who in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falsehoods, and when you lightly engage in any resolution, just from their suggestions ; what must be the consequence ? How then shall these abuses be removed ?——By offering yourselves, Athenians, to execute the commands of your general, to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return : so as not only to hear how your affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. But now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you, to answer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life, by once engaging his enemy. No ; they chuse the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors should die by the sentence of the law. Generals should meet their fate bravely in the field.

Then,

PHILIPPIC THE FIRST. 35

Then, *as to your own conduct*—— some wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedemonians, and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes, and [s] the dissolution of some free states. Others assure us, he hath sent an embassy [T] to the KING; others, that [U] he is fortifying places in Illyria. Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many such visionary prospects, as he sees no power rising to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I cannot be persuaded that he hath so taken his measures, that the weakest among us know what he is next to do :

[s] *The dissolution, &c.* Wherever the Lacedemonians had power, they were always for establishing Oligarchies, as has been observed in the preface to these orations.

[T] *To the king.* So the king of Persia was called.——The intent of this embassy was supposed to be, to make such demands, as must produce a war with the Persian, which Isocrates had exhorted him to very early.

[U] *He is fortifying places in Illyria.* Possibly these rumours were spread by Philip's friends, to persuade the Athenians, that his views and schemes were removed to a great distance from Athens.

(for it is the weakest among us who spread these rumours)—Let us disregard them: let us be persuaded of this; that he is our enemy, that he hath spoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been subject to his insolence, that whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved against us, and that all the resource left, is in ourselves, that if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage him here——let us be persuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination, then we shall be freed from those idle tales. For we are not to be solicitous to know what particular events will happen; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unless you grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians.

I, on my part, have never upon any occasion chosen to court your favour, by speaking any thing but what I was convinced would serve you. And on this occasion, I have freely declared my sentiments, without art, and without reserve. I should have been glad indeed, that as it is for your advantage to have your true interest laid before you, so I might be assured that he who  
layeth

layeth it before you, would share the advantage : for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the consequence with respect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their use. And of all those opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen, which will best advance the general weal !

*End of the* FIRST PHILIPPIC.



PHILIPIC THE FIRST  
Lecture in the year 1794, at the  
University of Cambridge, in the  
Hall of the University, before  
the President, and the  
Fellowes of the University.  
By  
OLYNTHEAC ORATION.  
PUBLISHED  
Tenth Year after the First PHILIPIC.  
LONDON  
ARCHONSHIP of CALLIMACHUS  
Fourth Year of the Hundred and Second  
Olympiad  
and the Twelfth of PHILIP'S REIGN.  
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THE FIRST  
OLYNTIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED

Four Years after the FIRST PHILIPPIC,  
IN THE  
ARCHONSHIP of CALLIMACHUS,  
THE  
Fourth Year of the Hundred and Seventh  
OLYMPIAD,  
and the Twelfth of PHILIP's REIGN.

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## INTRODUCTION.

*THE former Oration does not appear to have had any considerable effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who probably recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favourably heard. In the mean time, this prince pursued his ambitious designs. When he found himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to such remote parts, as he might reduce without alarming the states of Greece. And at the same time, he revenged himself upon the Athenians, by making himself master of some places which they laid claim to. At length his success emboldened him to declare those intentions which he had long entertained secretly against the Olynthians.*

*Olynthus (a city of Thrace possessed by Greeks originally from Chalcis a town of Euboea and colony*



## INTRODUCTION.

colony of Athens) commanded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty two cities. It had arisen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable contests both with Athens and Lacedemon. Nor did the Olynthians shew great regard to the friendship of Philip when he first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to secure the possession of it. For they did not scruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy; and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens, against him, which he by secret practices found means to defeat. But as he was yet scarcely secure upon his throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he courted, or rather purchased the alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession of Anthemus, a city, which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with them, and afterwards, by that of Pydna and Potidaea; which their joint forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be influenced by gratitude towards such a benefactor. The rapid progress of his arms and his glaring acts of perfidy alarmed them exceedingly. He had already made some inroads on their territories, and now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore dispatched

## INTRODUCTION.

*patched ambassadors to Athens, to propose an alliance, and request assistance against a power which they were equally concerned to oppose.*

*Philip affected the highest resentment at this step; alledged their mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace, inveighed against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the conspirators; and under pretence of punishing their infractions pursued his hostilities with double vigour, made himself master of some of their cities, and threatened the capital with a siege.*

*In the mean time the Olynthians pressed the Athenians for immediate succours. Their ambassadors opened their commission in an assembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to, or to reject their demand. As the importance of the occasion increased the number of speakers, the elder orators debated the affair before Demosthenes arose. In the following oration therefore he speaks as to a people already informed, urges the necessity of joining with the Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by powerful arguments; lays open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their dreadful*

## INTRODUCTION.

*dreadful apprehensions of his power. He concludes with recommending to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put an end to all domestic dissensions.*

THE

[A] THE FIRST  
OLYNTHIAC ORATION.

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**I**N many instances, (Athenians!) have the Gods, in my opinion, manifestly declared their favour to this state: nor is it least observable in this present juncture. For that an enemy should arise against Philip, on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconsiderable power, and, what is of most importance, so determined upon the war, that they

[A] I have disposed the Olynthiac orations in the order pointed out by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. And it plainly appears that this should precede the others, for in this, Demosthenes solicits the immediate conclusion of an alliance with Olynthus: in the others, he supposes the alliance already concluded, and insists only on the necessity of effectually fulfilling their engagements.

consider



consider any accommodation with him, first as insidious, next, as the downfal of their country: this seems no less than the gracious interposition of Heaven itself. It must, therefore, be our care, (Athenians!) that we ourselves may not frustrate this goodness. For it must reflect disgrace, nay the foulest infamy upon us, if we appear to have thrown away not those states and territories only which we once commanded, but those alliances and favourable incidents which fortune hath provided for us.

To begin on this occasion with a display of Philip's power, or to press you to exert your vigour, by motives drawn from hence, is, in my opinion, quite improper. And why? Because whatever may be offered upon such a subject, sets him in an honourable view, but seems to me, as a reproach to our conduct. For the higher his exploits have arisen above his former estimation, the more must the world admire him: while your disgrace hath been the greater, the more your conduct hath proved unworthy of your state. These things therefore I shall pass by. He indeed, who examines justly, must find the source of all his greatness here, not in himself. But the services he hath here received, from those  
whose

whose public administration hath been devoted to his interest ; those services which you must punish, I do not think it seasonable to display. There are other points, of more moment for you all to hear ; and which must excite the greatest abhorrence of him, in every reasonable mind.—These I will lay before you.

And now, should I call him perjured and perfidious, and not point out the instances of this his guilt, it might be deemed the mere virulence of malice, and with justice. Nor will it engage too much of your attention, to hear him fully and clearly convicted, from a full and clear detail of all his actions. And this I think useful upon two accounts : first, that he may appear, as he really is, treacherous and false ; and then, that they who are struck with terror, as if Philip was something more than human, may see that he hath exhausted all those artifices to which he owes his present elevation ; and that his affairs are now ready to decline. For I myself, (Athenians !) should think Philip really to be dreaded and admired, if I saw him raised by honourable means. But I find, upon reflection, that at the time when certain persons drove out the Olynthians from this assembly, when  
desirous

# 48 OLYNTHIAC THE FIRST.

desirous of conferring with you, he began with abusing our simplicity by his promise of surrendering Amphipolis, and executing the [B] secret article of his treaty, then so much spoken of: that, after this, he courted the friendship of the Olynthians by seizing Potidaea, where we were rightful sovereigns, despoiling us his former allies, and giving them possession: that, but just now, he gained the Thessalians, by promising to give up [c] Magnesia; and for their ease, to take the whole conduct of the Phocian war upon himself. In a word, there are no people who have ever made the least use of him, but have suffered by his subtilty: his present greatness being

[B] *The secret article, &c.* When Philip had declared Amphipolis a free city, the Athenians who were desirous of recovering it, sent ambassadors to Philip to solicit his assistance for that purpose: and on this condition promised to make him master of Pydna. But lest the people of Pydna who were averse to Philip's government, should take the alarm, the whole negotiation was transacted secretly in the senate, without being referred as usual to the assembly of the people.—This account Ulpian and Suidas cite from Theopompus.

[c] *Magnesia.* He had made himself master of this city, when he marched into Theffaly against the Tyrants. The Theffalians remonstrated against this proceeding, but suffered themselves to be amused by his assurances that he would give it up: while he really determined to keep possession of it.

TOUR.  
wholly



wholly owing to his deceiving those who were unacquainted with him, and making them the instruments of his success. As these states therefore raised him while each imagined he was promoting some interest of theirs ; these states must also reduce him to his former meanness, as it now appears that his own private interest was the end of all his actions.

Thus then, Athenians ! is Philip circumstanced. If not, let the man stand forth, who can prove to me, I should have said to this assembly, that I have asserted these things falsely ; or that they whom he hath deceived in former instances, will confide in him for the future ; or that the Thessalians, who have been so basely, so undeservedly [D] enslaved, would not gladly embrace their freedom.— If there be any one among you, who acknowledges all this, yet thinks that Philip will support his power, as he hath secured places of

[D] *Enslaved.* When Philip had dispossessed the Tyrants of Thessaly, he began to set himself up in their place ; but not by open force. He was so compleat a master of dissimulation, appeared so gentle, so affable, so humane, so amiable, even to the conquered, that the Thessalians gave themselves up to him, with an entire confidence : which he knew how to take the advantage of. TOUR.

E

strength,



strength, convenient ports, and other like advantages ; he is deceived. [E] For when forces join in harmony and affection, and one common interest unites the confederating powers, then they share the toils with alacrity, they endure the distresses, they persevere. But when extravagant ambition, and lawless power, (as in his case) have aggrandized a single person ; the first pretence, the slightest accident, overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground. For it is not, no, Athenians ! it is not possible to found a lasting power upon injustice, perjury, and treachery. These may perhaps succeed for once ; and borrow for a while from hope, a gay and flourishing appearance. But time

[E] *For when forces, &c.* I need not take notice to the learned reader, how highly this passage is ornamented in the original, by the beauty of the metaphors, the grandeur of the composition, and the fineness of the sentiment. The word *ἀνχαίριος*, by which he expresses the downfall of Philip, I apprehend, is not to be rendered into our, or perhaps any other language. It gives us the idea of a generous steed, tossing his mane, impatient of the bit, and casting his rider to the ground : which at once expresses the subjection of the states conquered by Philip, their impatience of his government, their bold effort to regain their liberty, and the downfall of their master. The change of tenses [*ἀνχαίριος καὶ διέκρου*] adds greatly to the force and beauty : it seems as if the destruction of Philip was too quick for words.

betrays

betrays their weakness ; and they fall into ruin of themselves. For as in structures of every kind, the lower parts should have the greatest firmness, so the grounds and principles of actions should be just and true. But these advantages are not found in the actions of Philip.

I say then, that you should dispatch succours to the Olynthians : (and the more honourably and expeditiously this is proposed to be done, the more agreeably to my sentiments) and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some, and to enliven the spirit already raised in others: (for it hath actually been resolved to demand the restitution of [F] Pagasae, and to assert their claim to Magnesia.) And let it be your care, Athenians, that our ambassadors may not depend only upon words, but give them some action to display, by taking the field in a manner worthy of the state, and engaging in the war with vigour. For words, if not accompanied by actions, must ever appear vain and contemptible ; and particularly when they come from us, whose prompt abilities, and well-

[F] *Pagasae.* A city of Thessaly, which he had made himself master of five years before. Toua.

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known eminence in speaking, make us to be always heard with the greater suspicion.

Would you indeed regain attention and confidence, your measures must be greatly changed, your conduct totally reformed; your fortunes, your persons, must appear devoted to the common cause; your utmost efforts must be exerted. If you will act thus, as your honour and your interest requires; then Athenians! you will not only discover the weakness and insincerity of the confederates of Philip, but the ruinous condition of his own kingdom will also be laid open. The power and sovereignty of Macedon may have some weight indeed, when joined with others. Thus, when you marched against the Olynthians under the conduct of Timotheus, it proved an useful ally; and when united with the Olynthians against Potidaea, it added something to their force; just now, when the Thessalians were in the midst of disorder, sedition, and confusion, it aided them against the family of their tyrants: (as in every case, any, even a small accession of strength, is, in my opinion, of considerable effect.) But of itself, unsupported, it is infirm, it is totally distempered: for by all those glaring exploits, which have given him this  
appa-



apparent greatness, his wars, his expeditions, he hath rendered it yet weaker than it was naturally. For you are not to imagine, that the inclinations of his subjects are the same with those of Philip. He thirsts for glory : this is his object, this he eagerly pursues, thro' toils and dangers of every kind ; despising safety and life, when compared with the honour of atchieving such actions as no other prince of Macedon could ever boast of. But his subjects have no part in this ambition. Harassed by those various excursions he is ever making, they groan under perpetual calamity ; torn from their business, and their families, and without opportunity to dispose of that pittance which their toils have earned ; as all commerce is shut out from the coast of Macedon, by the war.

Hence one may perceive how his subjects in general are affected to Philip. But then, his auxiliaries, and the [G] soldiers of his Phalanx, have the character of wonderful forces, trained compleatly to war. And yet I can affirm, upon the credit of a person from that

[G] *The Soldiers of his Phalanx.* In the original *παιζέταις*, fellow-soldiers. A term invented for the encouragement of this body, and to reconcile them to all the severities of their duty. Such kind of familiarities cost but little, and are often of considerable service to a prince.

TOUR.



country, incapable of falsehood, that they have no such superiority. For, as he assures me, if any man of experience in military affairs, should be found among them; he dismisses all such, from an ambition of having every great action ascribed wholly to himself: (for besides his other passions, the man has this ambition in the highest degree.) And if any person, from a sense of decency, or other virtuous principle, betrays a dislike of his daily intemperance, and riotings, and [H] obscenities, he loses all favour and regard; so that none are left about him, but wretches, who subsist on rapine and flattery, and who when heated with wine, do not scruple to descend to such instances of revelry, as it would shock you to repeat. Nor can the truth of this be doubted: for they whom we all conspired to drive from hence, as infamous

[H] *Obscenities.* In the original χορδαϊσμός. Certain lascivious dances, so called from the name of a satyr, said to have invented them. Theophrastus mentions it as a part of the character of a man utterly abandoned, that when inflamed by wine, he is even capable of dancing the *Chordax*.

TOUR.

In this description of the dissolute manners of Philip and his court, one would imagine, that the orator had aggravated a little; yet we have the whole description still more heightened in history. The learned reader will find it in Athenaeus. Book 6.

TOUR.

and

and abandoned, Callias [1] the public servant, and others of the same stamp; buffoons, composers of lewd songs, in which they ridicule their companions: these are the persons whom he entertains and caresses. And these things, Athenians, trifling as they may appear to some, are to men of just discernment, great indications of the weakness both of his mind and fortune. At present, his successes cast a shade over them; for prosperity hath great power to veil such baseness from observation. But let his arms meet with the least disgrace, and all his actions will be exposed. This is a truth, of which he himself, Athenians! will, in my opinion, soon convince you, if the Gods favour us, and you exert your vigour. For as in our bodies, while a man is in health, he feels no effect of any inward weakness; but when disease attacks him, every thing becomes sensible, in the vessels, in the joints, or in whatever other part his frame may be disordered; so in states and monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, their defects es-

[1] *The public servant.* One of those public slaves, who attended the Athenian generals in the field. They chose slaves for this business, that if there was occasion for their evidence on any public enquiry into the conduct of the war, they might be put to the torture; from which free citizens were exempted.

ULF.

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cape the general eye ; but when it once approaches their own territory, then they are all detected.

If there be any one among you, who from Philip's good fortune, concludes that he must prove a formidable enemy ; such reasoning is not unworthy a man of prudence. Fortune hath great influence, nay, the whole influence, in all human affairs : but then, were I to chuse, I should prefer the fortune of Athens, (if you yourselves will assert your own cause, with the least degree of vigour) to this man's fortune. For we have many better reasons to depend upon the favour of heaven, than this man. But our present state is, in my opinion, a state of total inactivity ; and he who will not exert his own strength, cannot apply for aid, either to his friends or to the gods. It is not then surprising, that he who is himself ever amidst the dangers and labours of the field ; who is every where ; whom no opportunity escapes ; to whom no season is unfavourable ; should be superior to you, who are wholly engaged in contriving delays, and framing decrees, and enquiring after news. I am not surpris'd at this, for the contrary must have been surprising : if we, who never act in any single instance, as  
becomes



becomes a state engaged in war, should conquer him, who in every instance, acts with an indefatigable vigilance. This indeed surprises me ; that you, who [K] fought the cause of Greece against Lacedemon, and generously declined all the many favourable opportunities of aggrandizing yourselves ; who, to secure their property to others, parted with your own, by your contributions ; and bravely exposed yourselves in battle ; should now decline the service of the field, and delay the necessary supplies, when called to the defence of your own rights : that you, in whom Greece in general, and each particular state, hath often found protection, should sit down quiet spectators of your own private wrongs. This I say surprises me : and one thing more ; that not a man among you can reflect how long a time we have been at war with Philip, and in what measures, this time hath all been wasted. You are not to be informed, that, in delaying, in hoping that others would assert our cause, in accusing each other, in impeaching, then again entertaining hopes, in such measures as are now pursued, that time hath been entirely wasted. And are you so

[K] See note on Philip. i. page 2.

devoid



devoid of apprehension, as to imagine, when our state hath been reduced from greatness to wretchedness, that the very same conduct will raise us from wretchedness to greatness? No! this is not reasonable, it is not natural; for it is much easier to defend, than to acquire dominions. But now, the war hath left us nothing to defend: we must acquire. And to this work, you yourselves are only equal.

This, then, is my opinion. You should raise supplies; you should take the field with alacrity. Prosecutions should be all deferred till you have recovered your affairs; then, let each man's sentence be determined by his actions: honour those who have deserved applause; let the iniquitous meet their punishment. Let there be no pretences, no deficiencies on your part; for you cannot bring the actions of others to a severe scrutiny, unless you have first been careful of your own duty. What indeed can be the reason, think ye, that every man whom ye have sent out at the head of an army, hath deserted your service, and fought out some private expedition? (if we must speak ingenuously of these our generals also,) The reason is this: When engaged

gaged in the service of the state, the prize for which they fight, is yours. Thus, should Amphipolis be now taken, you instantly possess yourselves of it: the commanders have all the danger, the rewards they do not share. But in their private enterprises, the dangers are less; the acquisitions are all shared by the generals and soldiers; as were [L] Lampfacus, Sigaeum, and those vessels which they plundered. Thus are they all determined by their private interest. And when you turn your eyes to the wretched state of your affairs, you bring your generals to a trial; you grant them leave to speak; you hear the necessities they plead; and then acquit them. Nothing then remains for us, but to be distracted with endless contests and divisions: (some urging these, some, those measures,) and to feel the public calamity. For in former times, Athenians,

[L] *Lampfacus*, *Sigaeum*, etc. Chares received these two cities of Asia Minor, from the Setrap Artabazus, in return for his service, (see note on Ph. i. p. 8.) This general, instead of employing the fleet he had been intrusted with, for the recovery of Amphipolis, according to his instructions, joined with some pirates, and committed considerable outrages in the Aegean Sea. He was accused of this at his return, but escaped, by flying from public justice, until his faction grew powerful enough to reinstate him in his former command.

TOUR.

nians, you divided into [M] classes, to raise supplies. Now the business of these classes is to govern; each hath an orator at its head, and a general, who is his creature; the THREE HUNDRED are assistants to these, and the rest of you divide, some to this, some to that party. You must rectify these disorders: you must appear yourselves: you must leave the power of speaking, of advising, and of acting, open to every citizen. But if you suffer some persons to issue out their mandates, as with [N] a royal authority; if one set

[M] *Classes, etc.* [Συμμορίαι.] Each of the ten tribes elected one hundred and twenty of the richer citizens, out of their own body, who were obliged to perform the public duties, and to raise supplies for the exigencies of state, out of their private fortunes. The twelve hundred persons thus chosen, were divided into two parts, and each of these into ten classes called Συμμορίαι. These were again subdivided into two parts, according to the estates of those who composed them. And thus out of the ten first classes were appointed the THREE HUNDRED, that is, such a number of the wealthy citizens, who were on all occasions to supply the commonwealth with money; and with the rest of the twelve hundred to perform all extraordinary duties in their turns—It seems however, that in the time of Demosthenes, these classes sought pretences to avoid their duty, and contended for the power of throwing the whole weight of public business on each other.

[N] *As with a royal, &c.* Eubulus, Aristophon, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, governed every thing with an absolute



set of men be forced to fit out ships, to raise supplies, to take up arms; while others are only to make decrees against them, without any charge, any employment besides; it is not possible that any thing can be effected seasonably and successfully: for the injured party will ever desert you; and then your sole resource will be, to make them feel your resentment instead of your enemies.

To sum up all, my sentiments are these: — That every man should contribute in proportion to his fortune; that all should take the field in their turns, until all have served; that whoever appears in this place, should be allowed to speak; and that when you give your voices, your true interest only should determine you, not the authority of this or the other speaker. Pursue this course, and then your applause will not be lavished on some orator, the moment he concludes, you yourselves will share it hereafter, when you find how greatly you have advanced the interests of your country.

absolute power, in the assemblies; the conduct of military affairs was entirely ingrossed by Diopithes, Menestheus, Leosthenes, and Chares. Thus the administration of affairs was shared among a few men as it were by lot; so that the popular government degenerated into an Oligarchy. See Plutar. in Phocion. TOUR.

*End of the* FIRST OLYNTHIAC.



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THE SECOND  
OLYNTHIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED

In the same YEAR.

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# INTRODUCTION.

## THE SECOND.

To remove the impressions made on the mind  
of the Abolitionists by the late Convention,  
Dana and other popular leaders in the in-  
terests of Philip, rose up, and opposed the  
propositions of the Convention, with all their en-  
ergetic power. Their opposition, however, proved in-  
effective: for the strongly avowed, that it  
was not to be for the Convention; and  
their gaudy and the thousand forms, were  
accordingly rejected, under the command of  
the Convention. But this action, which entirely  
of circumstances, and commenced by a general  
no great reputation, could not be of considerable  
service; and were better rejected, and hence-  
forth directed by the Convention than the Ab-  
olitionists themselves. In the mean time the  
progress of Philip's cause was not

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**O remove the impression made on the minds of the Athenians by the preceding oration, Demades and other popular leaders in the interests of Philip, rose up, and opposed the propositions of Demosthenes, with all their eloquence. Their opposition, however, proved ineffectual: for the assembly decreed, that relief should be sent to the Olynthians: and thirty gallies and two thousand forces, were accordingly dispatched, under the command of Chares. But these succours, consisting entirely of mercenaries, and commanded by a general of no great reputation, could not be of considerable service: and were besides suspected, and scarcely less dreaded by the Olynthians than the Macedonians themselves. In the mean time the progress of Philip's arms, could meet with  
F little



## INTRODUCTION.

*little interruption. He reduced several places in the region of Chalcis, razed the fortress of Zeira; and having twice defeated the Olynthians in the field, at last shut them up in their city. In this emergency, they again applied to the Athenians, and pressed for fresh and effectual succours. In the following oration, Demosthenes endeavours to support this petition; and to prove, that both the honour and the interest of the Athenians, demanded their immediate compliance. As the expence of the armament, was the great point of difficulty, he recommends the abrogation of such laws, as prevented the proper settlement of the funds necessary for carrying on a war of such importance. The nature of these laws will come immediately to be explained.*

*It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that other speakers had arose before Demosthenes, and inveighed loudly against Philip. Full of the national prejudices however, or disposed to flatter the Athenians in their notions of the dignity and importance of their state, they breathed nothing but indignation against the enemy, and possibly with some contempt of his present enterprises, proposed to the Athenians to correct his arrogance, by an invasion of his own kingdom. Demosthenes*

## INTRODUCTION.

*on the contrary, insists on the necessity of self-defence; endeavours to rouse his hearers from their security, by the terror of impending danger; and affects to consider the defence of Olynthus, as the last and only means of preserving the very being of Athens.*

## INTRODUCTION.

on the contrary, insists on the necessity of his  
 presence; and offers to render the defence of  
 OLYMPIA, at the last and only means of pre-  
 serving her from the danger of being  
 carried off by the force of numbers.

I Am by no means affected in the same  
 manner, Athenians! when I review the  
 state of our affairs, and when I attend  
 to those speakers who have now declared  
 their sentiments. They insist that we  
 should punish Philip: but our affairs re-  
 quire that we should now appear, warn us to guard  
 against the dangers which we our-  
 selves are threatened. Thus far therefore  
 I must differ from these speakers, that I  
 apprehend they have not proposed the pro-  
 per object of your attention. There was  
 a time indeed, I know it well, when the  
 state could have possessed her own do-  
 minions in security, and sent one her ar-  
 mies to assist chastisement on Philip. I

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## OLYNTHIAC THE SECOND.

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**I** Am by no means affected in the same manner, Athenians! when I review the state of our affairs, and when I attend to those speakers, who have now declared their sentiments. They insist, that we should punish Philip: but our affairs, situated as they now appear, warn us to guard against the dangers with which we ourselves are threatened. Thus far therefore I must differ from these speakers, that I apprehend they have not proposed the proper object of your attention. There was a time indeed, I know it well, when the state could have possessed her own dominions in security, and sent out her armies to inflict chastisement on Philip. I



myself have seen that time when we enjoyed such power. But now, I am persuaded we should confine ourselves to the protection of our allies. When this is once effected, then we may consider the punishment his outrages have merited. But 'till the first great point be well secured, it is weakness to debate about our more remote concernments.

And now, Athenians, if ever we stood in need of mature deliberation and counsel, the present juncture calls loudly for them. To point out the course to be pursued on this emergency, I do not think the greatest difficulty: but I am in doubt in what manner to propose my sentiments; for all that I have observed, and all that I have heard, convinces me, that most of your misfortunes have proceeded from a want of inclination to pursue the necessary measures! not from ignorance of them.

———Let me intreat you, that, if I now speak with an unusual boldness, ye may bear it: considering only, whether I speak truth, and with a sincere intention to advance your future interests: for you now see, that by some orators, who study but

to

## OLYNTIAC THE SECOND. 71

to gain your favour, our affairs have been reduced to the extremity of distress.

I think it necessary in the first place, to recal some late transactions to your thoughts.

— You may remember, Athenians, that about three or four years since, you received advice that Philip was in Thrace, and had laid siege to the fortress of Heraea. It was then the month of [A] November. Great commotions and debates arose: It was resolved, to send out forty gallies; that all citizens [B] under the age of five and forty, should themselves embark; and that sixty talents should be raised. Thus it was agreed; that year passed away; then came in the months [C] July, August, September.

F 4

[A] *Of November.* The reducing the Attic months to the Julian, hath occasioned some dispute among the learned. As I thought it best to make use of Roman names in the translation, I have followed the reduction of Scaliger.

[B] *Under the age of five and forty, &c.* This expresses their zeal, and their apprehensions of the danger: for by the laws of Athens, a citizen was exempted from military service at the age of forty; except on some very urgent occasion.

[C] *July, &c.* That is, the first months of the [next year: for the reader is to observe, that the Attic year

ber. In this last month, with great difficulty, when the mysteries had first been celebrated, you sent out [D] Charidemus, with just ten vessels unmanned, and five talents of silver. For when reports came of the sickness, and the death of Philip, (both of these were affirmed) you laid aside your intended armament, imagining, that at such a juncture there was no need of succours. And yet this was the very critical moment: for had they been dispatched with the same alacrity with which they were granted, Philip would not have then escaped, to become that formidable enemy he now appears.

year commenced on that new moon, whose full-moon immediately succeeded the summer-solstice.

[D] *Charidemus*. That is, the worst of all your generals: a foreigner, a soldier of fortune, who had sometimes fought against you, sometimes betrayed your cause, and who on many occasions, had proved himself unworthy of the confidence you reposed in him.

—— Monsieur Turreil translates this passage thus, *ce fut en ce dernier mois qu' IMMEDIATEMENT après la célébration des mystères, vous DEPECHATES d'ici Charidème, &c.* Here there are two unfortunate words which express haste and expedition: whereas, the description in the original, labours on in the slowest and heaviest manner possible. Every single word marks out the tediousness or the meanness of their armament.

But

But what was then done, cannot be amended. Now we have the opportunity of another war: that war I mean, which hath induced me to bring these transactions into view; that you may not once more fall into the same errors. How then shall we improve this opportunity? *This is the only question.* For if you are not resolved to assist with all the force you can command, you are really serving under Philip, you are fighting on his side. The Olynthians are a people, whose power was thought considerable. Thus were the circumstances of affairs: Philip could not confide in them; they looked with equal suspicion upon Philip. We and they then entered into mutual engagements of peace and alliance: this was a grievous embarrassment to Philip, that we should have a powerful state confederated with us, spies upon the incidents of his fortune. It was agreed, that we should by all means engage this people in a war with him. And now, what we all so earnestly desired, is effected: the manner, is of no moment. What then remains for us, Athenians, but to send immediate and effectual succours, I cannot see. For besides the disgrace that must attend us, if any of our interests are supinely



pinely disregarded; I have no small apprehensions of the consequence, (the [E] Thebans being thus disposed towards us, and the Phocians exhausted of their treasures) if Philip be left at full liberty to lead his armies into these territories, when his present enterprizes are accomplished. If any one among you can be so far immersed in indolence, as to suffer this, he must chuse to be witness of the misery of his own country rather than to hear of that which strangers suffer; and to seek assistants for himself, when it is now in his power to grant assistance to others. That this must be the consequence, if we do not exert ourselves on the present occasion, there can scarcely remain the least doubt among us.

But as to the necessity of sending succours, this, it may be said, we are agreed

[E] *The Thebans being, &c.* They had a mortal hatred to the Athenians, as they had favoured Lacedæmon after the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, and had lately taken part with the Phocians against them, in the sacred war. [And even before these times, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans strenuously contended for the utter extirpation of Athens.]

TOUR.

in;

## OLYNTIAC THE SECOND. 75

in; this is our resolution. But how shall we be enabled? that is the point to be explained.——Be not surprised, Athenians, if my sentiments on this occasion seem repugnant to the general sense of this assembly.——Appoint [F] magistrates for the inspection of your laws: not in order to enact any new laws; you have already a sufficient number; but to repeal those, whose ill effects you now experience. I mean the laws relating to the [G] theatrical funds (thus  
openly

[F] *Magistrates for, &c.* In the original *Νομοθετας*. So were those citizens called, who were intrusted by the people with the regulation of their laws. They were chosen by lot, to the number of 1001, that their votes might not be equal. Every citizen, at certain times, and in certain assemblies, had usually a right to complain of any law. The president of the assembly proposed the complaint to the people: five advocates were allowed to plead in defence of the law, and after hearing them, the people referred the affair to the *Νομοθηται*.

TOUR.

[G] *The theatrical funds.* The Athenians, as well as the other Greeks, were ever passionately fond of the entertainments of the theatre. Disputes for places soon became remarkably inconvenient, and called for a regulation. The Magistrates therefore, ordered that a small price should be paid for places, to reimburse the builders of the theatre, which as yet knew not that magnificence, which riches and luxury afterwards introduced. This purchasing of places, began to be  
com-

openly I declare it) and some about [H] the soldiery. By the first, the soldier's pay goes as theatrical expences to the useless and inactive; the others screen those from justice, who decline the service of the field; and thus damp the ardor of those disposed to serve us. When you have repealed these, and rendered it consistent with safety to advise you justly, then seek for some person to

complained of by the poorer citizens: and therefore Pericles, out of a pretended zeal for their interest; proposed, that a sum of money (which had been deposited in the treasury, after the war of Egina, when they had made a thirty years peace with Lacedemon, and was intended as a public resource in case of any invasion of Attica) should be distributed among the citizens, to defray the expence of their entertainments in time of peace only. The proposal and the restriction were both agreed to. But as all indulgencies of this kind, degenerate sooner or later, into licentiousness, the people began to consider this distribution as their unalienable property. And the very year of the Olynthiac orations, Eubulus a popular leader, of a party opposite to Demosthenes, prevailed to have a law passed, which forbade any man, on pain of death, to make a motion, or proposal of a decree, for restoring what was now called the theatrical funds, to the military, or any other public service. This is the law which Demosthenes here attacks.

[H] *About the soldiery.* The laws of Solon, exacted personal service from every citizen, with the utmost rigour.

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to propose [1] that decree, which you all are sensible the common good requires. But till this be done, expect not that any man will urge your true interest, when for urging your true interest, you repay him with destruction. Ye will never find such zeal: especially since the consequence can be only this; he who offers his opinion, and moves for your concurrence, suffers some unmerited calamity: but your affairs are not in the least advanced: nay, this additional inconvenience must arise, that for the future,

rigour. Those which the orator complains of, must have been made when the state began to be corrupted.

[1] *That decree, which, &c.* A decree for the alienation of the theatrical funds. While Eubulus's law was in force, such a decree could not be proposed. The usefulness and necessity of it however, the orator ventures to insinuate: for the penalty was not understood as extending to a man's barely declaring his sentiments, provided he did not make the motion in form. In the latter part of this oration, he seems to propose another method of avoiding the ill consequences of the law of Eubulus: and that is, that the theatrical distributions should be still continued; but that all those who were in public offices, and who usually received their several salaries and appointments, should now serve the state without fee or reward. The name only of these distributions would have then remained.



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it will appear more dangerous to advise you, than even at present. And the authors of these laws, should also be the authors of their repeal. For it is not just that the public favour should be bestowed on them, who in framing these laws, have greatly injured the community; and that the odium should fall on him, whose freedom and sincerity are of important service to us all.—Untill these regulations be made, you must not think any man so great, that he may violate these laws with impunity; or so devoid of reason, as to plunge himself into open and foreseen destruction.

And be not ignorant of this, Athenians; that a decree is of no significance, unless attended with resolution and alacrity to execute it. For were decrees of themselves sufficient to engage you to perform your duty; could they even execute the things which they enact; so many would not have been made, to so little, or rather to no good purpose; nor would the insolence of Philip have had so long a date. For if decrees can punish, he hath long since felt all their fury. But they have no such power: for tho' proposing and resolving be first in order; yet in force and efficacy,  
action

action is superior. Let this then be your principal concern; the others you cannot want: for you have men among you, capable of advising, and you are of all people, most acute in apprehending: and now, let your interest direct you, and it will be in your power to be as remarkable for acting. What season indeed, what opportunity do you wait for, more favourable than the present? or when will you exert your vigour, if not now, my countrymen? Hath not this man seized all those places that were ours? should he become master of [K] this country too, must we not sink into the lowest state of infamy? are not they whom we have promised to assist whenever they are engaged in war, now attacked themselves? Is he not our enemy? is he not in possession of our dominions? is he not a [L] barbarian? is he not every

[K] *Of this Country, &c.* That is, the country of Chalcis, where Philip took two and thirty cities, before he laid siege to Olynthus. **TOUR.**

[L] *A barbarian?* This was the term of reproach, which the Greeks applied to all other nations: nor were the Macedonians excepted. In the time of Xerxes, Alexander, King of Macedon, could not be admitted into

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every base thing words can express? If we are insensible to all this, if we almost aid his designs; heavens! can we then ask to whom the consequences are owing? Yes, I know full well, we never will impute them to ourselves. Just as in the dangers of the field: not one of those who fly, will accuse himself; he will rather blame the general, or his fellow-soldiers: [M] yet every single man that fled was accessory to the defeat; he who blames others, might have maintained his own post; and had every man maintained his, success must have ensued. Thus then, in the present

into the Olympic Games, untill he had proved his descent to be originally from Argos. And when he came over from the Persian Camp, to give the Greeks notice of the motions of Mardonius, he justified his perfidy by his antient descent from Greece: which he needed not to have had recourse to, if Macedon had not been then considered as part of the barbarian world.

TOUR.

[M] *Yet every single, &c.* The orator did not foresee, that in ten years after, he himself would be guilty of this very crime; be branded with a name of infamy, for casting away his shield at the battle of Chæroneæ; and have nothing to oppose to the reproaches of his enemies, but a weak and trifling pleasantry.

TOUR.

case;

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case; is there a man, whose counsel seems liable to objection? let the next rise, and not inveigh against him, but declare his own opinion. Doth another offer some more salutary counsel? pursue it, in the name of heaven! ——— “But then it is not pleasing.” ——— This is not the fault of the speaker; [N] unless, in that he hath

[N] *Unless in that he hath, &c.* This passage, which is translated pretty exactly from the original, seems at first view, to have something of a forced and unnatural air. Indeed it is not possible for us to perceive fully and clearly the strength and propriety of every part of these orations. To this it would be requisite to know the temper and disposition of the hearers, at that particular time when each of them was delivered; and also to have before us every thing said by other speakers in the debate. In many places, we find very plain allusions to the speeches of other orators. And it is not unreasonable to think, that there are other more obscure ones, which escape our observation. If we suppose, for instance, that, in the present debate, before Demosthenes arose, some other speaker had amused the people with flattering hopes, with professions of zeal and affection, with passionate exclamations, and prayers to the Gods for such and such instances of public success; while at the same time he neglected to point out such measures as were fit to be pursued, or perhaps recommended pernicious measures. ——— Upon such a supposition I say, this passage, considered as an indirect reproof of such a speaker, will perhaps appear to have sufficient force and propriety.



neglected to express his affection in prayers and wishes. To pray, is easy, Athenians; and in one petition may be collected as many instances of good fortune, as we please. To determine justly when affairs are to be considered, is not so easy. But what is most useful, should ever be preferred to that which is agreeable, where both cannot be obtained.

But if there be a man who will leave us the theatrical funds, and propose other subsidies for the service of the war, are we not rather to attend to him? I grant it, Athenians! if such a one can be found. But I should account it wonderful, if it ever did, if it ever can happen to any man on earth, that, while he lavishes his present possessions on unnecessary occasions, some future funds should be procured, to supply his real necessities. But such proposals find a powerful advocate in the breast of every hearer. So that nothing is so easy as to deceive one's self: for what we wish, that we readily believe: but such expectations are oftentimes inconsistent with our affairs. On this occasion therefore, let your affairs direct you; then, will you be enabled to take  
the

## OLYNTHIAC THE SECOND. 83

the field ; then, you will have your full pay. And men, whose judgments are well directed, and whose souls are great, could not support the infamy which must attend them, if obliged to desert any of the operations of a war, from the want of money : they could not, after snatching up their arms, and marching against the [o] Corinthians and [P] Megareans, suffer Philip to enslave

[o] *The Corinthians*: This alludes to an expedition that the Athenians had made about an age before. Some time after the Persian war, when the Greeks began to quarrel among themselves, Corinth and Megara had some dispute about their boundaries. The better to support their quarrel, the Megareans quitted the Lacedemonians, and entered into an alliance with Athens. But as this state was then engaged both in Egypt and Egina, the Corinthians imagined they would not be able to give any assistance ; and therefore invaded the territories of Megara. But the Athenians came immediately to the assistance of their allies, altho' they were obliged to commit the defence of their city to their old men and boys : and the Corinthians were repulsed. TOUR.

[P] *The Megareans*. This war happened twelve years after that mentioned in the preceding note. The Megareans, after having put an Athenian garrison to the sword, that was stationed in their territory, joined with Lacedemon, and even with Corinth their mortal enemy, against whom the Athenians had espoused their quarrel. This state, incensed at the ingratitude of their revolt,

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enslave the states of Greece, thro' the want of provisions for their forces.—I say not this wantonly, to raise the resentment of some among you. No ; I am not so unhappily perverse, as to study to be hated, when no good purpose can be answered by it : but it is my opinion, that every honest speaker should prefer the interest of the state to the favour of his hearers. This (I am assured, and perhaps you need not be informed) was the principle which actuated the public conduct of those of our ancestors who spoke in this assembly : (men, whom the present set of orators are ever ready to applaud, but whose example they by no means imitate :) such were Aristides, Nicias, the former Demosthenes, and Pericles. But since we have had speakers, who, before their public appearance, ask you : “ what do you desire ? what shall I propose ? how can I oblige you ? ” the in-

determined to reduce them to reason. They issued out a mandate, directing the Megareans to abstain from cultivating a piece of ground consecrated to Ceres and Proserpine ; and on their refusing to comply, published an edict, to exclude them from all commerce in Attica ; and bound their generals by an oath, to invade their territories once every year.

TOUR.

terest

OLYNTIAC THE SECOND. 85

terest of our country hath been sacrificed to momentary pleasure, and popular favour. Thus have we been distressed; thus have these men risen to greatness, and you sunk into disgrace.

And here let me intreat your attention to a summary account of the conduct of your ancestors, and of your own. I shall mention but a few things, and these well known: (for if you would pursue the way to happiness, you need not look abroad for leaders; our own countrymen point it out.) These our ancestors therefore, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence with which you are flattered, held the sovereignty of Greece with general consent, [Q] five and forty years;

[Q] *Five and forty years.* In Wolfius's edition it is 65. But this reading is found in other copies, and is confirmed by the parallel passage in the oration on regulating the commonwealth. The Orator computes from the death of Pausanias, when the supreme command was given to the Athenians, to the beginning of the Peloponesian war. Add to this the 27 years of that war, during which time the Athenians maintained their power, tho' not with consent: and the whole will be 72 years compleat, and part of the 73d year. Agreeably to this last calculation, Demosthenes says, in the



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years ; deposited above ten thousand talents in our public treasury ; kept the king of this country in that subjection, which a barbarian owes to Greeks ; erected monuments of many and illustrious actions, which they themselves achieved, by land and sea ; in a word, are the only persons who have transmitted to posterity, such glory as is superior to envy. Thus great do they appear in the affairs of Greece. Let us now view them within the city, both in their public and private conduct. And first, the edifices which their administrations have given us, their decorations of our temples, and the offerings which they deposited, are so numerous and so magnificent, that all the efforts of posterity cannot exceed them. Then, in private life, so exemplary was their moderation, their adherence to the ancient manners, so scrupulously exact, that if any of you ever discovered the house of Aristides, or Miltiades, or any of the illustrious men of those times, he must know that it was not distinguished by the least extraordi-

third Philippic, that the Athenians commanded in Greece 73 years. These two accounts are thus easily reconciled by distinguishing the times of the voluntary and the involuntary obedience of the Greeks. TOUR.

nary

OLYNTIAC THE SECOND. 87

nary splendor. For they did not so conduct the public business, as to aggrandize themselves ; their sole great object, was to exalt the state. And thus by their faithful attachment to Greece, by their piety to the Gods, and by that equality which they maintained among themselves, they were raised (and no wonder) to the summit of prosperity.

Such was the state of Athens at that time, when the men I have mentioned, were in power. But what is your condition, under those indulgent ministers who now direct us ? Is it the same, or nearly the same ?— Other things I shall pass over, tho' I might expatiate on them. Let it only be observed, that we are now, as you all see, left without competitors ; the [R] Lacedemonians lost ; the Thebans [s] engaged at home ; and not one of all the other states, of consequence sufficient to dispute the sovereignty with us. Yet at a time, when we might have enjoyed our own dominions in security,

[R] *The Lacedemonians lost.* The Battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa had entirely destroyed their power.

TOUR.

[s] *engaged, &c.* In the Phocian war.

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and have been the umpires in all disputes abroad ; our territories have been wrested from us, we have expended above one thousand five hundred talents to no purpose : the [T] allies which we gained in war, have been lost in time of peace ; and to this degree of power have we raised an enemy against ourselves. (For let the man stand forth, who can shew whence Philip hath derived his greatness, if not from us.)

“ Well ! if these affairs have but an unfavourable aspect, yet those within the city, are much more flourishing than ever.”

——Where are the proofs of this ? The walls which have been whitened ? the ways we have repaired ? the supplies of water ; and such trifles ?——Turn your eyes to the men, of whose administrations these are the

[T] *The allies, &c.* Ulpian and Wolfius understand this of the Peace, by which the Athenians consented that the People of Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and other Revolters, should all continue free. But it seems more natural to apply it to some prior events ; as the taking of Pydna and Potidaea, and other cities of Thrace, that were then subject to Athens, and which Philip made himself master of, after he had concluded a peace with the Athenians, in the second year of his reign.

TOUR.  
fruits,

fruits. Some of whom, from the lowest state of poverty, have arisen suddenly to affluence; some from meanness to renown: others have made their own private houses much more magnificent than the public edifices. Just as the state hath fallen, their private fortunes have been raised.

And what cause can we assign for this? How is it that our affairs were once so flourishing, and now in such disorder? Because, formerly, the people dared to take up arms themselves; were themselves, masters of their ministers; themselves disposers of all emoluments: so that every citizen thought himself happy, to derive honours and authority, and all advantages whatever, from the people. But now, on the contrary, favours are all dispensed, affairs all transacted by the ministers: while you, quite enervated, robbed of your riches, your allies, stand in the mean rank of servants and assistants: happy if these men grant you the theatrical appointments, and send you scraps [u] of the public meal. And what

[u] *Of the public meal.* Demetrius Phalereus records a saying of Demades, in ridicule of the custom of distributing



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what is of all most sordid, you hold yourselves obliged to them for that which is your own: while they confine you within these walls, lead you on gently to their purposes, and sooth and tame you to obedience. Nor is it possible, that they who are engaged in low and groveling pursuits, can entertain great and generous sentiments. No! Such as their employments are, so must their dispositions prove.—And now I call heaven to witness, that it will not surprize me, if I suffer more by mentioning this your condition, than they who have involved you in it! Freedom of speech you do not allow on all occasions; and that you have now admitted it, excites my wonder.

But if you will at length be prevailed on to change your conduct; if you will take the field, and act worthy of Athenians; if those redundant sums which you receive at home, be applied to the advancement of your affairs abroad; perhaps, my countrymen! perhaps some instance of consummate

tributing victuals to the people. *The State, said he, is now become a feeble old woman, that sits at home in her slippers, and sups up her prisian.*

good

good fortune may attend you, and ye may become so happy as to despise those pittances, which are like the morsels that a physician allows his patient. For these do not restore his vigour, but just keep him from dying. So, your distributions cannot serve any valuable purpose, but are just sufficient to divert your attention from all other things, and thus increase the indolence of every one among you.

But I shall be asked, what then! is it your opinion, that these sums should pay our army?—And besides this, that the state should be regulated in such a manner, that every one may have his share of public business, and approve himself an useful citizen, on what occasion soever his aid may be required. Is it in his power to live in peace? He will live here with the greater dignity, while these supplies prevent him from being tempted by indigence, to any thing dishonourable. Is he called forth by an emergency like the present? Let him discharge that sacred duty which he owes to his country, by applying these sums to his support in the field. Is there a man among you past the age of service? Let him,

him, by inspecting and conducting the public business, regularly merit his share of the distributions, which he now receives, without any duty enjoined, or any return made to the community. And thus, with scarcely any alteration, either of abolishing, or innovating, all irregularities are removed, and the state compleatly settled; by appointing one general regulation, which shall entitle our citizens to receive, and at the same time oblige them, to take arms, to administer justice, to act in all cases, as their time of life, and our affairs require. But it never hath, nor could it have been moved by me, that the rewards of the diligent and active, should be bestowed on the useless citizen: or that you should sit here, supine, languid, and irresolute, listening to the exploits of some general's foreign troops, (for thus it is at present)—— Not that I would reflect on him who serves you, in any instance. But you yourselves, Athenians, should perform those services, for which you heap honours upon others; and not recede from that illustrious rank of virtue, the price of all the glorious toils of your ancestors; and by them bequeathed to you.

Thus

OLYNTHIAC THE SECOND. 93

Thus have I laid before you the chief points, in which I think you interested. It is your part to embrace that opinion, which the welfare of the state in general, and that of every single member, recommends to your acceptance.

*End of the SECOND OLYNTHIAC.*



OLYNTIAC THE SECOND

There have I said before and the child  
in which I say you intended  
is your part to embrace that which  
the state of the law is concerned, and that  
of every single member, and stands to  
your convenience

THE THIRD

OLYNTIAC ORATION

OLYNTIAC THE SECOND

OLYNTIAC THE SECOND

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OLYNTIAC THE SECOND

INTRODUCTION

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THE THIRD  
OLYNTHIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED  
In the same YEAR.

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INTRODUCTION

THE THIRD

OLYNTIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED

In the same Year

THESE

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## INTRODUCTION.

*THE preceding oration had no other effect upon the Athenians, than to prevail on them to send orders to Charidemus, who commanded for them at the Hellespont, to make an attempt to relieve Olynthus. He accordingly led some forces into Chalcis, which, in conjunction with the forces of Olynthus, ravaged Pallene, a peninsula of Macedon, towards Thrace, and Bottia, a country on the confines of Chalcis, which among other towns contained Pella, the capital of Macedon.*

*But these attempts could not divert Philip from his resolution of reducing Olynthus, which he had now publicly avowed. The Olynthians therefore, found it necessary to have once more recourse to Athens: and to request, that they would send troops, composed of citizens, animated with a sincere ardor for their interest, their own glory, and the common cause.*

H

Demost-



## INTRODUCTION.

*Demosthenes, in the following oration, insists on the importance of saving Olynthus; alarms his hearers with the apprehension of a war, which actually threatened Attica, and even the capital; urges the necessity of personal service; and returns to his charge of the misapplication of the public money; but in such a manner, as sheweth, that his former remonstrances had not the desired effect.*

OLYN-

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## OLYNTHIAC THE THIRD.

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**I** Am persuaded, Athenians ! that you would account it less valuable, to possess [A] the greatest riches, than to have the true interest of the state on this emergency, clearly laid before you. It is your part, therefore, readily and cheerfully to attend to all who are disposed to offer their opinions. For your regards need not be confined to those, whose counsels are

[A] *The greatest riches.* Ulpian finds out a particular propriety in this exordium. He observes, that as the orator intends to recommend to them to give up their theatrical appointments, he prepares them for it by this observation; and while he is endeavouring to persuade them to a just disregard of money, appears as if he only spoke their sentiments.

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the effect of [B] premeditation: it is your good fortune to have men among you, who can at once suggest many points of moment. From opinions therefore, of every kind, you may easily chuse that most conducive to your interest.

And now, Athenians, the present juncture calls upon us; we almost hear its voice, declaring loudly, that you yourselves must engage in these affairs, if you have the least attention to your own security. You entertain, I know not what sentiments, on this occasion: my opinion is, that the reinforcements should be instantly decreed; that they should be raised with all possible expedition; that so our succours may be sent from this city, and all former inconveniences be avoided; and that you should

[B] *Premeditation.* Monsieur Tourreil admires the greatness of mind of Demosthenes, who, tho' he gloried in the pains and labour his orations cost him, was yet superior to that low and malignant passion, which oftentimes prompts us to decry those talents which we do not possess. I suspect however, that this passage was occasioned by some particular circumstance in the debate. Perhaps some speaker who opposed Demosthenes, might have urged his opinion somewhat dogmatically, as the result of mature reflection and deliberation.

send

send embassadors to notify these things, and to secure our interests by their presence. For as he is a man of consummate policy, compleat in the art of turning every incident to his own advantage; there is the utmost reason to fear, that partly by concessions, where they may be seasonable, partly by menaces, (and his [c] menaces may be believed) and partly by rendering us and our absence suspected; he may tear from us something of the last importance, and force it into his own service.

Those very circumstances, however, which contribute to the power of Philip, are happily the most favourable to us. For that uncontroled command, with which he governs all transactions public and secret; his entire direction of his army, as their leader, their sovereign, and their treasurer; and his diligence, in giving life to every part of it, by his presence; these things greatly contribute to carrying on a war with expedition and success, but are powerful obstacles to that accommodation, which he would gladly make with the Olynthians.

[c] *His menaces may, &c.* Altho' his promises could by no means be relied on,



For the Olynthians see plainly, that they do not now fight for glory, or for part of their territory, but to defend their state from dissolution and slavery. They know how he rewarded those traitors of Amphipolis, who made him master of that city; and those of Pydna, who opened their gates to him. In a word, free states, I think, must ever look with suspicion on an absolute monarchy: but a neighbouring monarchy must double their apprehensions.

Convinced of what hath now been offered, and possessed with every other just and worthy sentiment; you must be resolved, Athenians; you must exert your spirit; you must apply to the war, now, if ever: your fortunes, your persons, your whole powers, are now demanded. There is no excuse, no pretence left, for declining the performance of your duty. For that which you were all ever urging loudly, that the Olynthians should be engaged in a war with Philip, hath now happened of itself; and this in a manner most agreeable to our interest. For if they had entered into this war at our persuasion, they must have been precarious allies, without steadiness or resolution: but as their private injuries have  
made

made them enemies to Philip, it is probable that enmity will be lasting, both on account of what they fear, and what they have already suffered. My countrymen! let not so favourable an opportunity escape you: do not repeat that error which hath been so often fatal to you. For when, at our return from assisting the [D] Euboeans, Hierax and Stratocles, citizens of Amphipolis, mounted this [E] gallery, and press'd you to send out your navy, and to take their city under your protection; had we discovered that resolution in our own cause, which we exerted for the safety of Euboea; then had Amphipolis been yours: and all those difficulties had been avoided, in which you have been since involved. Again, when we received advice of the sieges of Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pa-

[D] *The Euboeans.* This refers to the expedition in favour of the Euboeans against the Thebans; which is mentioned in the note on Phil. i. page 11. The Athenians prepared for this expedition in three days, according to Demosthenes; in five, according to Aeschines. And their success was as sudden as their preparation.

[E] *This gallery,* in the original τοῦτο τὸ ΒΗΜΑ. That eminence where all the public speakers were placed, and from whence the people were addressed on all occasions.

gææ, and other places, (for I would not detain you with a particular recital) had we ourselves marched with a due spirit and alacrity, to the relief of the first of these cities, we should now find much more compliance, much more humility in Philip. But by still neglecting the present, and imagining our future interests will not demand our care; we have aggrandized our enemy, we have raised him to a degree of eminence, greater than any king of Macedon hath ever yet enjoyed.—Now we have another opportunity. That, which the Olynthians of themselves, present to the state: one, no less considerable than any of the former.

And in my opinion, Athenians! if a man were to bring the dealings of the Gods towards us, to a fair account; tho' many things might appear not quite agreeable to our wishes, yet he would acknowledge that we had been highly favoured by them; and with great reason: for that many places have been lost in the course of war, is truly to be charged to our own weak conduct. But that the difficulties arisen from hence, have not long affected us; and that an alliance now presents itself, to remove them,  
if

if we are disposed to make the just use of it; this, I cannot but ascribe to the divine goodness. But the same thing happens in this case, as in the use of riches. If a man is careful to save those he hath acquired, he readily acknowledges the kindness of fortune: but if by his imprudence, they are once lost; with them he also loses the sense of gratitude. So in political affairs, they who neglect to improve their opportunities, forget the favours which the Gods have bestowed. For it is the ultimate event which generally determines mens judgment of every thing precedent. And therefore, all affairs hereafter, should engage your strictest care; that by correcting our errors, we may wipe off the inglorious stain of past actions. But should we be deaf to these men too, and should he be suffered to subvert Olynthus; say, what can prevent him from marching his forces into whatever territory he pleases?

Is there not a man among you, Athenians! who reflects by what steps, Philip, from a beginning so inconsiderable, hath mounted to this height of power? First he took Amphipolis: then he became master of Pydna; then Potidaea fell; then Methone:



thone : then came his inroad into Thes-  
saly : after this, having disposed affairs at  
Pherae, at Pagasae, at Magnesia, entirely  
as he pleased, he marched [F] into Thrace.  
Here, while engaged in expelling some, and  
establishing other princes, he fell sick. A-  
gain, recovering, he never turned a mo-  
ment from his course, to ease or indulgence,

[F] *Into Thrace. Here while engaged, &c.* Thrace  
was inhabited by an infinite number of different people  
whose names Herodotus hath transmitted. And he ob-  
serves, that could they have united under a single chief,  
or connected themselves by interest or sentiment, they  
would have formed a body infinitely superior to all their  
neighbours. After Teres, the Thracians had divers  
kings. This prince had two sons, Sitalces and Spara-  
docus. Among whose descendants various contests arose,  
'till after a series of usurpations and revolutions, Seuthes  
recovered part of the territory of his father Maesades,  
and transmitted the succession peaceably to Cotis the  
father of Cerfobleptes, (as Demosthenes says, not his  
brother, as Diodorus.) At the death of Cotis the di-  
visions recommenced : and in the place of one king,  
Thrace had three, Cerfobleptes, Berisades and Ama-  
docus ; Cerfobleptes dispossessed the other two, and  
was himself dethroned by Philip. Frontinus reports,  
that Alexander, when he had conquered Thrace,  
brought the princes of that country with him in his  
expedition into Asia, to prevent their raising any com-  
motions in his absence. A proof that Philip and  
Alexander had established several petty kings in Thrace,  
who were vassals to Macedon.

TOUR.

but

but instantly attacked the Olynthians. His expeditions against the Illyrians, the Paconians, against [G] Arymbas, I pass all over. —But I may be asked, why this recital, now? —That you may know and see your own error, in ever neglecting some part of your affairs, as if beneath your regard: and that active spirit with which Philip pursueth his Designs: which ever fires him: and which never can permit him to rest satisfied with those things he hath already accomplished. If then he determines firmly and invariably to pursue his conquests; and if we are obstinately resolved against every vigorous and effectual measure; think, what consequences may we expect! In the name of heaven, can any man be so weak, as not to know that by neglecting this war, we

[G] *Arymbas.* He was son of Alcetas king of Epirus, and brother to Neoptolemus, whose daughter Olympias, Philip married. About three years before the date of this oration, the death of their father produced a dispute between the brothers, about the succession: Arymbas was the lawful heir. Yet Philip obliged him by force of arms, to divide the kingdom with Neoptolemus. And not contented with this, at the death of Arymbas, he found means by his intrigues and menaces, to prevail on the Epirots to banish his son, and to constitute Alexander the son of Neoptolemus, sole monarch.

TOUR.

are transferring it from that country to our own? And should this happen, I fear, Athenians! that as they who inconsiderately borrow money upon high interest, after a short-lived affluence are deprived of their own fortunes; so we, by this continued indolence, by consulting only our ease and pleasure, may be reduced to the grievous necessity of engaging in affairs the most shocking and disagreeable, and of exposing ourselves in the defence of this our native territory.

To censure, some one may tell me, is easy, and in the power of every man: but the true counsellor should point out that conduct which the present exigence demands.—Sensible as I am, Athenians, that when your expectations have in any instance been disappointed, your resentment frequently falls not on those who merit it, but on him who hath spoken last; yet I cannot, from a regard to my own safety, suppress that which I judge of moment to be laid before you. I say then, this occasion calls for a twofold armament. First we are to defend the cities of the Olynthians; and for this purpose, to detach a body of forces: in the next place, in order

der to infest his kingdom, we are to send out our navy manned with other levies. If you neglect either of these, I fear your expedition will be fruitless. For if you content yourselves with infesting his dominions; this he will endure, until he is master of Olynthus; and then he can with ease repel the invasion: Or if you only send succours to the Olynthians, when he sees his own kingdom free from danger, he will apply with constancy and vigilance to the war, and at length weary out the besieged to a submission. Your levies therefore must be considerable enough to serve both purposes.—These are my sentiments, with respect to our armament,

And now as to the expence of these preparations. You are already provided for the payment of your forces better than any other people. This provision is distributed among yourselves in the manner most agreeable; but if you restore it to the army, the supplies will be compleat without any addition; if not, an addition will be necessary; or the whole, rather, will remain to be raised. “How then! (I may be asked) do you move for a decree to apply those funds to the military service?” By no means!



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means ! it is my opinion indeed, that an army must be raised ; that this money really belongs to the army ; and that the same regulation which entitles our citizens to receive, should oblige them also to act. At present you expend these sums on entertainments, without regard to your affairs. It remains then that a general contribution be raised : a great one, if a great one be required ; a small one if such may be sufficient. Money must be found : without it nothing can be effected : various schemes are proposed by various persons : do you make that choice which you think most advantageous ; and while you have an opportunity, exert yourselves in the care of your interests.

[H] It is worthy your attention to consider how the affairs of Philip are at this time

[H] *It is worthy, &c.* Hitherto the orator has painted Philip in all his terrors. He is politic and vigilant and intrepid : he has risen gradually to the highest pitch of power ; and is now ready to appear before the walls of Athens, if he is not instantly opposed. But lest this description should dispirit the Athenians, he is now represented in a quite different manner. His power is by no means real and solid ; his allies are prepared to revolt : his kingdom is threatened with war and desolation : and he is just ready to be crushed, by the

### OLYNTIAC THE THIRD. 111

time circumstanced. For they are by no means so well disposed, so very flourishing, as an inattentive observer would pronounce. Nor would he have engaged in this war at all, had he thought he should have been obliged to maintain it. He hoped that the moment he appeared, all things would fall before him. But these hopes were vain. And this disappointment, in the first place, troubles and dispirits him. Then the Thes-  
salians alarm him; a people remarkable for their [1] perfidy on all occasions, and to all persons. And just as they have ever

the very first effort that is made to distress him: But as it was necessary, that the danger, to which they were exposed, should make the deepest impression upon the minds of his hearers; he returns immediately to his former description, and concludes with the dreadful image of a formidable enemy, ravaging their territory and shutting them up within their walls.

[1] *Their perfidy.* This people had a bad character from the earliest times, so as to become even proverbial. And Greece, and Athens particularly, had experienced their want of faith on very important occasions. They invited Xerxes into Greece: and were not ashamed to join Mardonius after the battle of Salamis, and to serve him as guides, in his invasion of Attica. And in the heat of a battle between Athens and Sparta, they on a sudden deserted their allies the Athenians and joined the enemy. See Thucyd. Book 1.

TOUR.  
proved,

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proved, even so he finds them now. For they have resolved in council to demand the restitution of Pagasæ, and have opposed his attempt to fortify Magnesia: and I am informed, that for the future he is to be excluded from their ports and markets, as these conveniences belong to the states of Theffaly, and are not to be intercepted by Philip. And should he be deprived of such a fund of wealth, he must be greatly streightened to support his foreign troops. Besides this, we must suppose that the Pæonian and the Illyrian, and all the others would prefer freedom and independence, to a state of slavery. They are not accustomed to subjection: and the insolence of this man, it is said, knows no bounds: nor is this improbable: for great and unexpected success is apt to hurry weak minds into extravagances. Hence it often proves much more difficult to maintain acquisitions, than to acquire. It is your part therefore, to regard the time of his distress as your most favourable opportunity. Improve it to the utmost: and send out your embassies; take the field yourselves; and excite a general ardor abroad: ever considering how readily Philip would attack us, if he were favoured

# OLYNTHIAC THE THIRD. 113

voured by any incident like this ; if a war had broke out in our borders. And would it not be shameful to want the resolution to bring that distress on him, which, had it been equally in his power, he certainly would have made you feel ?

This too demands your attention, Athenians ! that you are now to determine whether it be most expedient to carry the war into his country, or to fight him here. If Olynthus be defended, Macedon will be the seat of war : you may harraßs his kingdom, and enjoy your own territories free from apprehensions. But should that nation be subdued by Philip, who will oppose his marching hither ? will the Thebans ? let it not be thought severe when I affirm that they [K] will join readily in the invasion. Will the Phocians ? a people [L] scarcely able to defend their own country, without

[K] *Join readily in the invasion.* The reasons of Thebes's hatred to Athens, have been already assigned, See Note on Olynth. 2. p. 74.

[L] *Scarcely able, &c.* The Phocians were at this time reduced to a very low state, by a continued series of ill success in the sacred war. Philomelus and Onomarchus had perished. Phayllus and Phalecus their successors, had been frequently defeated ; and the Thebans were continually gaining advantages over them.

TOUR.

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your



your assistance. [M] Will any others?—  
 “But Sir,” cries some one, “he would  
 “make no such attempt.—This would  
 be the greatest of absurdities; not to execute those threats, when he hath full power, which, now when they appear so idle and extravagant, he yet dares to utter. And I think you are not yet to learn how great would be the difference between our engaging him here, and there. Were we to be only thirty days abroad, and to draw all the necessaries of the camp from our own lands, even if there were no enemy to ravage them, the damage would, in my opinion, amount to more than the whole expence [N] of the late war. Add then the presence of an enemy, and how greatly must the calamity be increased. But farther add the infamy: and to those who judge rightly, no distress can be more grievous than the scandal of misconduct.

[M] *Will any others?* He avoids all mention of the Thessalians; because he had just shewed that they were ill-affected to Philip, and therefore might be supposed willing to join with the Athenians.

[N] *Of the late war.* That is, their expedition into Thrace, in order to recover Amphipolis, which, according to the calculation of Aeschines, cost them 1500 Talents.

TOUR.

It

## OLYNTHIAC THE THIRD. 115

It is incumbent therefore upon us all, (justly influenced by these considerations) to unite vigorously in the common cause, and repel the danger that threatens this territory. Let the rich *exert themselves on this occasion*; that by contributing a small portion of their affluence, they may secure the peaceful possession of the rest. Let those who are of the age for military duty; that by learning the art of war in Philip's dominions, they may become formidable defenders of their native land. And our Orators; that they may safely submit their conduct to the public inspection. For your judgment of their administrations will ever be determined by the event of things. And may we all contribute to render that favourable!

*End of the* THIRD OLYNTHIAC.

OLYMPIAN THE THIRD

It is important therefore upon us  
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ORATION on the PEACE

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ARCHONSHIP of AROCHAS

Three Years after the OLYMPIAN ORATION

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INTRODUCTION

THE  
ORATION on the PEACE:  
PRONOUNCED IN THE  
ARCHONSHIP of ARCHIAS,  
Three Years after the OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS.

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# INTRODUCTION.

THE Athenians, after their success in the Persian war, were recommended in the preceding oration, that they should not be so far from their spirit as to consider themselves invulnerable. The following is a short history of the city. The Athenians and Persians, during the war, to Philip. He took it, the greater part of the inhabitants, in chains, sold master part, and distinguished the two traitors and by the cruelty of their death. His own mother who had been harboured in Olynthus by the Persians, to his jealousy and revenge.

These events no less than the repeated banners of Demosthenes presented on the Altar, means to declare war against Philip in form. Hitherto he had kept some neutrality with them, and

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## INTRODUCTION.

*THE Athenians sent those succours to Olynthus, which were recommended in the preceding oration. But they could not defend that state against its domestic enemies. For the year following, two of its citizens, Lasthenes and Euthykrates, betrayed the city to Philip. He razed it; threw part of the inhabitants in chains, sold another part, and distinguished the two traitors only by the cruelty of their death. His two brothers who had been harboured in Olynthus he also sacrificed to his jealousy and revenge.*

*These events no less than the repeated instances of Demosthenes prevailed on the Athenians to declare war against Philip in form. Hitherto he had kept some measures with them,*

## INTRODUCTION.

and had sought various pretences for glossing over his hostilities; but how he fell with the utmost fury upon all their tributary states; and obliged Demosthenes to appear once more in the Assembly to persuade the Athenians to defend the Islanders, and their colonies which lay upon the Hellespont. But scarcely had the war been declared, when the vigour of their enemy, and their own fickleness and indolence made them weary of it. Ctesiphon and Phrynon were sent to sound Philip's dispositions towards a separate peace. This was as he could wish. The Phocian war was at present the object of his views: and his arts had just regained the Thessalians over to the confederacy, who had been prevailed on to stand neuter. To the Athenian ministers therefore he made such professions, that Demosthenes and nine others were sent to negotiate the peace; who proceeded as far as they were authorized, and returned with Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus on the part of Philip. Ambassadors were sent soon after from Athens with full powers to conclude the treaty. In the first of these embassies, Demosthenes had met with some Athenian prisoners in Macedon whom he promised to redeem at his own expence, and took this opportunity to perform it, while his colleagues, in the mean time, were to proceed with all expedition

## INTRODUCTION.

*pedition in order to conclude with Philip. Three months elapsed however before they came to an audience with the king, who was all this time making himself master of those places in Thrace, which the Athenians claimed as their right. At last the terms of the treaty were agreed to; but by affected delays, and by corrupting the Ambassadors he found means to defer the execution of it, until he had advanced his troops into Thessaly, in order to proceed against the Phocians. He then concluded the peace; and on their return, the Ambassadors who had conducted the treaty, (and Aeschines in particular) expatiated upon his candor and sincerity. They declared, (at the very time when he was giving Thebes the most solemn assurances that he would exterminate the Phocians) that his sole views were to screen that people from the fury of their enemies, and to control the insolence of the Thebans. They also vouched for his performing several things in favour of the state, not formally stipulated in the treaty. Thus were the Athenians amused, and Philip suffered to pass the streights of Thermopylae, and to pursue his march into Phocis.*

*His reputation and approach struck such a terror into the Phocians, that altho' they received*



## INTRODUCTION.

ceived a reinforcement of a thousand Spartans, they yet sent to treat, or rather to submit. He allowed Phalecus with eight thousand mercenaries to retire into Peloponesus; but the rest, who were inhabitants of Phocis were left at his mercy. The disposal of these he referred to the Amphictyons, from an affected regard to the authority of an assembly composed of the representatives of the states of Greece. They thundered out the severest decrees against this wretched people. Among other things, it was enacted, that they should lose their seat in the Amphictyonic council, and that the double voice which they had enjoyed in it should be transferred to Philip: who by the same resolution gained the superintendency of the Pythian games, which the Corinthians forfeited by taking part with the Phocians.

The Athenians had not been present at Philip's election into this council; and probably to avoid all opposition he had assembled only such Amphictyons as were devoted to his interest. He thought it proper however to send circular letters to the absent states, inviting them to assemble at Delphos and to ratify his election.

Athens, among others, received the invitation: and as Philip's ambitious designs could  
be

## INTRODUCTION.

*be no longer concealed, many were for violent measures. The proposal raised a ferment in the assembly; which seems to have breathed nothing but indignation and opposition. On this occasion, Demosthenes thought it his duty to moderate their heat; and in the following oration, endeavours to prevent their being betrayed into any rash and imprudent measures.*

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as to every subject, many more for our  
purpose. The subject of a permanent  
peace is now before us.

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[A] T H E  
ORATION on the PEACE.

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ATHENIANS!

**I** See that this debate must be attended with many difficulties, and great commotion : not only because many of our interests are already given up, and therefore unnecessary to be now laid before you ; but as it is impossible to agree on such expedients

[A] I shall here take the liberty to transcribe a remark from the authors of the Universal History.

Libanius and Photius have taken pains to prove, that the oration to which we refer above, ought not to be ascribed to Demosthenes. We might well enough defend ourselves, by alledging, that it has been generally esteemed his, and, as such, as constantly maintained its place



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pedients as may secure what yet remain ;  
but that a variety of clashing opinions  
must

place in his works. This would be sufficient for our purpose ; but, in truth, the arguments on which the opposite sentiment is built, are so easily overturned, that we might be justly blamed for neglecting so favourable an occasion of setting this point in its true light. Demosthenes, say those who will not allow this oration to be his, charged Aeschines with betraying his country on account of his recommending warmly a peace with Philip ; they cannot therefore think, that Demosthenes would run openly into those measures, which he had so lately and so warmly decried ; or that he, who, on every other occasion, singly opposed Philip, and run all hazards to bring him into odium with the people, should now be single on the other side, and attempt to cross the disposition of the Athenians, in favour of peace and Philip. These objectors forget, that Demosthenes was a patriot as well as an orator ; that he did not pursue Philip with implacable hatred, because he was king of Macedon, but because he thought him both willing and able to obstruct the designs of Athens, and even to reduce her from that splendid pre-eminence which she now held in Greece, to the ordinary rank of a state, in name free, but in truth dependent upon him ; this was the motive of Demosthenes's heat on other occasions ; and the motive to his coolness now was the strict alliance between Philip and the other Grecian states, which rendered it a thing impracticable for Athens to contend with him and them, alone. Besides, as he rightly observes in the harangue, it would have been ridiculous for those, who refused to enter into an equal war for rich cities and fertile provinces, to have rushed suddenly  
into

The ORATION on the PEACE. 127

must divide the assembly. Then, to advise, is naturally a difficult and distressing part. But you, Athenians, have rendered it yet more distressing: for all other people naturally seek counsel, while affairs are yet depending: you deliberate, when the event hath made it too late. Hence hath it happened thro' the whole course of my observation, that the man who arraigns your conduct, is heard with esteem, and his sentiments approved; yet have your affairs ever miscarried, and the objects of your deliberation have all been lost. But altho' this be too true, still I am persuaded, (and from this persuasion I arose to speak) that if you will put an end to tumult and opposition, and grant me that attention which becomes those who are consulting for their country, and upon so important an occasion; I have some points to urge, some

into a most unequal contest about an empty title, or as he emphatically expresses it, *To take away the shadow of Delphos from him who was master of Delphos itself*. We therefore acknowledge this to be the oration of Demosthenes, because he was worthy of it.

It is scarcely worth while to take notice of a small mistake in this remark. Libanius does not deny that Demosthenes was the author of this oration. He allows it to have been written by him, but is of opinion that he never ventured to pronounce it.

measures

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measures to propose, which will serve our present interests, and repair our past miscarriages.

Sensible as I am, Athenians, that to expatiate on those counsels one hath formerly given, and to speak of one's self, is the most successful artifice of those who dare to practise such arts ; yet to me it is so odious, so detestable, that altho' I see it necessary, yet I loath it. However, it will assist your judgment, I presume, on this occasion, if you recall to mind something of what I have formerly mentioned.—You may remember, that during the disorders of Euboea, when certain persons persuaded you [B] to assist Plutarchus, and to undertake an inglorious

[B] *To assist Plutarchus.* Philip had long regarded Euboea, as very proper by its situation, to favour the designs he meditated against Greece. He therefore took pains to form a party in the island, and fomented divisions and factions in the several states of which it was composed. Plutarch the Governor of Eretria, one of the principal cities of Euboea, applied to the Athenians for assistance against some attempts of Philip, and obtained it ; but afterwards (having probably been gained over to Philip's party) he took up arms against the very auxiliaries he had invited. But this perfidy did not disconcert Phocion who commanded them. He gained a victory over the Macedonians, and drove Plutarch out of Eretria,

inglorious and expenfive war; I was the first, the only one who rose up to oppose it, and scarcely escaped their fury, who for a trifling gain were urging you to many highly pernicious measures. In a little time, when the load of infamy had fallen upon you, and that you had suffered such treatment as no people ever received from those they had assisted; you were all made sensible of the iniquity of your seducers, and the justness and integrity of my counsels. Again, when I saw [c] Neoptolemus the player, (in that full security which his profession gave him) involving the state in the greatest distress, and in all his public conduct, devoted to Philip: I appeared, and warned you of the danger; and this from no secret

Eretria. Phocion was afterwards recalled, and Molossus his successor in this war, was defeated and taken prisoner by Philip.

TOUR.

[c] *Neoptolemus the Player.* This Neoptolemus was also a great Tragic Poet, tho' the Orator only mentions the less honourable distinction. Not that the profession of a player was held in disesteem in Greece. Players were the favourites of princes, and were raised to the highest employments in the state. This very man was nominated the year before, one of the ten ambassadors that were to conclude the peace with Philip.

TOUR.

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motive,



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motive, no [D] private enmity, no officious baseness, as the event itself discovered. But it is not the defenders of Neoptolemus that I accuse, (for he was not depending on a single one) but you yourselves: for had you been spectators in the theatre, not engaged in affairs of the highest and most intimate concernment to the public, you could not have heard him with more indulgence, nor me with more resentment. And now you all know that he who then went over to the enemy, pretending to collect some debts, that he might bring them hither, (as he said) to enable him to serve the state; that he who was perpetually inveighing against the cruelty of accusing a man for thus transferring his effects from that country hither; the moment that a peace freed him from all apprehensions, converted that [E] estate into money, which he acquired here, and brought it off with him to Philip.

[D] *No private enmity, &c.* Probably, this is a repetition of the very words of Neoptolemus's party.

[E] *That estate.* The text has it, *ἐὸς αὐτῶν*. The Athenians distinguished two sorts of goods or estates, *apparent*, by which they understood *lands*; and *not-apparent*, that is *money, slaves, moveables, &c.*

These

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These two instances which I have produced shew with what fidelity and truth I spoke on those occasions. I shall mention one, and but one more, and then proceed to the point now to be debated. When we had received the solemn ratification of the treaty, and that the embassy returned home; when certain persons assured you, that [F] Thespia and Plataea were to be re-peopled; that if Philip became master of the Phocians, he would spare them; that Thebes [G] was to submit to his regulation; that

[F] *That Thespia and Plataea were to be re-peopled.* Thespia had been razed by the Thebans, under Epaminondas. Plataea had been twice destroyed by them; once, when Archidamus, King of Sparta, obliged the Plataeans to surrender at discretion, in the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war. The Thebans, who were then joined with Lacedemon, insisted that they should be exterminated. The treaty of Antalcidas restored them; but this did not last long; for three years before the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans reduced them to their former wretched state, because they refused to join with them against the Lacedemonians.

TOUR.

[G] *That Thebes was to submit to his regulation.* In the Greek it is *δοῦναι ἀministraturum*. Philip made use of this soft expression, to persuade the Athenians that he would reduce the Thebans to reason, and put it out of their power to undertake any act of outrage or injustice; and at the same time, to avoid alarming the Thebans,

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[H] that Oropus was to be ours; that [1] Euboea should be given up to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis; with other such insidious promises, which in spite of interest, of justice, and of honour, drove you to abandon Phocis; I never attempted to deceive you, I was not silent; no, you must remember I declared that I knew of none, that I expected none of these things; but thought that whoever mentioned them, could scarcely be serious.

And these instances of my superior foresight, I do by no means ascribe to any extraordinary penetration: I speak it not from boasting or arrogance: nor do I pretend

or alienating them from his party. Wolfius thinks, that διοικῆν is put for διοικιζέω, and translates it *dissipaturum*, that he would exterminate the Thebans. But I cannot think that he would have expressed himself in a manner so harsh, and so likely to make the Thebans his enemies.

TOUR.

[H] That Oropus, &c. This city had been taken from the Athenians, the third year of the 103d Olympiad, by Themistion the Tyrant of Eretria, and afterwards put into the hands of the Thebans. Their mutual pretensions to this city, had oftentimes embroiled these two states.

TOUR.

[1] Euboea should be given up, &c. For he had by this time gained a great authority in that island, and stationed his garrisons in most of its cities.

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to any superiority but what arises from these two causes. The first is fortune: which I find more powerful than all the policy and wisdom of man: the other, that perfect disinterestedness, with which my judgments are ever formed: so that no man can hold out any advantage to my view, to influence my public conduct. Hence it is, that on all occasions of debate, your true interest strikes my eye directly. But when a bribe is, as it were, cast into one scale, it then preponderates, and forces down the judgment with it: so that it is not possible that a person thus influenced can ever offer good and salutary counsel.

And now, to give my sentiments on the present occasion. Whether subsidies, or alliances, or whatever schemes are concerting for the public good, one point must be secured; the continuance of the present peace. Not that it is so very excellent, or so worthy of you: but of what kind soever it may be, it were more for the interest of your affairs that it had never been concluded, than that now, when it is concluded, you should infringe it: for we have suffered ourselves to be de-

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prived of many advantages, which would have given our arms much more security and strength.

In the next place we must be careful not to drive those to extremities, who are now assembled, and call themselves the council of Amphietyons ; nor to afford them a pretence for a general war against us. Were we again engaged with Philip for Amphipolis, or any such private matter of dispute, in which neither Theſſalians, nor Argians, nor Thebans were concerned ; in my opinion, none of these would join against us ; and least of all——let me be heard out without interruption,——the Thebans : not that they wish well to us, or would not willingly recommend themselves to Philip ; but they are perfectly sensible (however mean their understandings may be thought) that, were they to engage in a war with you, [κ] the evils would all fall on them ; the advantages, others would lie ready to intercept. They will

[κ] *The evils would all fall on them, &c.* Sparta only waited for this rupture, to assert its power once more. And from Philip's former conduct, it appeared very plainly, that he knew how to avail himself of such a quarrel.

therefore

therefore never be betrayed into such a quarrel, unless the cause be general. In like manner, another war with the Thebans for Oropus, or any such private cause, could not, I think, distress us: for there are those who would join either with us or them, to repel an invasion, but in offensive measures would concur with neither. This is the true nature, the very spirit of alliances. There are none so much attached to us or Thebes, as to desire that we should maintain our own power and triumph over our competitor. To be secure, they would all wish us for their own sakes, but that either of us should reduce the other to subjection, and so be enabled to give law to them, not one would bear.

Where then lies the danger? what are you to guard against; that general pretence for uniting against us, which the war now in agitation may afford the states. For if [L] the Argians, and the Messenians, and the Megalopolitans, and such other of the

[L] *For if the Argians, &c.* When the Spartan power was broken by Thebes, these people who had been dependent on Sparta, asserted their freedom. This occasioned some contests which still subsisted, and in which the Spartans were favoured by Athens.

TOUR.  
Pelo-

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Peloponnesians as are in the same interest, should make it a cause of quarrel, that we have sought a treaty with the Lacedemonians, and seem [M] to have favoured their designs: if the Thebans incensed as they are said to be at present, should become yet more incensed at [N] our harbouring their exiles, and taking every occasion of declaring ourselves implacably averse to them; if the Thessalians should resent our reception of the fugitive Phocians; and Philip our opposing his admission into the council of Amphietyons; I fear, that to revenge these private quarrels, they may use the authority of this council, to give sanction to a general war against us; and in the violence

[M] *To have favoured their designs, &c.* The designs of the Lacedemonians, of reducing these people to their former subjection. Turreil, translates *ἰνδύσθαι*, *to approve*. Suidas renders it stronger. *To forward, to promote, ἰνδύσθαι, significat aliquid ab altero accipere, quod ipse deinde tractandum suscipias.* Wolfius applies *ἰνδύσθαι* to the Argians, etc. and translates the passage thus, *propter acta quaedam sua impedita*, but I have chosen the other interpretation as the most natural.

[N] *At our harbouring their exiles.* Many of the cities of Boeotia favoured the Phocians in the sacred war. But when this war was ended, and the Thebans became masters of these cities, they treated the inhabitants with great cruelty, and obliged them to take shelter at Athens.

of

The ORATION on the PEACE. 137

of resentment, forget even their own interest; as it happened in the Phocian war. You are not ignorant that the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians, altho' they had by no means the same views, have yet all conspired to the very same purposes. The Thebans, for instance, were not able to hinder Philip from passing, and becoming master of Thermopylae, nor from coming in, after all their toils, and depriving them of the glory; (for as [o] to possessions and the acquisition of territories, the Thebans have succeeded happily; but in point of honour and reputation they have suffered most shamefully.) If Philip did not pass, they were to expect nothing: it was highly disagreeable to them; yet for the sake of [p] Orchomenus and Coronea, which they greatly desired, but were not able to take, they chose to endure all this. And yet there are persons who dare to assert that Philip did not surrender these cities to the Thebans freely, but was compelled. Away with such pretences! I am satisfied that this was

[o] *As to possessions, &c.* All Phocis was given up to them immediately after the war.

[p] *Orchomenus and Coronea, &c.* The Phocians had taken these two cities from them the year before.

equally



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equally his concern, with the gaining the freights, the glory of the war, the honour of deciding it, and the direction of the Pythian games ; and these were the greatest objects of his most earnest wishes. As to the Thessalians, they neither desired to see the Thebans aggrandized, nor Philip ; (for in their power they saw danger to themselves) but two things they greatly desired, [Q] a seat in the council of Amphictyons, and the wealth of Delphos ; and thence were they induced to join in the confederacy. Thus you may observe that private interest oftentimes engages men in measures quite opposite to their inclinations. And therefore it is your part to proceed with the utmost caution.

“What then ?” saith some one, “shall these apprehensions make us yield to his demands ? is this your motion ?” Not at all ! I only mean to shew you, how you may maintain your dignity, avoid a war, and approve your moderation and justice to the world. As to those violent men who think we should brave all dangers, nor fore-

[Q] *A seat in the council, &c.* Of which they had been deprived by the Phocians making themselves masters of Delphos, where this council assembled.

see

The ORATION on the PEACE. 139

see the difficulties attending upon arms, I wish them to consider this. We allow the Thebans to possess Oropus : should we be asked the motive ; we would answer, to avoid a war. In like manner by the present treaty, we yield Amphipolis to Philip ; [R] we suffer the Cardians to be distinguished from the other inhabitants of the Chersonesus ; the king of Caria [s] to possess Chios, and Cos, and Rhodes ; and the Byzantines [T] to cruize for prizes : and this, because we think that peace and tranquillity will produce more advantages than violence and

[R] *We suffer the Cardians to be distinguished, &c.* This is explained in the introduction to the oration on the state of the Chersonesus.

[s] *The King of Caria.* Mausolus, king of that country, had assisted these islands against Athens, in the social war : and when at the conclusion of this war, the Athenians were obliged to declare them free and independent, their ally made himself master of them. Upon the death of Mausolus, his wife Artemisia maintained his dominion in these new conquered islands. She survived her husband but two years, and was succeeded by her brother Hidrieas, who reigned in Caria at the time that this oration was pronounced.

TOUR.

[T] *And the Byzantines, &c.* These people had also revolted from the Athenians, and joined with the islanders in the social war ;—How far, or on what pretence they were suffered to commit those outrages upon the seas, does not appear.

TOUR.

contests

# 140 The ORATION on the PEACE.

contests about those points. And if we are thus directed in our conduct towards each particular state, and where our interest is highly and intimately concerned, it would be perfect weakness and absurdity to provoke the resentment of them all, for a shadow [u].

[u] *For a shadow.* In the Greek : Περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς εἰκῆς, for a shadow in Delphos. That is, for an empty title of Amphictyon, or protector of the temple of Delphos.

## End of the ORATION on the PEACE.

the Oration on the Peace.  
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highly and ultimately concerned, it would  
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voke the resentment of them all, for a dis-  
advantage.

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THE SEVENTH  
ORATION against PHILIP:

Commonly called the SECOND.

PRONOUNCED IN THE  
ARCHONSHIP of LYCISCUS,

Two Years after the Oration on the Peace.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE Greeks thought it proper to confirm, or at least not to oppose Philip's admission into the council of *Amphietyons*, where he immediately assumed a despotic power. In every enterprize he armed himself with one of their decrees, and under pretence of executing them, made a merit of oppressing several states of Greece.

The Thebans opened him an entrance into *Peloponnesus*, where, from their inveterate hatred to the *Lacedemonians*, they were constantly fomenting divisions. They solicited Philip to join with them, the *Messenians*, and the *Argians*, to reduce the power of *Lacedemon*, who without any right, but that of the strongest, had erected itself into a kind of sovereignty, to the prejudice of the neighbouring states. Philip willingly listened to an overture, which agreed so well with his own views. He proposed, or rather dictated a decree to the *Amphietyons*, that the *Lacedemonians* should suffer *Argos* and *Messene* to enjoy an absolute independence; and under the pretence of supporting their authority, at the same time marched a great body of forces towards those parts.

## INTRODUCTION.

*The Lacedemonians justly alarmed, applied to Athens for succour ; and strongly urged, by their Ambassadors, the conclusion of a league which was necessary for their common safety. All the powers interested in crossing this league, used their utmost diligence to that end. Philip by his ministers, represented to the Athenians, that they could not with justice declare against him : and that if he had not come to a rupture with the Thebans, he had in this done nothing contrary to his treaty with Athens. And this indeed was true, with respect to the public articles of the peace ; whatever private assurances he might have given their ambassadors. The representatives of Thebes, Argos, and Messene, pressed the Athenians on their part ; and reproached them with having already too much favoured the Lacedemonians, those enemies of Thebes, and tyrants of Peloponnesus. The strength of those remonstrances somewhat staggered the Athenians. They were unwilling to break with Philip, and then on the other hand, could not but see danger to themselves in the ruin of Lacedemon. They were therefore in doubt what answer to give to the Lacedemonian ambassadors : on which occasion Demosthenes pronounced the following oration.*

PHIL-

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## PHILIPPIC THE SECOND.

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ATHENIANS!

**W**HEN the hostile attempts of Philip, and those outrageous violations of the peace, which he is perpetually committing, are at any time the subject of our debates; the speeches on your side I find humane and just; and the sentiments of those who inveigh against Philip never fail of approbation: but as to the necessary measures; to speak out plainly, not one hath been pursued, nor any thing effected even to reward the attention to these harangues. Nay, to such circumstances is our state reduced, that the more fully and evidently a man proves that Philip is acting contrary to his treaty, and

L

harbouring



harbouring designs against Greece, the greater is his difficulty in pointing out your duty.

The reason is this. They who aspire to an extravagant degree of power, are to be opposed by force, and action, not by speeches: and yet, in the first place, we public speakers are unwilling to recommend or to propose any thing to this purpose, from the fear of your displeasure: but confine ourselves to general representations of the grievous, of the outrageous nature of his conduct; and the like. Then, you who attend, are better qualified than Philip, either to plead the justice of your cause; or to apprehend it, when enforced by others: but as to any effectual opposition to his present designs, in this, you are entirely inactive. You see then the consequence, the necessary, the natural consequence; each of you excels in that which hath engaged your time and application: he, in acting; you, in speaking. And if, on this occasion, it be sufficient that we speak with a superior force of truth and justice, this may be done with the utmost ease: but if we are to consider how to rectify our present disorders; how to guard against the danger of plunging inadvertently into still greater; against the progress of a power which may at last bear down all opposition;

position; then must our debates proceed in a different manner; and all they who speak, and all you who attend, must prefer the best and most salutary measures, to the easiest and most agreeable.

First then, Athenians, if there is a man who feels no apprehensions at the view of Philip's power, and the extent of his conquests; who imagines that these portend no danger to the state, or that his designs are not all aimed against you; I am amazed! and must intreat the attention of you all, while I explain those reasons briefly, which induce me to entertain different expectations, and to regard Philip as our real enemy: that if I appear to have looked forward with the more penetrating eye, you may join with me; if they, who are thus secure and confident in this man, you may yield to their direction.

In the first place therefore, I consider the acquisitions made by Philip when the peace was just concluded: Thermopylae, and the command of Phocis. What use did he make of these?—He chose to serve the interest of Thebes, not that of Athens. And why? As ambition is his great passion, universal empire the sole object of his views; not  
L 2
peace,

peace, not tranquillity, not any just purpose ; he knew this well, that neither our constitution nor our principles would admit him to prevail upon you, (by any thing he could promise, by any thing he could do,) to sacrifice one state of Greece to your private interest : but that, as you have the due regard to justice, as you have an abhorrence of the least stain upon your honour, and as you have that quick discernment which nothing can escape ; the moment his attempt was made, you would oppose him with the same vigour, as if you yourselves had been immediately attacked. The Thebans, he supposed, (and the event confirmed his opinion) would, for the sake of any private advantage, suffer him to act towards others as he pleased ; and far from opposing or impeding his designs, would be ready at his command to fight upon his side. From the same persuasion he now heaps his favours on the Messenians and Argians. And this reflects the greatest lustre upon you, my countrymen ! for by these proceedings you are declared the only invariable assertors of the rights of Greece ; the only persons, whom no private attachment, no views of interest can seduce from their affection to the Greeks.

And that it is with reason he entertains these sentiments of you, and sentiments so different of the Thebans and the Argians; he may be convinced, not from the present only, but from a review of former times. For he must have been informed, I presume, he cannot but have heard, that your ancestors, when by submitting to the KING, they might have purchased the sovereignty of Greece; not only scorned to listen, [A] when Alexander this man's ancestor was made the messenger of such terms, but chose to abandon their city, encountered every possible difficulty; and after all this, performed such exploits, as men are ever eager to recite, yet with the just force and dignity, no man ever could express: and therefore it becomes me to be silent on this subject: for in reality their actions are superior to the power of words. As to the ancestors

[A] *When Alexander, &c.* The reader may find the history here alluded to in the eighth and ninth books of Herodotus. The expressions in the original, are as contemptuous as possible, ὁ τέρης; or as some editions have it, ὁ τέρων Πρύωνος, the ancestor of *these wretches the Macedonians*; and then, not Πρέσβευς, *ambassador*, but ΚΗΡΥΞ, *herald or crier, the slave or menial officer of his master Mardonius*. Avec le titre d'ambassadeur (as Tourréil translates it) suggests the honourable idea which Demosthenes takes such pains to keep out of view.



of the Thebans and the Argians, the [B] one, he knows, fought for the Barbarian; the others did not oppose him. He knew then, that both these people would attend but their private interest, without the least regard to the common cause of Greece: should he choose you for allies, you would serve him so far only, as justice would permit; but if he attached himself to them, he gained assistants, in all the schemes of his ambition. This it is that then determined him, this it is that now

[B] *The one, he knows, fought for the Barbarian; the others did not oppose him.* The readiness with which the Thebans granted earth and water, the tokens of submission, to the Persian, the regret with which they joined Leonidas at Thermopylae, their joining openly with Xerxes, when his arms had the appearance of success, and other circumstances, confirmed by the united testimony of historians, all warrant the assertion of Demosthenes. The Argians were engaged to a neutrality, by an artifice of the Persians, who pretended to derive their descent from Perseus, the son of Acrisus, one of the kings of Argos. This pretence, how gross soever, was sufficient for a people who chose to be deceived: and would not reflect that this monarchy had not the title of Persian, till the reign of Cyrus. Their infidelity to the cause of Greece, they concealed under the veil of ambition; for they professed themselves ready to concur in the common defence, provided that they were admitted to an equal share of the command with Lacedemon: which proposal was rejected, as they desired. TOUR.

determines

determines him to their side rather than to yours : not that he sees they have [c] a greater naval force than we ; or that, having gained the sovereignty in the inland countries, he declines the command of the seas, and the advantages of commerce ; or that he hath forgotten those pretences, those promises which obtained him the peace.

But I may be told, “ it is true, he did act thus ; but not from ambition, or from any of those motives of which I accuse him ; but as he thought the cause of Thebes [D] more just than ours.”——This of all pre-

[c] *A greater naval force, &c.* Athens, as a maritime power, was superior to all the other Greeks. At the battle of Salamis, of the 300 vessels which composed the Grecian fleet, 200 were Athenian. 300 ships sailed from the port of Athens upon the expedition to Sicily ; and their fleet was afterwards encreased to 400. TOUR.

[D] *The cause of Thebes more just than, &c.* The union of Philip with the Thebans, had a very plausible colour : that of espousing the cause of Apollo, and punishing the sacrilegious profaners of his temple. It was not convenient to display this at large, and therefore he cuts it short by one vague expression. For the art of an orator appears no less in suppressing such things as may prove unfavourable to his design, than in dwelling on those points which may assist it. TOUR.

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tences he cannot now alledge. [E] Can he, who commands the Lacedemonians to quit their claim to Messene, pretend that in giving up Orchomenus and Coronea to the Thebans, he acted from regard to justice? But now comes his last subterfuge. He was compelled: and yielded these places, quite against his inclinations; being encompassed by the Thessalian horse, and Theban infantry. Fine pretence!—Just so, they cry, he is to entertain suspicions of the Thebans: and some spread rumours of their own framing, that he is to [F] fortify Elatea. Yes! these things are yet to be, and will ever remain so; in my opinion; but his attack on Lacedemon in conjunction with the Thebans and Argians is not yet to be made. No! he is actually detaching forces, supplying money; and is himself expected at the head of a formidable

[E] *Can he who commands the Lacedemonians, &c.* Because the pretensions of each were of the same nature. Lacedemon assumed the supreme power in Peloponnesus. Thebes affected the like power in Boeotia.

[F] *To fortify Elatea.* This was the most considerable city in Phocis; and by it's situation, very well fitted to keep the Thebans in awe. So that some years after, when Philip perceived that the Thebans were growing cool to him, his first step was to take possession of Elatea.

TOUR.

army.

army. The Lacedemonians therefore, the enemies of Thebes, he now infests. And will he then restore the Phocians, whom he hath but just now ruined? who can believe this? I, for my part, can never think, if Philip had been forced into those former measures, or if he had now abandoned the Thebans, he would make this continued opposition to their enemies. No! his present measures prove that all his past conduct was the effect of choice; and from all his actions it appears, that all his actions are directly levelled against the state. And there is in some sort a necessity for this. Consider: he aims at empire: and from you alone he expects opposition. He hath long loaded us with injuries: and of this he himself is most intimately conscious: for those of our possessions which he hath reduced to his service, he uses as a barrier to his other territories: so that if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would not think himself secure even in Macedon. He is therefore sensible, that he entertains designs against you, and that you perceive them. Then, as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he concludes that you must hold him in that abhorrence which he merits: and is alarmed: expecting to feel some effects of your resentment, (if you have any favourable opportunity)



opportunity) unless he prevents you by his attack. Hence is his vigilance awakened: his arm raised against the state: he courts some of the Thebans, and such of the Peloponnesians as have the same views with him; whom he deems too mercenary to regard any thing but present interest, and too perversely stupid to foresee any consequences. And yet persons of but moderate discernment may have some manifest examples to alarm them, [G] which I had occasion to mention to the Messenians, and to the Argians. Perhaps it may be proper to repeat them here.

“ Messenians! said I, how highly (think ye)  
 “ would the Olynthians have been offended,  
 “ if any man had spoken against Philip  
 “ at that time when he gave them up [H]  
 “ Anthemus, a city which the former kings  
 of

[G] *Which I had occasion to, &c.* When Philip first began to interest himself in the disputes between these states and Lacedemon, the Athenians sent an embassy, to endeavour to weaken his Interest in Peloponnesus, and to dissuade the Messenians and Argians from accepting of his interposition. On this occasion it was, that Demosthenes made the oration from which he now quotes this passage.

[H] *Anthemus.* This city of Macedon had been possessed by the ancestors of Philip from the earliest ages; for

“ of Macedon had ever claimed? when he  
 “ drove out the Athenian colony, and gave  
 “ them Potidaea? when he took all our re-  
 “ sentment on himself, and left them to enjoy  
 “ our dominions? Did they expect to have  
 “ suffered thus? had it been foretold, would  
 “ they have believed it? you cannot think it!  
 “ Yet after a short enjoyment of the territories  
 “ of others, they have been for ever despoiled  
 “ of their own, by this man. Inglorious  
 “ has been their fall, not conquered only,  
 “ but betrayed and sold by one another. For  
 “ those intimate correspondences with tyrants  
 “ ever portend mischief to free states. Turn  
 “ your eyes, said I, to the Thessalians! think  
 “ ye, that when he first expelled their tyrants,  
 “ when he then gave them up [1] Nicaea and  
 “ Magnesia, that they expected ever to have  
 “ been subjected to those governors now im-  
 “ posed on them? or that the man who restored  
 “ them to their seat in the Amphictyonic  
 “ council, would have deprived them of their  
 “ own proper revenues? yet that such was

for we learn from Herodotus, B. 5. that about 200 years  
 before, Amyntas made an offer of Anthemus to Hippias  
 the son of Pisistratus.

TOUR.

[1] *Nicaea*. This city of Locris had been given up to  
 Philip, by Phalecus, at the conclusion of the sacred war.

TOUR.

“ the event, the world can testify. In like  
 “ manner, you now behold Philip lavishing  
 “ his gifts and promises upon you. If you  
 “ are wise, you will pray that he may never  
 “ appear to have deceived and abused you.  
 “ Various are the contrivances for the defence  
 “ and security of cities: as battlements, and  
 “ walls, and trenches, and every other kind  
 “ of fortification: all which are the effects of  
 “ labour, and attended with continual ex-  
 “ pence. But there is one common bulwark,  
 “ with which men of prudence are naturally  
 “ provided, the guard and security of all  
 “ people, particularly of free states, against the  
 “ assaults of tyrants. What is this? Distrust.  
 “ Of this be mindful: to this adhere: pre-  
 “ serve this carefully, and no calamity can  
 “ affect you. What is it you seek? said I:  
 “ liberty? And do ye not perceive that no-  
 “ thing can be more adverse to this than the  
 “ very titles of Philip? every monarch, every  
 “ tyrant is an enemy to liberty, and the op-  
 “ poser of laws. Will ye not then be careful,  
 “ lest, while ye seek to be freed from war,  
 “ ye find yourselves his slaves?”

But altho' they heard these things, and  
 loudly exprest their approbation; tho' the like  
 points were frequently urged by the ambas-  
 sadors,

PHILIPPIC THE SECOND. 157

fadors, while I was present; and probably were afterwards repeated; yet still, they have no less dependence on the friendship and the promises of Philip. But it is not strange that the Messenians and some of the Peloponnesians should act contrary to the dictates of nature, reason, and reflection. Even you, who are yourselves fully sensible, and constantly reminded by your public speakers, that there are designs forming against you, that the toils of your enemies are surrounding you; will, I fear, be plunged by your supineness into all those dangers that threaten you: so vastly prevalent is the pleasure and indulgence of a moment, over all your future interests. — But as to the course necessary to be pursued, prudence requires, that this be debated hereafter among yourselves. At present, I shall propose such an answer to these ministers, as may be worthy of your concurrence. [K] \* \* \* \* \*

It would be just, Athenians, to call the men before you, who gave those promises which induced you to conclude the peace.

For

[K] Though none of the editors take notice of it; in this place, the proper officer must have proposed the orator's motion in form. Unless we suppose, that this  
oration



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For neither would I have undertaken the embassy, nor would you (I am convinced) have laid down your arms, had it been suspected that Philip would have acted thus, when he had obtained a peace. No! the assurances he then gave, were quite different from his present actions. There are others also to be summoned. Who are these? The men, who, at my return from the second embassy, (sent for the ratification of the treaty) when I saw the state abused, and warned you of your danger, and testified the truth, and opposed with all my power the giving up Thermopylae and Phocis; the men, I say, who then cried out that I the water-drinker, was morose and peevish; but that Philip, if permitted to pass, would act agreeably to your desires; would fortify Thespia and Plataea; restrain the insolence of Thebes; [L] cut thro'

oration has descended to us imperfect: for as the text now stands, there is a manifest want of connection between this sentence, and what follows. OLIVET.

[L] *Cut thro' the Chersonesus, &c.* When Cerfobleptes has given up the Chersonesus to the Athenians, it became perpetually exposed to the incursions of Thrace. The only way of putting a stop to them was to cut thro' the Isthmus, (for the Thracians had no ships.) And this Philip promised to do in favour of the Athenians and their colonies.

TOUR.

the

the Chersonesus at his own expence; and give you up Euboea and Oropus, as an equivalent for Amphipolis.——That all this was positively affirmed, you cannot, I am sure, forget, tho' not remarkable for remembering injuries. And to compleat the disgrace, you have engaged your posterity to the same treaty, in full dependence on those promises; so entirely have you been seduced.

And now, to what purpose do I mention this? and why do I desire that these men should appear?——I call the Gods to witness, that without the least evasion I will boldly declare the truth!——Not that by breaking out into invectives, I may expose myself to the like treatment, and once more give my old enemies an opportunity of receiving Philip's gold: nor yet that I may indulge an impertinent vanity of haranguing. But I apprehend the time must come, when Philip's actions will give you more concern than at present. His designs, I see, are ripening: I wish my apprehensions may not prove just: but I fear that time is not far off. And when it will no longer be in your power to disregard events; when neither mine nor any other person's information, but your own knowledge, your own senses will assure you of the impending danger;

danger; then will your severest resentment break forth. And as your ambassadors have concealed certain things, influenced (as they themselves are conscious) by corruption; I fear that they who endeavour to restore what these men have ruined, may feel the weight of your displeasure: for there are some, I find, who generally point their anger not at the deserving objects, but those most immediately at their mercy.

While our affairs, therefore, remain not absolutely desperate; while it is yet in our power to debate; give me leave to remind you all, of one thing, tho' none can be ignorant of it. —[M] Who was the man that persuaded you to give up Phocis and Thermopylae? which once gained, he also gained free access for his troops, to Attica and to Peloponnesus: and obliged us to turn our thoughts from the rights of Greece, from all foreign interests, to a defensive war, in these very territories: whose approach must be severely felt by every one of us: and that very day gave birth to it: for had we not been then deceived, the

[M] *Who was the Man, &c.* The person pointed at, is Aeschines. These two statesmen accused each other, when the bad consequences of this treaty came to be universally felt and acknowledged.

state

PHILIPPIC THE SECOND. 161

state could have nothing to apprehend. His naval power could not have been great enough to attempt Attica by sea, nor could he have passed by land thro' Thermopylae and Phocis. But he must have either confined himself within the bounds of justice, and lived in a due observance of his treaty, or have instantly been involved in a war, equal to that which obliged him to sue for peace.

Thus much may be sufficient to recall past actions to your view. May all the Gods forbid that the event should confirm my suspicions! for I by no means desire that any man should meet even the deserved punishment of his crimes, when the whole community is in danger of being involved in his destruction.

*End of the* SECOND PHILIPPIC.



## PHILIPIC THE SECOND.

State could have nothing to apprehend. This naval power could not have been great enough to attempt Africa by sea, nor could he have passed by land thro' Thermopylae and Phocis. But he must have either confined himself within the bounds of justice, and lived in the observance of his treaty, or have instantly been involved in a war, equal to that which obliged him to the former peace.

Thus much may be sufficient to recall past actions to your view. May all the Gods forbid that the event should contain any lesson! for I by no means desire that any man should meet even the distant punishment of his crimes, when the whole community is in danger of being involved in his delinquency.

## ARCHONSHIP & SOCIETY.

THESE YEAHS ARE THE SECOND PHILIPIC.

## End of the SECOND PHILIPIC.

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THE  
O R A T I O N  
ON THE  
STATE of the CHERSONESUS:  
PRONOUNCED IN THE  
ARCHONSHIP of SOSIGENES,  
TWO YEARS after the SECOND PHILIPPIC.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**I**N the foregoing oration, the vehemence of Demosthenes determined the Athenians to oppose the attempts of Philip; and his representations to the Argians and Messenians inspired them with suspicion, and at length detached them from all connexions with Macedon. When Philip therefore found his practices in Peloponnesus unsuccessful, he began to turn his thoughts to other enterprises: to pursue his conquests in Thrace, and cross the Athenian interest in the Chersonesus. This peninsula had, with some little interruption, been for many years in the hands of the Athenians. Cotys, as king of the country, had lately wrested it from them, and left it in succession to his son Cersobleptes. But he being unable to support himself against the power of Philip, resigned it again to the Athenians; and they, according to custom, sent in a colony, which the inhabitants received, and freely shared their lands and habitations with their new guests. The people of Cardia, the principal city, however, still asserted  
their



## INTRODUCTION.

*their independence ; and when Diopithes, the head of the Athenian colony, would have reduced them by force of arms, had recourse to Philip ; who immediately detached a body of forces to their support. Diopithes considered this proceeding as an act of hostility against Athens ; and without waiting for instructions from his state, raised a considerable force ; and while Philip was engaged in war, in the inland parts of Thrace, entered the maritime parts (which were his territories) with fire and sword, and brought off a great booty, which he lodged safe in the Chersonesus. Philip was not at leisure to repel this insult : he therefore contented himself with complaining by letters, to the Athenians, of this conduct of their general. The pensioners which he had at Athens, immediately exerted themselves for their master. They inveighed loudly against Diopithes, accused him of violating the peace which then subsisted between them and Philip, of involving the state in war ; of exaction, rapine, and piracy ; and pressed for his being recalled.*

*Demosthenes, judging, that at such a juncture, the public interest was connected with that of Diopithes, undertakes his defence in the following oration ; throws the whole blame of the exactions and piracies he is accused of, upon the Athenians themselves ; turns their attention to Philip and*  
*his*

## INTRODUCTION.

*his hostilities; and concludes, that whoever opposes or distresses him in any manner, does a service to the state; and that, instead of disavowing what Diopithes had done, or directing him to dismiss his army, they should reinforce him, and shew the king of Macedon, they know how to protect their territories, and to maintain the dignity of their country, as well as their ancestors.*

*It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that before Demosthenes arose, the affair had been violently contested in the assembly. Possibly the heat of opposition added to the natural fire of the orator. For the style of the oration is (in my opinion) remarkably animated: and we find an extraordinary degree of severity and indignation breaking out in every part of it.*

INTRODUCTION

THE following is a summary of the contents of the

report of the Committee on the

subject of the

proposed

amendment to the

constitution of the

State of the

CHERRONESS.

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THE  
O R A T I O N  
ON THE  
STATE of the CHERSONESUS.

**I**T were to be wished, Athenians, that they who speak in public, would never suffer hatred or affection to influence their counsels; but in all that they propose, be directed by unbiaſſed reason; particularly, when affairs of ſtate, and thoſe of higheſt moment, are the object of our attention. But ſince there are perſons, whoſe ſpeeches are partly dictated by a ſpirit of contention, partly by other like motives; it is your duty, Athenians, to exert that power which your numbers give you; and in all your reſolutions, and in all your actions, to conſider only the intereſt of your country.

Our preſent concernment is about the affairs of the Chersonesus, and Philip's expedition  
into



into Thrace, which hath now engaged him eleven months: but most of our orators insist upon the actions and designs of Diopithes. As to crimes objected to those men, whom our laws can punish when we please; I, for my part, think it quite indifferent, whether they be considered now, or at some other time; nor is this a point to be violently contested, by me or any other speaker. But when Philip, the enemy of our country, is now actually [A] hovering about the Hellespont, with a numerous army, and making attempts on our dominions, which if one moment neglected, the loss may be irreparable; here, our attention is instantly demanded; we should resolve, we should prepare with all possible expedition, and not run from our main concern, in the midst of foreign clamours and accusations.

I have frequently been surprized at assertions made in public; but never more, than when I lately heard it affirmed [B] in the senate, that

[A] *Hovering about the Hellespont.* By the Hellespont we are to understand not the streight itself, that separates Europe from Asia, but the cities and countries all along the coast.

[B] *In the senate.* Into which Demosthenes had been admitted, in the archonship of Themistocles, a little after the

that there are but two expedients to be proposed, either absolutely to declare war, or to continue in peace. The point is this: if Philip acts as one in amity with us; if he does not keep possession of our dominions, contrary to his treaty; if he is not every where spiring up enemies against us; all debates are at an end; we are undoubtedly obliged to live in peace, and I find it perfectly agreeable to you. But if the articles of our treaty, ratified by the most solemn oaths, remain upon record, open to public inspection; if it appears, that long before the departure of Diopithes and his colony, who are now accused of involving us in a war, Philip had unjustly seized many of our possessions, (for which, I appeal to your own decrees;) if, ever since that time, he has been constantly arming himself with all the powers of Greeks and Barbarians, to destroy us; what do these men mean, who affirm we are either absolutely to declare war, or to observe the peace? You have no choice at all; you have but one just and necessary measure to pursue, which they industriously pass over. And what is this? to repel force by force.

the taking of Olynthus. And (if we may believe Aeschines) not in the regular manner; but by intrigue and bribery.

Unless

Unless they will affirm, that while Philip keeps from Attica and [c] the Piræus, he does our state no injury, makes no war against us. If it be thus they state the bounds of peace and justice, we must all acknowledge that their sentiments are inconsistent with the common rights of mankind, with the dignity and the safety of Athens.

Besides, they themselves contradict their own accusation of Diopithes. For shall Philip be left at full liberty to pursue all his other designs, provided he keeps from Attica; and shall not Diopithes be permitted to assist the Thracians? and if he does, shall we accuse him of involving us in a war?——But this is their incessant cry, “our foreign troops com-

[c] *The Piræus.* This is the first time the orator mentions this celebrated port at Athens. It was at first detached from the city, but afterwards joined to it, by two long walls which the Greeks called the Legs of the Piræus; and from that time, by the advice of Themistocles, the Athenians made this their principal harbour. It could contain 400 ships of war; was well fortified, and furnished with a market, to which all the trading part of Greece resorted. Historians call it the *triple port*, for it really contained three: the first called *Καὶθάπος*, from an hero of that name: the second *Ἀπολλισιον*, from two temples of Venus that were erected in it: the third *Ζεῆα*, because it was the mart for corn.

TOUR.

mit

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“ mit outrageous devastations on the Helles-  
“ pont: Diopithes, without regard to justice,  
“ seizes and plunders vessels! These things  
“ must not be suffered!” Be it so: I ac-  
quiesce! but while they are labouring to have  
our troops disbanded, by inveighing against  
that man, whose care and industry support  
them: (if they really speak from a regard to  
justice) they should shew us, that if we yield  
to their remonstrances, Philip’s army will also  
be disbanded: else, it is apparent that their  
whole aim is to reduce the state to those cir-  
cumstances which have occasioned all the  
losses we have lately suffered. For, be assured  
of this; that nothing hath given Philip such  
advantage over us, as his superior vigilance  
in improving all opportunities. For, as he is  
constantly surrounded by his troops, and his  
mind perpetually engaged in projecting his  
designs, he can, in a moment, strike the  
blow where he pleases. But we wait till  
some event alarms us: then we are in  
motion, then we prepare. To this alone I  
can impute it, that the conquests he hath  
lately made, he now enjoys in full security;  
while all your efforts are too late, all your  
vast expences ineffectual: your attempts have  
served only to discover your enmity, and in-  
clination to oppose him; and the conse-  
quences



quences of your misconduct are still farther aggravated by the disgrace.

Know then, Athenians, that all our orators alledge at present is but words, but idle pretences. Their whole designs, their whole endeavours are to confine you within the city; that while we have no forces in the field, Philip may be at full liberty to act as he pleases. Consider the present posture of affairs. Philip is now stationed in Thrace, at the head of a large army; and (as we are here informed) sends for reinforcements from Macedon and Thessaly. Now, should he watch the blowing of the Etesian winds, and march his forces to Byzantium, and invest it; in the first place, can you imagine that the Byzantines would persist in their present folly; or that they would not have recourse to you for assistance? I cannot think it. No: [D] if there

[D] *If there was a people whom they less confided in, &c.* In the third year of the 105th olympiad, the Byzantines entered into a league with Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, against the Athenians, and withdrew themselves from their dominion. This is what Demosthenes calls their *folly and extravagance*. They had reason to think the Athenians would regard them as rebellious subjects, and treat them with the resentment of offended sovereigns; “ however, says the orator, if they were reduced to the  
“ alternative

there was a people, in whom they less confided than in us; they would receive even these into their city, rather than give it up to him; unless prevented by the quickness of his attack. And, should we be unable to sail thither, should there be no forces ready to support them, nothing can prevent their ruin.—

“ But the extravagance and folly of these men exceed all bounds.”——I grant it. Yet still they should be secured from danger; for this is the interest of our state. Besides, it is by no means clear, that he will not march into the Chersonesus itself. On the contrary, if we may judge from the letter which he sent to you, he is determined to oppose us in that country. If then the forces stationed there be still kept up, we may defend our own dominions, and infest those of our enemy; if they be once dispersed and broken, what shall we do, if he attempts the Chersonesus?——

“ Bring Diopithes to a trial.”——And how will that serve us?——“ No: but we will dispatch succours from hence:”——What

“ alternative of either submitting to Philip, or having recourse to you for protection, they would without hesitation chuse the latter.” The event confirmed his prediction. Philip besieged Byzantium, the Byzantines had recourse to the Athenians, and Phocion at the head of their army obliged Philip to raise the siege. TOUR.

if the winds prevent us?—" But he will " not turn his arms thither."—Who will be our surety for this? Consider, Athenians! is not the season of the year approaching, in which it is thought by some, that you are to withdraw your forces from the Hellespont, and abandon it to Philip? But suppose, (for this too merits our attention) that at his return from Thrace, he should neither bend his force against the Chersonesus, nor Byzantium; but fall on Chalcis or Megara, as he lately did [E] upon Oreum; which would be the wiser course, to oppose him here, and make Attica the seat of war, or to find him employment abroad? I think, the latter.

Let these things sink deep into our minds: and let us not raise invidious clamours against those forces which Diopithes is endeavouring to keep up for the service of his country; or attempt to break them: let us rather prepare to reinforce them; grant their general the necessary supplies of money, and in every other instance favour his designs with an hearty zeal. Imagine this question proposed

[E] *As he lately did upon Oreum.* In the third Philippic, we shall find a particular account of the manner in which he reduced this city to his obedience.

to Philip: " which would be most agreeable  
 " to you, that the forces commanded by Dio-  
 " pithes—(of whatever kind they be, for I  
 " will not dispute on that head) " should con-  
 " tinue in full strength and good esteem at  
 " Athens, and be reinforced by detachments  
 " from the city; or that the clamours and  
 " invectives of some persons should prevail  
 " to have them broken and disbanded?" I  
 think he would chuse this latter. And are  
 there men among us labouring for that which  
 Philip would entreat the Gods to grant him?  
 and if so, is it still a question, whence our  
 distresses have arisen?

Let me entreat you to examine the present  
 state of Athens, with an unbiassed freedom;  
*to consider*, how we are acting, and how our  
 affairs are conducted. We neither are willing  
 to raise contributions, nor do we dare to take  
 the field, nor do we spare the public funds,  
 nor do we grant supplies to Diopithes, nor do  
 we approve of those subsidies he hath procured  
 himself: but we malign him, we pry into his  
 designs, and watch his motions. Thus we  
 proceed, quite regardless of our interests; and  
 while in words we extol those speakers who  
 assert the dignity of their country, our actions  
 favour their opposers.—It is usual, when a



speaker rises, to ask him, "What are we to do?" Give me leave to propose the like question to you: "What am I to say?" For if you neither raise contributions, nor take the field, nor spare the public funds, nor grant subsidies to Diopithes, nor approve of those provisions he hath made himself, nor take the due care of our interests, I have nothing to say. If you grant such unbounded licence to informers, as even to listen to their accusations of a man, for what they pretend he will do, before it be yet done; what can one say? —

But it is necessary to explain to some of you the effect of this behaviour: (I shall speak with an undaunted freedom, for in no other manner can I speak.) — It has been the constant custom of all the commanders who have sailed from this city, (if I advance a falsehood, let me feel the severest punishment) to take money from the Chians, and from the Erythrians, and from any people that would give it; I mean of the inhabitants of Asia. They who have but one or two ships, take a talent; they who command a greater force, raise a larger contribution. And the people who give this money, whether more or less, do not

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not give it for nothing; (they are not so mad) no; it is the price they pay, to secure their trading vessels from rapine and piracy, to provide them with the necessary convoys, and the like; however they may pretend friendship and affection, and dignify those payments with the name of free gifts. It is therefore evident, that as Diopithes is at the head of a considerable power, the same contributions will be granted to him. Else, how shall he pay soldiers? how shall he maintain them, who receives nothing from you, and has nothing of his own? from the skies? no; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. So that the whole scheme of his accusers is to warn all people to grant him nothing; as he is to suffer punishment for crimes yet to be committed, not for any he hath already committed, or in which he hath already assisted. This is the meaning of their clamours. "He is going to form sieges! he leaves the Greeks exposed." Have these men all this tenderness for the Grecian colonies of Asia? They then prefer the interests of foreigners to that of their own country. This must be the case, if they prevail to have another general sent to the Hellespont. If Diopithes commits outrages, if

he is guilty of piracy, [F] one single edict, Athenians, a single edict will put a stop to such proceedings. This is the voice of our laws; that such offenders should [G] be impeached; and not opposed with such vast preparations of ships and money; (this would be the height of madness:) it is against our enemies, whom the laws cannot touch, that we ought, we must maintain our forces, send out our navies, and raise our contributions. But, when citizens have offended, we can decree, we can impeach, [H] we can recall.

These

[F] *One single edict.* In the Greek Πινδύριον, which in this place may either signify the tablet which was fixed up in public, containing a citation of the accused party, and an account of the crimes of which he was accused; or that which was given to the judges who sat on his trial, to write their sentences upon. I have chosen the first of these senses.

[G] *That such offenders should be impeached.* The Greek words 'Εισαγγελίαν, and 'Εισαγγελία, which I have translated to *impeach*, and *impeachment*, are terms in the Athenian judicature; and relate to those particular kind of actions, which were not referred to any court of justice, but immediately brought before the senate of 500, or assembly of the people, and sometimes before the Archon: and in which, both the accusation and defence were made by word of mouth, without any written articles.

[H] *We can recall.* In the original *we have the Πάραλος*, that is, the Gally called so (from the hero Paralus, who with Theseus signalized himself against the Thebans).

The

These are arms sufficient; these are the measures befitting men of prudence: they who would raise disorder and confusion in the state, may have recourse to such as these men propose.

But, dreadful as it is, to have such men among us, yet the dreadful circumstance of all is this. You assemble here, with minds so disposed, that, if any one accuses Diopithes, or [H] Chares, or [I] Aristophon, or any citizen

N 3

whatever,

The Athenians had two galleys, the Salaminian, and Paralian, appointed for the most pressing occasions of the state. In allusion to this usage, Pericles was called the Salaminian Gally, because he affected to appear in public only upon extraordinary emergencies. When Lysander had beaten the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont, the Paralian gally was dispatched with the melancholy news to the people. And when Alcibiades was recalled from Sicily, to defend himself against the charge of impiety, the Salaminian gally was ordered to bring him home. Both the one and the other were employed to recall such generals as were superseded.

TOUR.

[H] *Or Chares.* This apology (says monsieur Turreil) favours a little of faction and cabal: their ill success might with great justice have been charged upon Chares. Indeed what could have been expected from a general no less incapable than luxurious, who in all his military expeditions drew after him a train of musicians, whom he kept in pay at the expence of his troops? accordingly his enterprizes were unsuccessful; and, to crown all his mis-

carriages,



whatsoever, as the cause of our misfortunes, you instantly break forth into acclamations and applause. But if a man stands forth, and thus declares the truth, "this is all trifling, Athenians! It is to Philip we owe our calamities: he hath plunged us in these difficulties: for had he observed his treaty, our state would be in perfect tranquillity." This you cannot deny; but you hear it with the utmost grief, as if it were the account of some dreadful misfortune. The cause is this; (for when I am to urge the interest of my country, let me speak boldly.)—Certain persons, who have been entrusted with public affairs, have for a long time past rendered you daring and terrible, in council; but, in all affairs of war, wretched and contemptible. Hence it is, that if a citizen, subject to your

carriages, he lost the battle of Chaeronea. And yet this Chares was able to support himself to the last, by the credit of those orators who protected him.

[1] *Or Aristophon.* Another Athenian general. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1. 2. c. 23.) mentions a smart answer made to him by Iphicrates. Aristophon accused him of having betrayed the fleet which he commanded. Iphicrates, with that confidence which an established reputation inspires, asked him, *would you be guilty of such a piece of treachery?* By no means, answered he. *What!* returned the other, *can Iphicrates have committed what Aristophon would refuse to do?*

TOUR.

OWN

own power and jurisdiction, be pointed out as the author of your misfortunes, you hear the accusation with applause; but if they are charged upon a man, who must first be conquered before he can be punished, then you are utterly disconcerted: that truth is too severe to be borne. Your ministers, Athenians, should take a quite contrary course. They should render you gentle and humane in council, where the rights of citizens and allies come before you: in military affairs, they should inspire you with fierceness and intrepidity; for here you are engaged with enemies, with armed troops. But now, by leading you gently on to their purposes, by the most abject compliance with your humours, they have so formed and moulded you, that in your assemblies you are delicate, and attend but to flattery and entertainment; in your affairs, you find yourselves threatened with extremity of danger.

And now, in the name of heaven, [K] suppose that the states of Greece should thus demand an account of those opportunities

N 4

which

[K] Suppose that the states of Greece should thus demand, &c. After the taking of Olynthus, when the Athenians were at last prevailed upon to declare war in form

which your indolence hath lost. "Men of  
 "Athens! you are ever sending embassies to  
 "us; you assure us that Philip is projecting  
 "our ruin, and that of all the Greeks; you  
 "warn us to guard against this man's designs.  
 "(And, it is too true, we have done thus.)  
 "But, O most wretched of mankind! when  
 "this man had been ten months detained  
 "abroad; when sickness, and the severity of  
 "winter, and the armies of his enemies, ren-  
 "dered it impossible for him to return home;  
 "you neither restored the liberty of Euboea,  
 "nor recovered any of your own dominions.  
 "But while you sit at home in perfect ease  
 "and health, (if such a state may be called  
 "health) Euboea is commanded by his two  
 "tyrants [L]; the one, just opposite to Attica,  
 "to keep you perpetually in awe; the other

form against Philip, they sent embassies to all the states of Greece to represent the danger of his growing power, and to engage them to join against him. From hence the orator takes occasion to introduce this beautiful *Protopoeia*, by which he throws out the bitterest reproaches against his countrymen, so artfully, as not to give them offence, and yet at the same time sets the shamefulness of their misconduct in the strongest light. TOUR.

[L] *By his two tyrants.* Philistides and Clitarchus: the one fixed at Eretria, opposite to Attica; the other at Oreum, over against Scyathus, an island subject to Athens.

" to

“ to Scyathus. Yet you have not attempted  
 “ to oppose even this. No; you have sub-  
 “ mitted; you have been insensible to your  
 “ wrongs; you have fully declared, that if  
 “ Philip were ten times to die, it would not  
 “ inspire you with the least degree of vigour.  
 “ Why then these embassies, these accusa-  
 “ tions, all this unnecessary trouble, to us?”—  
 If they should say this, what could we alledge?  
 what answer could we give? I know not!

We have those among us, who think a  
 speaker fully confuted by asking, “ What then  
 “ is to be done?” to whom I answer, with  
 the utmost truth and justness, “ not what we  
 “ are now doing.”——But I shall be more  
 explicit; if they will be as ready to follow,  
 as to ask advice.

First then, Athenians, be firmly convinced  
 of these truths. That Philip does commit  
 hostilities against us, and has violated the  
 peace; (and let us no longer accuse each other  
 of his crimes;)—that he is the implacable  
 enemy of this whole city, of the ground on  
 which this city stands, of every inhabitant  
 within these walls; even of those who imagine  
 themselves highest in his favour. If they  
 doubt this, let them think of Euthycrates and  
 Lasthenes,



Læsthenes, the Olynthians. They who seemed the nearest to his heart, the moment they betrayed their country, were distinguished only by the superior cruelty of their death. But it is against our constitution, that his arms are principally directed; nor, in all his schemes, in all his actions, hath he any thing so immediately in view, as to subvert it. And there is in some sort a necessity for this. He knows full well, that his conquests, however great and extensive, can never be secure, while you continue free; but that, if once he meets with any accident, (and every man is subject to many,) all those whom he hath forced into his service, will instantly revolt, and fly to you for protection. For you are not naturally disposed to grasp at empire yourselves; but to frustrate the ambitious attempts of others; to be ever ready to oppose usurpation, and assert the liberty of mankind; this is your peculiar character. And therefore it is not without regret that he sees, in your freedom, a spy upon the incidents of his fortune. Nor is this his reasoning weak or trivial.

In the first place, therefore, we are to consider him as the enemy of our state, the implacable enemy of our free constitution. Nothing but the deepest sense of this can give you

you a true, vigorous, and active spirit. In the next place be assured, that every thing he is now labouring, every thing he is concerting, he is concerting against our city; and that wherever any man opposes him, he opposes an attempt against these walls. For none of you can be weak enough to imagine that Philip's desires are centered in those paltry villages of Thrace; (for what name else can one give to [M] Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira, and all those places he is now reducing to his obedience?) that he endures the severity of toils and seasons, and braves the utmost dangers for these; and has no designs upon the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver-mines, and all the other revenues of Athens; but that he will leave them for you to enjoy; while, for some wretched hoards of grain in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in [N] the horrors of a dungeon?

[M] *For what name else can one give to Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira, &c.* Drongilus and Cabyle, however the orator affects to treat them with contempt, are yet mentioned in history. As to Mastira, it is entirely unknown: hence Harpocration suggested, that instead of Mastira we should read Bastira; a town of Thrace of that name having been mentioned in a history of Philip, written by Anaximenes, a work long time lost. TOUR.

[N] *In the horrors of a dungeon.* In the original it is in a *Barathrum*. There was a ditch or cavern in Athens of that

geon? Impossible! No; these and all his expeditions are really intended to facilitate the conquest of Athens.

Let us then approve ourselves men of wisdom; and, fully persuaded of these truths, let us shake off our extravagant and dangerous supineness. Let us supply the necessary expences; let us call upon our allies; let us take all possible measures for keeping up a regular army: so that, as he has his force constantly prepared to injure and enslave the Greeks, yours too may be ever ready to protect and assist them. If you depend upon occasional detachments, you cannot ever expect the least degree of success: you must keep an army constantly on foot, provide for its maintenance, appoint public treasures, and by all possible means secure your military funds: and, while these officers account for all disbursements, let your generals be bound to answer for the conduct of the war. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an

that name, into which criminals were precipitated. So that by this figure he not only represents the dreadful and deadly nature of the country, but at the same time sets Philip in the light of a wicked wretch, who merited the vilest and most ignominious fate.

TOUR.

equitable

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equitable peace, and to confine himself to his own kingdom, (which is most for our interest,) or we shall fight him upon equal terms.

If any man thinks that the measures I propose will require great expence, and be attended with much toil and trouble; he thinks justly. Yet let him consider, what consequences must attend the state, if these measures be neglected; and it will appear, that we shall really be gainers, by engaging heartily in this cause. Suppose some God should be our surety, (for no mortal ought to be relied on, in an affair of such moment) that if we continue quiet, and give up all our interests, he will not at last turn his arms against us; it would yet be shameful; it would (I call all the powers of heaven to witness!) be unworthy of you, unworthy the dignity of your country, and the glory of your ancestors, to abandon the rest of Greece to slavery, for the sake of private ease. I, for my part, would die, rather than propose so mean a conduct: however, if there be any other person who will recommend it, be it so; neglect your defence; give up your interests! but if there is no such counsellor; if, on the contrary, we all foresee, that the farther this man is suffered

to



to extend his conquests, the more formidable and powerful enemy we must find in him; why this reluctance? why do we delay? or when, my countrymen, will we perform our duty? Must some necessity compel us? What one may call the necessity of freemen, not only presses us now, but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. And how do these differ? To a freeman, the disgrace of past misconduct is the most urgent necessity: to a slave, stripes and bodily pains. Far be this from us! It ought not to be mentioned!

I would now gladly lay before you the whole conduct of certain politicians: but I spare them. One thing only I shall observe. The moment that Philip is mentioned, there is still one ready to start up, and cry, "what a happiness to live in peace! how grievous the maintenance of a great army! certain persons have designs upon our treasury!" Thus they delay your resolutions, and give him full liberty to act as he pleases: hence you gain ease and indulgence for the present; (which I fear may at some time prove too dear a purchase;) and these men recommend themselves to your favour, and are well paid for their service. But in my opinion there is

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no need to persuade you to peace, who sit down already thoroughly persuaded. Let it be recommended to him, who is committing hostilities: if he can be prevailed on, you are ready to concur. Nor should we think those expences grievous which our security requires; but the consequences which must arise, if such expences be denied. Then as to plundering our treasury, this must be prevented, by entrusting it to a proper guard, not by neglecting our affairs. For my own part, Athenians, I am filled with indignation, when I find some persons expressing their impatience, as if our treasures were exposed to plunderers; and yet utterly unaffected at the progress of Philip, who is successively plundering every state of Greece; and this, that he may at last fall with all his fury upon you.

What then can be the reason, Athenians, that notwithstanding all his manifest hostilities, all his acts of violence, all the places he hath taken from us, these men will not acknowledge that he has acted unjustly, and that he is at war with us; but accuse those of embroiling you in a war, who call upon you to oppose him, and to check his progress? I will tell you. That popular resentment which may arise from any disagreeable circumstances with

which a war may be attended (and it is necessary, absolutely necessary, that a war should be attended with many such disagreeable circumstances) they would cast upon your faithful counsellors, that you may pass sentence upon them, instead of opposing Philip; and they turn accusers, instead of meeting the punishment due to their present practices. This is the meaning of their clamours, that certain persons should involve you in a war: hence have they raised all these cavils and debates. I know full well, that before any Athenian had ever moved you to declare war against him, Philip seized many of our dominions; and hath now sent assistance to the Cardians. If you are resolved to dissemble your sense of his hostilities, he would be the weakest of mankind, if he attempted to contradict you. But suppose he marches directly against us, what will we say in that case? He will still assure us that he is not at war: such were his professions to the people of Oreum, when his forces were in the heart of their country; and to those of Pherae, until the moment that he attacked their walls; and thus he at first amused the Olynthians, until he had marched his army into their territory. And will you still insist, even in such a case, that they who call upon us to defend our country, are embroiling

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broiling us in a war? Then slavery is inevitable. There is no other medium between an obstinate refusal to take arms, on your part, and a determined resolution to attack us, on the part of our enemy.

Nor is the danger which threatens us the same with that of other people. It is not the conquest of Athens which Philip aims at: no; it is our utter extirpation. He knows full well, that slavery is a state you would not, or, if you were inclined, you could not submit to; for sovereignty is become habitual to you. Nor is he ignorant, that, at any unfavourable juncture, you have more power to obstruct his enterprizes, than the whole world besides.

Let us then be assured, that we are contending for the very being of our state; let this inspire us with abhorrence of those who have sold themselves to this man; and let them feel the severity of public justice: for it is not, it is not possible to conquer our foreign enemy, until we have punished those traitors who are serving him, within our walls. Else, while we strike on these, as so many obstacles, our enemies must necessarily prove superior to us.—And whence is it that he dares treat you with insolence, (I cannot give his present

O

conduct



conduct any other name,) that he utters menaces against you, while to others he does acts of kindness (to deceive them at least, if for no other purpose)? Thus, by heaping favours on the Thessalians, he hath reduced them to their present slavery. It is not possible to recount the various artifices, by which he abused the wretched Olynthians, from his first insidious gift of Potidaea. But now he seduced the Thebans to his party, by making them masters of Boeotia, and easing them of a great and grievous war. And thus, by being gratified in some favourite point, these people are either involved in calamities known to the whole world, or wait with submission for the moment when such calamities are to fall upon them. I do not recount all that you yourselves have lost, Athenians! but in the very conclusion of the peace, how have you been deceived? how have you been spoiled? Was not Phocis, was not Thermopylae, were not our Thracian dominions, Doriscum, Serrium, and [o] even our ally Cerfobleptes, all wrested from us? Is he not at this time in possession of

[A] *And even our ally Cerfobleptes.* The late treaty of peace, between Philip and the Athenians, was concluded without giving Cerfobleptes (then in alliance with Athens) an opportunity of acceding to it: nor was any provision made

of Cardia? and does he not avow it? Whence is it, I say, that he treats you in so singular a manner? Because our's is the only state where there is allowed full liberty to plead the cause of an enemy; and the man who sells his country, may harangue securely, at the very time that you are spoiled of your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at Olynthus, until the people of Olynthus had been gained by the surrender of Potidaea. In Theffaly, it was not safe to speak for Philip, until the Theffalians had been gained by the expulsion of their tyrants, and the recovery of their rank of Amphictyons; nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes, before he had restored Boeotia, and extirpated the Phocians. But at Athens, altho' he hath robbed us of Amphipolis, and the territory of Cardia; tho' he awes us with his fortifications in Euboea; tho' he is now upon his march to [P] Byzantium; yet his partizans may speak for Philip without any danger. Hence some of them, from the meanest poverty, have on a sudden risen to make by it for his security and protection. By this means Philip found himself at liberty to turn his arms against him, and a few years after drove him from his kingdom, and obliged him to become his tributary.

[P] *To Byzantium.* See the introduction to the following oration.

affluence; some, from obscurity and disgrace, to eminence and honour: while you, on the contrary, from glory, have sunk into mean-ness; from riches, to poverty: for the riches of a state I take to be its allies, its credit, its connexions; in all which you are poor. And by your neglect of these, your utter insensibility to your wrongs, he is become fortunate and great, the terror of Greeks and Barbarians; and you abandoned and despised; [Q] splendid indeed in the abundance of your markets; but as to any real provision for your security, ridiculously deficient.

[Q] *Splendid indeed in the abundance, &c.* They who opposed Philip's interest in the Athenian assembly, were ever urging the fallen condition of their country, and the dishonour of suffering another power to wrest that preeminence from her which had been enjoyed for ages. The speakers on the other side at first affected to despise the power of Philip, or insisted on the sincerity and uprightness of his intentions. But now, when the danger became too apparent, and his designs too flagrant to be dissembled, it appears that they had recourse to other arguments. They endeavoured to confine the views of the Athenians to what passed within their own walls; displayed the advantages of their trade, the flourishing state of their commerce; and perhaps recommended it as their true policy, to attend only to these, without making themselves a party in the quarrels of others, or loading the state with the expence of maintaining wars to support the power and interest of foreigners.

There

There are some orators, I find, who view your interests and their own in a quite different light. They would persuade you to continue quiet, whatever injuries are offered to you: they themselves cannot be quiet, though no one offers them the least injury. When one of these men rises, I am sure to hear, "What! will you not propose your decree? will you not venture? No; you are timid; you want true spirit."——I own, indeed, I am not, nor would I chuse to be a bold, an importunate, an audacious speaker. And yet, if I mistake not, I have more real courage than they who manage your affairs with this rash hardness. For he who, neglecting the the public interests, is engaged only in trials, in confiscations, in rewarding, in accusing, does not act from any principle of courage; but, as he never speaks but to gain your favour, never proposes measures that are attended with the least hazard: in this he has a pledge of his security; and therefore is he daring. But he who, for his country's good, oftentimes opposes your inclinations; who gives the most salutary, tho' not always the most agreeable counsel; who pursues those measures whose success depends more on fortune than on prudence, and is yet willing to be accountable for the event; this is the man of courage, this is



the true patriot: not they who, by flattering your passions, have lost the most important interests of the state: men whom I am so far from imitating, or deeming citizens of worth, that should this question be proposed to me, "What services have you done your country?" tho' I might recount the gallies I have fitted out, and [R] the public entertainments I have exhibited, and the contributions I have paid, and [s] the captives I have ransomed, and many like acts of benevolence, I would yet pass them all by, and only say, that my public conduct hath ever been directly opposite to theirs. I might, like them, have turned accuser, have distributed rewards and punish-

[R] *The public entertainments I have exhibited.* In the original, it is, the offices of *Choregus*, that I have discharged. Each of the ten tribes of Athens had their bands of musicians, to perform in the feasts of Bacchus, together with a poet, to compose the hymns and other pieces: and these bands contended for a prize. The feasts were exhibited with great magnificence; and, in order to defray the charges, they appointed the richest citizen out of each tribe (or sometimes he offered himself) to exhibit them at his own cost. He was called the *Choregus*; and if his band gained the prize, his name was inscribed, together with those of the tribe and the poet, upon the vase; which was the reward of the conquerors.

FOUR.

[s] *The captives I have ransomed.* See the preface to the Oration on the Peace.

ments:

ments : but this is a part I never assumed : my inclinations were averse ; nor could wealth or honours prompt me to it. No ; I confine myself to such counsels as have sunk my reputation ; but, if pursued, must raise the reputation of my country. Thus much I may be allowed to say, without exposing myself to envy.—I should not have thought myself a good citizen, had I proposed such measures as would have made me the first among my countrymen, but reduced you to the last of nations : on the contrary, the faithful minister should raise the glory of his country ; and, upon all occasions, advise the most salutary, not the easiest measures. To these, nature itself inclines ; those are not to be promoted, but by the utmost efforts of a wise and faithful counsellor.

I have heard it objected, “ that indeed I  
 “ ever speak with reason ; but that still this is  
 “ no more than words : that the state requires  
 “ something more effectual, some vigorous  
 “ actions.” Upon which, I shall give my sentiments without the least reserve. The sole business of a speaker is, in my opinion, to propose the course you are to pursue. It is easy to shew this. You know, that when the great Timotheus moved you to defend the

Euboeans, against the tyranny of Thebes, he addressed you thus: "What, my countrymen! when the Thebans are actually in the island, are you deliberating what is to be done, what part to be taken? Will you not cover the seas with your navies? Why are you not at the Piræus? why are you not embarked?"——Thus Timotheus advised, thus you acted; and success ensued. But had he spoken with the same spirit, and had your indolence prevailed, and his advice been rejected, would the state have had the same success? by no means. And so, in the present case, vigour and execution is your part; from your speakers you are only to expect wisdom and integrity.

I will just give a summary of my opinion; and then descend. You should raise supplies, you should keep up your present forces, and reform whatever abuses may be found in them (not break them entirely upon the first complaint). You should send ambassadors into all parts, to reform, to remonstrate, to exert all their efforts in the service of the state. But, above all things, let those corrupt ministers feel the severest punishment; let them, at all times, and in all places, be the objects of your abhorrence; that wise and faithful counsellors  
may

STATE of the CHERSONESUS. 201

may appear to have consulted their own interests, as well as that of others.—If you will act thus, if you will shake off this indolence, perhaps, even yet perhaps, we may promise ourselves some good fortune. But if you only just exert yourselves in acclamations and applauses, and, when any thing is to be done, sink again into your supineness, I do not see how all the wisdom of the world can save the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance.

*End of the ORATION on the CHERSONESUS.*



may appear to have confided their own interests as well as that of others.—If you will not thus, if you will shake off this indolence, perhaps, even yet perhaps, we may promise ourselves some good fortune. But if you only exert yourselves in acclamations and applauses, and when any thing is to be done, sink again into your torpor, I do not see how all the wisdom of the world can save the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance.

ORATION against the THIRD

Commonly called the THIRD

Pronounced in the same year  
AND OF THE ORATION at the CHERSONESUS

# INTRODUCTION

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## THE TENTH ORATION against PHILIP:

Commonly called the THIRD.

Pronounced in the same YEAR.

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# INTRODUCTION

## ORATION against PHILLIPS

Commonly called the THIRD.

Pronounced in the same Year.

in order to gain the B. P. and the  
number of his adherents but that he was  
that he refused to proceed in any manner  
It had a party in the city, in which  
the orator P. who, that engaged to do so  
up one of the gates but while he was on  
march towards the city the opportunity was  
covered, which immediately determined him to  
take another route. His sudden counter-  
intended to conceal the crime of P. who  
forward

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE former oration had its effect. For instead of punishing Diopithes, the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a condition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip pursued his Thracian conquests, and made himself master of several places, which, tho' of little importance in themselves, yet opened him a way to the cities of the Propontis, and above all to Byzantium, which he had always intended to annex to his dominions. He at first tried the way of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his allies: but this proving ineffectual, he resolved to proceed in another manner. He had a party in the city, at whose head was the orator Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates: but while he was on his march towards the city, the conspiracy was discovered, which immediately determined him to take another route. His sudden countermarch, intended to conceal the crime of Python, really



## INTRODUCTION.

served to confirm it. He was brought to trial; but the credit, and the presents of Philip, prevailed to save him.

The efforts of the Athenians to support their interests in Euboea, and the power which Philip had acquired there, and which every day increased, had entirely destroyed the tranquillity of this island. The people of Oreum, divided by the Athenian and Macedonian factions, were on the point of breaking out into a civil war; when, under pretence of restoring their peace, Philip sent them a body of a thousand forces, under the command of Hipponicus: which soon determined the superiority to his side. Philistides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public contests, was entrusted with the government of Oreum, which he administered with all possible severity and cruelty to those in the Athenian interest: while the other states of the island were also subjected to other Macedonian governors. Callias, the Chalcidian, whose inconstancy had made him espouse the interests of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon, successively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He sent deputies thither, to desire assistance, and to prevail on the Athenians to make some vigorous attempt to regain their power in Euboea.

## INTRODUCTION.

*In the mean time, the king of Persia, alarmed by the accounts of Philip's growing power, made use of all the influence which his gold could gain at Athens, to engage the Athenians to act openly against an enemy equally suspected by them both. This circumstance perhaps disposed them to give the greater attention to the following oration.*

PHILIPPIC

INTRODUCTION

[illegible]

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## PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.

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**T**HOUGH we have heard a great deal, Athenians, in almost every assembly, of those acts of violence which Philip hath been committing, ever since his treaty, not against our's only, but the other states of Greece; though all (I am confident) are ready to acknowledge, even they who fail in the performance, that we should, every one of us, exert our efforts, in council and in action, to oppose and to chastise his insolence; yet to such circumstances are you reduced, by your supineness, that I fear, (shocking as it is to say, yet) that if we had all agreed to propose, and you to embrace such measures, as would most effectually ruin our affairs, they could not have been more distressed, than at present. And to this, perhaps, a variety of causes have

P

conspired;



conspired ; nor could we have been thus affected by one, or two. But, upon a strict and just enquiry, you will find it principally owing to those orators, who study rather to gain your favour, than to advance your interests. Some of whom (attentive only to the means of establishing their own reputation and power) never extend their thoughts beyond the present moment, and therefore think that your views are equally confined. Others, by their accusations and invectives against those at the head of affairs, labour only to make the state inflict severity upon itself ; that, while we are thus engaged, Philip may have full power of speaking and of acting as he pleases. Such are now the usual methods of our statesmen ; and hence all our errors and disorders.

Let me entreat you, my countrymen, that if I speak some truths with boldness, I may not be exposed to your resentment. Consider this : on other occasions, you account liberty of speech so general a privilege of all within your city, that [A] aliens and slaves are allowed

[A] *Aliens and slaves.* The Athenians picqued themselves upon being the most independent and most humane of all people. With them a stranger had liberty of speaking as he pleased, provided he let nothing escape him against

lowed to share it. So that many domestics may be found among you, speaking their thoughts with less reserve, than citizens, in some other states. But from your councils you have utterly banished it. And the consequence is this: in your assemblies, as you listen only to be pleased, you meet with flattery and indulgence: in the circumstances of public affairs, you find yourselves threatened with the extremity of danger. If you have still the same dispositions, I must be silent: if you will attend to your true interests, without expecting to be flattered, I am ready to speak. For altho' our affairs are wretchedly situated, tho' our inactivity hath occasioned many losses, yet by proper vigour and resolution you may still repair them all. What I am now going to advance may possibly appear

against the government. So far were they from admitting him into their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to touch on state affairs in the presence of an alien. Their slaves enjoyed a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they were allowed to assume the character of masters, was originally an Athenian institution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and Theffaly, on the contrary, slaves were treated with such severity, as obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its reward: for their slaves did them considerable service on several occasions: at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginusae. TOUR.

incredible; yet it is a certain truth. The greatest of all our past misfortunes, is a circumstance the most favourable to our future expectations. And what is this? That the present difficulties are really owing to our utter disregard of every thing which in any degree affected our interest. For, were we thus situated, in spite of every effort which our duty demanded, then we should regard our fortune as absolutely desperate. But now Philip hath conquered your supineness and inactivity; the state he hath not conquered. Nor have you been defeated; your force hath not even been exerted.

Were it generally acknowledged that Philip was at war with the state, and had really violated the peace, the only point to be considered would then be, how to oppose him with the greatest ease and safety. But since there are persons so strangely infatuated, that, altho' he is still extending his conquests, altho' he has possessed himself of a considerable part of our dominions, altho' all mankind have suffered by his injustice, they can yet hear it repeated in this assembly, that it is some of us, who are embroiling the state in war. This suggestion must first be guarded against; else there is reason to apprehend, that the man  
who

who moves you to oppose your adversary, may incur the censure of being author of the war.

And, first of all, I lay down this as certain: if it were in our power to determine whether we should be at peace or war; if peace (that I may begin with this) were wholly dependent upon the option of the state, there is no doubt but we should embrace it. And I expect, that he who asserts it is, will, without attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form, and propose it to your acceptance. But if the other party hath drawn the sword, and gathered his armies round him; if he amuses us with the name of peace, while he really proceeds to all kinds of hostilities, what remains but to oppose him? To make professions of peace, indeed, like him; if this be agreeable to you, I acquiesce. But if any man takes that for peace, which is enabling him, after all his other conquests, to lead his forces hither, his mind must be disordered: at least, it is our conduct only towards him, not his towards us, that must be called a peace. But this it is for which all Philip's treasures are expended; that he should carry on the war against you; but that you should make no war on him.—Should we continue



thus inactive, 'till he declares himself our enemy, we should be the weakest of mortals. This he would not do, altho' he were in the heart of Attica, even at the Piraeus; if we may judge from his behaviour to others. For it was not 'till he came [B] within a few miles of Olynthus, that he declared, that "either the Olynthians must quit their city, or he his kingdom." Had he been accused of this at any time before, he would have repented it, and ambassadors must have been dispatched to justify their master. In like manner, while he was moving towards the Phocians, he still affected to regard them as allies and friends: nay, there were actually ambassadors from Phocis, who attended him in his march: and among us were many, who insisted that this march portended no good to Thebes. Not long since, when he went into Thessaly with all the appearance of amity, he possessed himself of Pherae. And it is but now he told the wretched people of Oreum, that he had, in all affection, sent some forces to inspect their affairs: for that he heard they laboured under disorders and seditions; and that true friends and allies should not be absent upon

[B] *A few miles, &c.* In the original *forty stadia*, about five miles.

such

such occasions. And can you imagine, that he, who chose to make use of artifice, rather than open force, against enemies by no means able to distress him, who, at most, could but have defended themselves against him; that he will openly proclaim his hostile designs against you; and this, when you yourselves obstinately shut your eyes against them? Impossible! He would be the absurdest of mankind, if, while his outrages pass unnoticed, while you are wholly engaged in accusing some among yourselves, and endeavouring to bring them to a trial, he should put an end to your private contests, warn you to direct all your zeal against him; and so deprive his pensioners of their most specious pretence for suspending your resolutions; that of his not being at war with the state. Heavens! is there any man of a right mind, who would judge of peace or war by words, and not by actions? Surely no man. *To examine then the actions of Philip.*—When the peace was just concluded, before ever Diopithes had received his commission, or those in the Chersonesus had been sent out, he possessed himself of Serrium and Doriscum; and obliged the forces our general had stationed in the citadel of Serrium and the Sacred Mount, to evacuate those places. From these proceedings, what

are we to judge of him? The peace he had ratified by the most solemn oaths.—And [c] let it not be asked, of what moment is all this? or how is the state affected by it? Whether these things be of no moment, or whether we are affected by them or no, is a question of another nature. Let the instance of violation be great or small, the sacred obligation of faith and justice is, in all instances, the same.

But farther: when he sends his forces into the Chersonesus, which the KING, which every state of Greece, acknowledged to be ours; when he confessedly assists our enemies, and braves us with such letters; what are his intentions? for they say he is not at war with us. For my own part, so far am I from acknowledging such conduct to be consistent with his treaty, that I declare, that by his attack of the Megareans, by his attempts upon the liberty of Euboea, by his late incursion into Thrace, by his practices in Peloponnesus, and by his constant recourse to the power of

[c] *Let it not be asked, &c.* The partizans of Philip affected to speak with contempt of these places. To deny the right of Athens to them, was dangerous and unpopular; they therefore endeavoured to represent them as beneath the public regard.

arms,

arms, in all his transactions, he has violated the treaty, and is at war with you; unless you will affirm, that he who prepares to invest a city is still at peace, until the walls be actually assaulted. You cannot, surely, affirm it! He whose designs, whose whole conduct, tends to reduce me to subjection, that man is at war with me, tho' not a blow hath yet been given, not one weapon drawn. And, if any accident should happen, to what dangers must you be exposed! The Hellespont will be no longer yours: your enemy will become master of Megara and Euboea: the Peloponnesians will be gained over to his interest. And shall I say, that the man who is thus raising his engines, and preparing to storm the city, that he is at peace with you? No: from that day, in which Phocis fell beneath his arms, I date his hostilities against you. If you will instantly oppose him, I pronounce you wise; if you delay, it will not be in your power when you are inclined. And so far, Athenians, do I differ from some other speakers, that I think it now no time to debate about the Chersonesus or Byzantium: but that we should immediately send reinforcements, and guard those places from all accidents, supply the generals stationed there with every thing they stand in need of, and extend our care to all the  
Greeks,



Greeks, now in the greatest and most imminent danger. Let me entreat your attention, while I explain the reasons which induce me to be apprehensive of this danger: that if they are just, you may adopt them, and be provident of your own interests at least, if those of others do not affect you: or if they appear frivolous and impertinent, you may now, and even hereafter, neglect me, as a man of an unsound mind.

That Philip, from a mean and inconsiderable origin, hath advanced to greatness; that suspicion and faction divide all the Greeks; that it is more to be admired that he should become so powerful from what he was, than that now, after such accessions of strength, he should accomplish all his ambitious schemes: these, and other like points, which might be dwelt upon, I chuse to pass over. But there is one concession, which, by the influence of your example, all men have made to him; which hath heretofore been the cause of all the Grecian wars. And what is this? An absolute power to act as he pleases, thus to harass and plunder every state of Greece successively, to invade and to enslave their cities. You held the sovereignty of Greece

Greece [D] seventy-three years: the Lacedemonians commanded for the space of [E] twenty-nine years: and in these latter times, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were in some degree of eminence. Yet neither to you, nor to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedemonians, did the Greeks ever grant this uncontrouled power: far from it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athenians of that age, seemed to treat some persons not with due moderation, it was universally resolved to take up arms; even they who had no private complaints, espoused the cause of the injured. And when the Lacedemonians succeeded to your power, the moment that they attempted to enlarge their sway, and to make such changes in affairs, as betrayed their ambitious designs, they were opposed by all, even by those who were not immediately affected by their conduct. But why do I speak of others? We ourselves, and the Lacedemo-

[D] *Seventy-three years.* See a note on Olynth. 2. page 85.

[E] *Twenty-nine years.* That is, from the destruction of Athens by Lyfander, in the last year of the 93d olympiad, to the first war in which the Athenians, when re-established by Conon, engaged against Sparta, to free themselves and the other Greeks from the Spartan yoke, in the last year of the 100th olympiad.

TOUR.

nians,

nians, tho' from the first we could alledge no injuries against each other, yet, to redress the injured, thought ourselves bound to draw the sword. And all the faults of the Lacedemonians in their thirty years, and of our ancestors in their seventy years, do not amount to the outrages which Philip hath committed against the Greeks, within less than [F] thirteen years of power; or, rather, do not all make up the smallest part of them. This I shall easily prove in a few words.

Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the two and thirty cities of Thrace, I pass all over; every one of which felt such severe effects of his cruelty, that an observer could not easily determine whether any of them had ever been inhabited or no. The destruction of the Phocians, a people so considerable, shall also pass unnoticed. But think on the condition of the Thessalians. Hath he not sub-

[F] *Thirteen years of power.* Philip had now reigned nineteen years. But being at first engaged in wars with his neighbours, he did not begin to make any considerable figure in Greece until the eighth year of his reign; when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the tyrants of Thessaly, and cut off the Phocian army commanded by Onomarchus. From this period Demosthenes begins his computation.

TOUR.

verted

verted their states and cities? hath he not established his Tetrarchs over them; that not only single towns, but [G] whole nations, might pay him vassalage? are not the states of Euboea in the hands of tyrants, and this in an island bordering on Thebes and Athens? are not these the express words of his letters; "they who are willing to obey me may expect peace from me?" And he not only writes, but confirms his menaces by actions. He marches directly to the Hellespont: but just before he attacked Ambracia. [H] Elis, one of the chief cities of Peloponnesus, is in his possession: not long since he entertained designs against Megara. All Greece, all the barbarian world, is too narrow for this man's ambition. And, tho' we Greeks see and hear all this, we send no embassies to each other, we express no resentment: but into such wretchedness are we sunk, (blocked up within our several cities) that even to this day we

[G] *Whole nations, &c.* The word in the original signifies a number of different people dependent on one principal state or city.

[H] *Elis, &c.* He made himself master of this place by treaty, not by force of arms. Elis entered into the league of the Amphictyons, by which Philip was acknowledged as their chief; and maintained its freedom till after the death of Alexander.

TOUR.

have



have not been able to perform the least part of that, which our interest or our duty demanded; to engage in any associations, or to form any confederacies: but look with unconcern upon this man's growing power: each fondly imagining (as far as I can judge) that the time in which another is destroyed is gained to him; without ever consulting or acting for the cause of Greece; altho' no man can be ignorant, that, like the regular periodic return of a fever, or other disorder, he is coming upon those, who think themselves most remote from danger.

You are also sensible, that whatever injuries the Greeks suffered by the Lacedemonians, or by us, they suffered by the true sons of Greece. And one may consider it in this light. Suppose a lawful heir, born to an affluence of fortune, should, in some instances, be guilty of misconduct: he indeed lies open to the justest censure and reproach; yet it cannot be said that he hath lavished a fortune to which he had no claim, no right of inheritance. But should a slave, should a pretended son, waste those possessions which really belonged to others, how much more heinous would it be thought! how much more worthy of resentment! And shall not  
Philip

Philip and his actions raise the like indignation? he, who is not only no Greek, no way related to Greece; but sprung from a part of the barbarian world, unworthy to be named; a vile Macedonian! where formerly we could not find a slave fit to purchase. And has his insolence known any bounds? Besides the destruction of cities, doth he not appoint [ι] the Pythian games, the common entertainment of Greece; and, if absent himself, send his slaves to preside? Is he not master of Thermopylae? Are not the passes into Greece possessed by his guards and mercenaries? Hath he not assumed [κ] the honours of the temple, in opposition to our claim, to that of the Thessalians, that of the

[ι] *The Pythian Games, &c.* To this honour he was admitted by being made an Amphictyon, and declared head of the sacred league. By *his slaves*, we are to understand no more than his subjects: for those old republicans affected to speak thus of the subjects of every king or tyrant. TOUR. and OLIV.

[κ] *The honours of the temple, &c.* Προμανείαν, the right of precedency in consulting the oracle of Delphos. This the Phocians had enjoyed, as being in possession of the temple: and Philip was invested with it, as well as their other privileges. It was thought of considerable consequence by the Greeks, as appears from the first article of a peace made between the Athenians and the allies of Lacedemon. See Thucyd. B. 5. TOUR.

Doreans, and of the other Amphictyons; honours, to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Doth he not prescribe to the Thesfalians, how they shall be governed? Doth he not send out his forces, some to Porthmus, to expel the Eretrian colony; some to Oreum, to make Philistides tyrant? And yet the Greeks see all this, without the least impatience. Just as at the fall of hail: every one prays it may not alight on his ground; but no one attempts to fend against it: so they not only suffer the general wrongs of Greece to pass unpunished, but carry their insensibility to the utmost, and are not roused even by their private wrongs. Hath he not attacked Ambracia and Leucas, cities of the Corinthians? Hath he not [L] wrested Naupaetus from the Achaeans, and engaged by oath to deliver it to the Aetolians? Hath he not

[L] *Wrested Naupaetus from the Achaeans, &c.* Naupaetus was not a city of the Achaeans, but of the Locri Ozolae. Possibly Demosthenes speaks with the liberty of an orator; and founds his assertion on some alliance which Naupaetus might have had with the Achaeans, against the Aetolians, its inveterate enemies. This city, thus delivered up, remained ever after under the jurisdiction of Aetolia, and is mentioned by Livy and Polybius as the principal city of that country.

TOUR.

robbed

robbed the Thebans of [M] Echinus? Is he not on his march [N] against the Byzantines? And are they not our allies? I shall only add, that Cardia, the chief city of the Chersonesus, is in his possession. Yet these things do not affect us: we are all languid and irresolute: we watch the motions of those about us, and regard each other with suspicious eyes: and this, when we are all so manifestly injured. And, if he behaves with such insolence towards the general body, to what extravagancies, think ye, will he proceed, when master of each particular state?

And now, what is the cause of all this? (for there must be some cause, some good reason to be assigned, why the Greeks were once so jealous of their liberty, and are now so ready to submit to slavery.) It is this,  
Q Athenians!

[M] *Echinus*. There were two places of this name; the one in Acarnania; the other, which is here spoken of, founded by the Thebans on the Maliac Gulph.

TOUR.

[N] *Against the Byzantines*. He had threatened them already, but had not as yet executed his threats: for we learn from history, that Philip having for a considerable time besieged Perinthus, raised the siege in order to march to that of Byzantium. If the siege of Perinthus had preceded this oration, Demosthenes could not have forgotten

so



Athenians! Formerly men's minds were animated with that, which they now feel no longer, which conquered all the opulence of Persia, maintained the freedom of Greece, and triumphed over the powers of sea and land: but now that it is lost, universal ruin and confusion overspread the face of Greece. What is this? Nothing subtle or mysterious: nothing more than an unanimous abhorrence of all those who accepted bribes from princes, prompted by the ambition of subduing, or the bare intent of corrupting Greece. To be guilty of such practices, was accounted a crime of the blackest kind; a crime, which called for all the severity of public justice: no petitioning for mercy, no pardon was allowed. So that neither orator nor general could sell those favourable conjunctures, with which fortune oftentimes assists the supine against the vigilant, and renders men, utterly regardless of their interests, superior to those who exert their utmost efforts: nor were mutual confidence among ourselves, distrust of tyrants and

so memorable an expedition in recounting the enterprizes of Philip. Probably this prince made a feint of marching to Byzantium, in order to conceal his designs against Perinthus.

TOUR.

In the introduction to this oration, the reader has another account of Philip's first march against Byzantium.

barbarians,

barbarians, and such like noble principles, subject to the power of gold. But now are all these exposed to sale, as in a public mart : and, in exchange, such things have been introduced, as have affected the safety, the very vitals of Greece. What are these? Envy, when a man hath received a bribe ; laughter, if he confesses it ; pardon, if he be convicted ; resentment, at his being accused ; and all the other appendages of corruption. For, as to naval power, troops, revenues, and all kinds of preparations, every thing that is esteemed the strength of a state, we are now much better, and more amply provided, than formerly : but they have lost all their force, all their efficacy, all their value, by means of these traffickers.

That such is our present state, you yourselves are witnesses ; and need not any testimony from me. That our state, in former times, was quite opposite to this, I will now convince you ; not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors, which they inscribed upon a brazen column erected in the citadel ; not with a view to their own advantage, (they needed not such memorials to inspire them with just sentiments) but that it might descend to you, as an example of the

great attention due to such affairs. Hear then the inscription. [o] "LET ARTHMIUS OF  
 "ZELIA, THE SON OF PYTHONAX,  
 "BE ACCOUNTED INFAMOUS, AND  
 "AN ENEMY TO THE ATHENIANS  
 "AND THEIR ALLIES, BOTH HE  
 "AND ALL HIS RACE." Then comes the reason of this sentence. "BECAUSE  
 "HE BROUGHT GOLD FROM MEDIA  
 "INTO PELOPONNESUS."——Not to Athens. This is the decree. And now, in the name of all the Gods, reflect on this! think what wisdom, what dignity appeared in this action of our ancestors! One Arthmius of Zelia, a slave of the KING's, (for Zelia is a

[o] *LET ARTHMIUS, &c.* This, in a few words, was the occasion of publishing this terrible decree against Arthmius, of which Themistocles was the Author. Egypt had thrown off the yoke of Artaxerxes Longimanus. A formidable army marched to reduce the rebels; but failed of success, as Athens had provided for their defence. The resentment of Artaxerxes then turned against the Athenians. He sent Megabyzus, and other secret agents, into Peloponnesus, to raise up enemies against them by the force of bribery; and to blow up the flame of resentment and jealousy in Sparta, which was ever ready to break out. But the attempt was ineffectual. Arthmius probably was one of the king of Persia's agents in this affair; and Diodorus, who does not name him, includes him however in the general appellation of *the emissaries of Artaxerxes.*

TOUR.

city

city of Asia,) in obedience to his master, brings gold, not into Athens, but Peloponnesus. This man they declare an enemy to them and their confederates, and that he and his posterity shall be infamous. Nor was this merely a mark of ignominy; for how did it concern this Zelite whether he was to be received into the community of Athens or no? The sentence imported something more: for, in the laws relating to capital cases, it is enacted, that **WHEN THE LEGAL PUNISHMENT OF A MAN'S CRIME CANNOT BE INFLICTED, HE MAY BE PUT TO DEATH.** And it was accounted meritorious to kill him. "LET NOT THE **" INFAMOUS MAN,"** saith the law, **" BE PERMITTED TO LIVE."** Intimating, that he is free from guilt, who executes this sentence.

Our fathers, therefore, thought themselves bound to extend their care to all Greece: else they must have looked with unconcern at the introduction of bribery into Peloponnesus. But we find they proceeded to such severity against all they could detect in it, as to raise monuments of their crimes. Hence it was (and no wonder) that the Greeks were a terror to the Barbarians, not the Barbarians to the Greeks.



But now it is not so: for you do not shew the same spirit, upon such, or any other occasions. How then do you behave? you need not be informed. Why should the whole censure fall on you? the conduct of the rest of Greece is no less blameable. It is my opinion, therefore, that the present state of things demands the utmost care, and most salutary counsel. What counsel? Shall I propose it? and will ye not be offended?—  
Read this memorial.

[*Here the secretary reads. And the orator resumes his discourse.*]

And here I must take notice of one weak argument made use of, to inspire us with confidence. That Philip is not yet so powerful as the Lacedemonians once were, who commanded by sea and land, [P] were strengthened by the alliance of the KING, were absolute and

[P] *Were strengthened by the alliance of the KING.* After the expedition into Sicily, an expedition as unfortunate as it was imprudent, the Athenians might still have supported themselves, if the king of Persia had not concurred to precipitate their ruin. Tissaphernes, the Satrap of Darius Nothus, conducted the first alliance between his master and the Lacedemonians. This alliance had at that time no very great effect. But when Cyrus the younger

and uncontrouled; and yet we made a brave stand against them; nor was all their force able to crush our state. In answer to this, I shall observe, that, amidst all the alterations and improvements which have happened in affairs of every kind, nothing hath been more improved than the art of war: for, in the first place, I am informed, that at that time the Lacedemonians, and all the other Greeks, used to keep the field four or five months, just the convenient season; and having so long continued their invasion, and infested the territories of the enemy, with their heavy-armed and domestic forces, they retired into their own country. Then, such was the simplicity, or rather the ingenuous candor of that age, that the power of gold was never called to their assistance; but all their wars were fair and open. Now, on the contrary, we see most defeats owing to treachery; no formal engagements, nothing left to the decision of arms. For you find the rapid progress of Philip is not owing to the force of regular troops, but to armies composed of light horse and foreign

younger was sent, by order of his father, to command in Asia Minor, Lysander gained the affection of this young prince, who soon made him able to give law to Athens. It is this period which Demosthenes points out. TOUR.

archers. With these he pours down upon some people, already engaged by civil discord and commotions: and, when none will venture out in defence of their state, on account of their private suspicions, he brings up his engines, and attacks their walls. Not to mention his absolute indifference to heat and cold, and that there is no peculiar season which he gives to pleasure. Let these things sink deep into all our minds: let us not suffer his arms to approach these territories: [Q] let us not proudly depend on our strength, by forming our judgments from the old Lacedæmonian war: but let us attend, with all possible precaution, to our interests and our armaments: and let this be our point in view; to confine him to his own kingdom; not to engage him upon equal terms in the field. For if you are satisfied with committing hostilities, there nature hath given you [R] many advantages (let us but do our part). The situa-

[Q] *Let us not proudly, &c.* In the original *ἐν παρρησίᾳ*, which, besides the signification which Wolfius assigns it, is frequently rendered *insolefcere*, *superbire*.

[R] *Many advantages.* Altho' the Athenians had lost Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidaea, they were still in possession of Thassus, Lemnos, and the adjacent islands, from whence they might readily have attempted a descent on Macedon.

TOUR.

tion

tion of his kingdom, for instance, exposes it to all the fury of an enemy ; not to speak of many other circumstances. But if we once come to a regular engagement, there his experience must give him the superiority.

But these are not the only points that require your attention : nor are you to oppose him only by the arts of war. It is also necessary that reason and penetration should inspire you with an abhorrence of those who plead his cause before you : ever bearing in mind the absolute impossibility of conquering our foreign enemy, until we have punished those who are serving him within our walls. But this, I call the powers of heaven to witness, ye cannot, ye will not do ! No : such is your infatuation, or madness, or—I know not what to call it, (for I am oftentimes tempted to believe, that some power, more than human, is driving us to ruin) that thro' malice, or envy, or a spirit of ridicule, or some like motive, you command hirelings to speak, (some of whom dare not deny that they are hirelings) and make their calumnies serve your mirth. Yet, shocking as this is, there is something still more shocking : these men are allowed to direct the public affairs with greater security than your faithful counsellors.—And now observe



observe the dreadful consequences of listening to such wretches. I shall mention facts well known to you all.

In Olynthus, the administration of affairs was divided between two parties. The one, in the interest of Philip, entirely devoted to him; the other, inspired by true patriotism, directed all their efforts to preserve the freedom of their country. To which of those are we to charge the ruin of that state? or who betrayed the troops, and by that treachery destroyed Olynthus? The creatures of Philip. Yet while their city stood, these men pursued the advocates for liberty, with such malicious accusations and invectives, that an assembly of the people was persuaded even to banish Apollonides.

But this is not the only instance. The same custom hath produced the same calamities in other places. In Eretria, at the departure of Plutarchus and the foreign troops, when the people had possession of the city and of Porthmus, some were inclined to seek our protection, some to submit to Philip. But, being influenced by this latter party, on most, or, rather, all occasions, the poor unfortunate Eretrians were at length persuaded to banish  
their

their faithful counsellors. And the consequence was this. Philip, their confederate and friend, detached a thousand mercenaries, under the command of Hipponicus, razed the fortifications of Porthmus, set three tyrants over them, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus; and, after that, when they discovered some inclination to shake off the yoke, drove them twice out of their territory; once by the forces commanded by Eurylochus; and, again, by those under Parmenio.

To give but one instance more. In Oreum, Philistides was the agent of Philip; as were Menippus, and Socrates, and Thoas, and Agapæus, the present masters of that city. And this was universally known. But there was one Euphraeus, a man who for some time resided here, who stood up against captivity and slavery. Much might be said of the injurious and contemptuous treatment which he received from the people of Oreum, upon other occasions. But the year before the taking of the city, as he saw thro' the traiterous designs of Philistides and his accomplices, he brought a formal impeachment against them. Immediately, considerable numbers form themselves into a faction, (directed and supported by Philip,) and hurry away Euphraeus to prison,

as

as a disturber of the public peace. The people of Oreum were witnesses of this ; but, instead of defending him, and bringing his enemies to condign punishment, shewed no resentment towards them ; but approved, and triumphed in his sufferings. And now the faction, possessed of all the power they wished for, laid their schemes for the ruin of the city, and were carrying them into execution. Among the people, if any man perceived this, he was silent ; struck with the remembrance of Euphraeus and his misfortunes. And to such dejection were they reduced, that no one dared to express the least apprehension of the approaching danger, until the enemy drew up before their walls, and prepared for an assault. Then some defended, others betrayed their country. When the city was thus shamefully and basely lost, the faction began to exercise the most tyrannic power, having, either by banishment or death, removed all those who had asserted their own cause, and that of Euphraeus ; and were still ready for any noble enterprize. Euphraeus himself put an end to his own life : and thus gave proof, that, in his opposition to Philip, he had been actuated by a just and pure regard to the interest of his country.

And

PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 237

And now what could be the reason (you may possibly ask with surprize) that the people of Olynthus, and those of Eretria, and those of Oreum, all attended with greater pleasure to the advocates of Philip, than to their own friends? The same reason which prevails here. Because they, who are engagad on the part of truth and justice, can never, even if they were inclined, advance any thing to recommend themselves to favour: their whole concern is for the welfare of their state. The others need but to sooth and flatter, in order to second the designs of Philip. The one press for supplies; the others insist that they are not wanted: the one call their countrymen to battle, and alarm them with apprehensions of danger; the others are ever recommending peace, until the toils come too near to be escaped. And thus, on all occasions, one sett of men speak but to insinuate themselves into the affections of their fellow-citizens; the other, to preserve them from ruin: 'till, at last, the interests of the state are given up; not corruptly or ignorantly, but from a desperate purpose of yielding to the fate of a constitution thought to be irrecoverably lost. And, by the powers of heaven! I dread, that this may prove your case; when you find that reflection cannot serve you! And



when I turn my eyes to the men who have reduced you to this, [s] it is not terror that I feel, but the utmost detestation. For, whether they act thro' design or ignorance, the distress to which they are reducing us is manifest. But far be this distress from us, Athenians! It were better to die ten thousand times, than to be guilty of a servile complaisance to Philip, and to abandon any of your faithful counselors! The people of Oreum have now met a noble return for their confidence in Philip's creatures, and their violence towards Euphraeus. The Eretrians are nobly rewarded for driving out our ambassadors, and committing their affairs to Clitarchus. Captivity, and stripes, and racks are their reward. Great was his indulgence to the Olynthians, for choosing Lasthenes their general, and banishing Apollonides. It were folly and baseness to be

[s] *It is not terror, &c.* The word in the original signifies the most abject fear and dismay: and the whole passage seems to have a particular reference or allusion. Possibly some of Philip's partizans might have accused Demosthenes of being thus affected at their fight; while they magnified their own integrity and resolution, their true discernment, and patriot zeal for the interest of their country; and possibly might have called out for severe punishment on the man who dared to utter the most bitter invectives against a powerful prince in alliance with Athens.

amused

amused with such false hopes as theirs, when neither our counsels direct us, nor our inclinations prompt us, to the pursuit of our true interests; and to suffer those who speak for our enemies to persuade us that the state is too powerful to be affected by any accident whatever. It is shameful to cry out, when some event hath surprized us, "Heavens! who could have expected this? We should have acted thus and thus; and avoided these and these errors." There are many things, the Olynthians can now mention, which, if foreseen in time, would have prevented their destruction. The people of Oreum can mention many: those of Phocis many: every state that hath been destroyed can mention many such things. But what doth it avail them now? while the vessel is safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every person should exert himself in his particular station, and preserve it from being wrecked, either by villainy or unskilfulness. But when the sea hath once broken in, all care is vain. And therefore, Athenians, while we are yet safe, possessed of a powerful city, favoured with many resources, our reputation illustrious——what are we to do? (perhaps some have sat with impatience to ask.)——I shall now give

give my opinion, and propose it in form; that, if approved, your voices may confirm it.

Having, in the first place, provided for your defence, fitted out your navy, raised your supplies, and arrayed your forces: (for, altho' all other people should submit to slavery, you should still contend for freedom.) Having made such a provision, (I say,) and this, in the sight of Greece, then we are to call others to their duty; and, for this purpose, to send ambassadors into all parts, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, and even to the KING: (for he is by no means unconcerned to oppose the rapidity of this man's progress.) If ye prevail, ye will have sharers in the dangers and expence which may arise; at least you will gain some respite: and, as we are engaged against a single person, and not the united powers of a commonwealth, this may be of advantage; as were those embassies of last year into Peloponnesus, and those remonstrances which were made in several places by me, and Polydatus, that true patriot, and Hegesippus, and Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other ministers; which checked his progress, prevented his attack of Ambracia, and secured Peloponnesus from an invasion.

I do

I do not mean that we should endeavour to raise a spirit abroad, which we ourselves are unwilling to assume. It would be absurd to neglect our own interests, and yet pretend a regard to the common cause; or, while we are insensible to present dangers, to think of alarming others with apprehensions of futurity. No: let us provide the forces in the Chersonesus with money, and every thing else that they desire. Let us begin with vigour on our part; then call upon the other Greeks; convene, instruct, exhort them. Thus it becomes a state of such dignity as our's. If you think the protection of Greece may be entrusted to the Chalcidians and Megareans, and so desert its cause, you do not think justly. It will be well if they can protect themselves. No: this is your province: this is that prerogative transmitted from your ancestors, the reward of all their many, and glorious, and great dangers. If every man sits down in ease and indulgence, and studies only to avoid trouble, he will certainly find no one to supply his place; and I am also apprehensive, that we may be forced into all that trouble, to which we are so averse. Were there persons to act in our stead, our inactivity would have long since discovered them: but there are really none.

R

You



You have now heard my sentiments. You have heard the measures I propose, and by which I apprehend our affairs may be yet retrieved. If any man can offer some more salutary course, let him arise, and declare his opinion. And whatever be your resolution, the Gods grant that we may feel its good effects!

*End of the* **THIRD PHILIPPIC.**

PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.

You have now heard my sentiments. You have heard the measures I propose, and by which I apprehend our affairs may be yet retrieved. If any man can question more

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in regard to them, and decide his opinion. And whatever be your resolution, the Gods grant that we may feel its good effect.

## THE ELEVENTH

# ORATION against PHILIP:

Commonly called the FOURTH.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of NICOMACHUS,

The Year after the former ORATION.

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# INTRODUCTION.

2

THE following is a list of the names of the persons who have been named in the preceding section, and who were present at the meeting of the Association, held at the residence of Mr. J. E. Thompson, on the 1st of January, 1844.

ORATION AGAINST PHILLIP.

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Demosthenes, introduced Phocion, but in a very  
tary character, but to endeavor to gain over the  
people of Athens to the Macedonians.  
which he had some success: to this the general, on  
his part, acted with so much conduct and resolu-  
tion, that the Macedonians were forced to withdraw  
the island: and the Euboeans entered into a treaty  
of alliance with Athens.

In the mean time Philip marched along the  
Hellespont, to support his fleet there in winter, and  
to prevent Diophanes from cutting off his pro-  
visions.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**S**OON after the preceding oration, the Athenian succours arrived at Euboea. Demosthenes had proposed the decree for them; and the command was given to Phocion, whom the Athenians gladly employed on all extraordinary emergencies, and who was always ready to serve them, at the same time that he highly condemned their conduct.

Demosthenes attended Phocion, not in a military character, but to endeavour to gain over the people of Euboea to the Athenian interest; in which he had some success: while the general, on his part, acted with so much conduct and resolution, that the Macedonians were forced to abandon the island; and the Euboeans entered into a treaty of alliance with Athens.

In the mean time Philip marched along the Hellespont, to support his fleet then in view, and to prevent Diopithes from cutting off his provisions.



## INTRODUCTION.

*visions. When he had crossed the Isthmus of the Cberfonesus, he returned, and by a forced march arrived with the choice of his army at Cardia; where he surprized Diopithes, and defeated him in an action in which that general fell. This he affected to consider, not as an open breach of his treaty, but only as the consequence of the protection he granted to the Cardians, and an act of particular revenge he had determined to take on Diopithes.*

*Philip then joined his army, and encamped before Perinthus, a place considerable by its commerce and situation, ever firm to the Athenians, and consequently dreadful and dangerous to Philip. The Perinthians defended themselves with a courage almost incredible, and which, it appeared, could not be abated by danger or fatigue. Philip, on his part, pressed them by all the methods of assault: and, after many vigorous efforts on each side, when the city was just on the point of being taken by assault, or of being obliged to surrender at discretion, fortune provided for it an unexpected succour.*

*The fame of Philip's arms having alarmed the court of Persia, Ocbus sent his letters mandatory to the governors of the maritime provinces, directing them to supply Perinthus with all things*  
in

## INTRODUCTION.

*in their power: in consequence of which they filled it with troops and provisions. While the Byzantines, justly conceiving their own turn would be next, sent into the city the flower of their youth, with all other necessaries for an obstinate defence.*

*The Perinthians, thus reinforced, resumed their former ardor. And, as all they suffered was on account of Athens, they dispatched ambassadors thither, to demand the speedy and effectual assistance of that state. On this occasion, Demosthenes pronounced the following oration.*

INTRODUCTION  
MOLTOUTS

1917

1970

1941

THE FOURTH

1910-1911

10-10-1944

On the 2nd day of the month

10. *Staphylococcus aureus*

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

On 10/10/1944, the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 1st Army were ordered to move to the front of the 1st Army.

...to them in the manner that you do.

\* We shall not in this section have any more

... to show that the ...

1. The first of these is the fact that the

1947

As a representative of all the officers and men in the

and in the preparation of the

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

... as by the many ...

\_\_\_\_\_

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## \*PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.

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**A**S I am persuaded, Athenians, that you are now convened about affairs of greatest moment, such as affect the very being of the state, I shall endeavour to speak to them in the manner most agreeable to your interests.

\* We shall find in this oration many things which occur in those that are precedent: and as it is on the same subject, already exhausted by so many orations, it was in some sort necessary for the orator to make use of repetitions. And it should seem, that in such a case repetition is by no means a fault, particularly as we may consider this as a recapitulation of all the others: and may in effect call it the PERORATION OF THE PHILIPPICS. In which the orator resumes the arguments he had already made use of; but, in resuming them, gives them new force, as well by the manner in which they are disposed, as by the many additions with which they are heightened.

TOUR.

There



There are faults of no late origin, and gradually encreased to no inconsiderable number, which have conspired to involve us in the present difficulties. But, of all these, what at this time most distresses us is this: that your minds are quite alienated from public affairs: that your attention is engaged just while you are assembled, and some new event related: then each man departs; and, far from being influenced by what he hath heard, he does not even remember it.

The insolence and outrage with which Philip treats all mankind, are really so great as you hear them represented. That it is not possible to set bounds to these, by the force of speeches and debates, no one can be ignorant: for, if other arguments cannot convince, let this be weighed: whenever we have had occasion to plead in defence of our rights, we have never failed of success, we have never incurred the censure of injustice: but all places and all persons must acknowledge that our arguments are irresistible. Is he then distressed by this? and are our affairs advanced? By no means! For, as he proceeds to take up arms, leads out his troops, and is ready to hazard his whole empire in pursuit of his designs, while we sit here, pleading, or attending

tending to those who plead the justice of our cause, the consequence (and I think the natural consequence) is this: actions prove superior to words: and men's regards are engaged, not by those arguments which we ever have advanced, or may now advance, how just soever; but by the measures we pursue: and these are by no means fitted to protect any of the injured states: to say more of them is unnecessary.

As, then, all Greece is now divided into two parties; the one composed of those who desire neither to exercise, nor to be subject to arbitrary power, but to enjoy the benefits of liberty, laws, and independence; the other, of those who, while they aim at an absolute command of their fellow-citizens, are themselves the vassals of another person, by whose means they hope to obtain their purposes: his partizans, the affecters of tyranny and despotism, are superior every where. So that, of all the popular constitutions, I know not whether one be left firmly established, except our own. And they, who in the several states have been raised by him to the administration of affairs, have their superiority secured by all the means which can advance a cause. The first and principal is this. When they would bribe those who are capable of selling their integrity,

integrity, they have a person ever ready to supply them. In the next place, (and it is of no less moment,) at whatever season they desire it, there are forces at hand to overwhelm their opposers: while we, Athenians, are not only deficient in these particulars, but unable even to awake from our indolence; [B] like men reduced by some potion to a lethargic state. In consequence of this, (for I hold it necessary to speak the truth,) we are fallen into such contempt and infamy, that, of the people immediately threatened with danger, some contend with us [c] for the honour of commanding, some about the place of conference; while others determine rather to trust to their own strength, than to accept of your assistance.

[B] *Like men reduced by some potion, &c.* In the original, *like men who had drank of mandragora*: an herb ranked by naturalists among those of the soporiferous kind. It seems to have been a proverbial phrase, to signify indolent and negligent persons. TOUR.

[c] *The honour of commanding, some about the place of conference.* In all the confederate wars of the Greeks, that state which was acknowledged the most powerful had the honour of giving a commander in chief, and of appointing the place of general congress for concerting the operations. In the Persian war we find the Lacedæmonians and Athenians sometimes contending for these points; which in effect was a dispute which of these states was most respectable.

And

PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 253

And why am I thus particular in recounting these things? I call the Gods to witness, that I would not willingly incur your displeasure; but I would have you know, and see; that in public as well as in private affairs, continued indolence and supineness, tho' not immediately felt in every single instance of omission, yet, in the end, must affect the general welfare. You see this in the instances of Serrium and Doriscum. When the peace was made, we began with neglecting these places. (Perhaps some of you have never heard of them.) And these places, thus abandoned and despised, lost you Thrace, and your ally Cersobleptes. Again, when he saw that this did not rouse you, and that you sent no assistance, he razed Porthmus; and, to keep us in continual awe, erected a tyranny in Euboea, over-against Attica. This was disregarded: and his attempt upon Megara was well nigh successful. Still ye were insensible, expressed no impatience, no inclination to oppose him. He purchased Antronae; and soon after got possession of Oreum. I pass over many things; [D] Pherae, the march to Ambracia, the massacre of

[D] *Pherae, the march to Ambracia, the massacre of Elis.*  
An orator does not always picque himself on an exact adherence to history; but sometimes disguises facts, or aggravates



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of Elis, and thousands of the like actions : for it is not my design to give a detail of Philip's acts of outrage and injustice ; but to convince you, that the property and liberty of mankind will never be secure from him, until he meets with some effectual opposition.

There are persons who, before they hear affairs debated, stop us with this question, " what is to be done ? " not that they may do it, when informed, (for then they would be the best of citizens,) but to prevent the trouble of attending. It is my part, however, to declare what we are now to do.

gravates them, when it serves his purpose. One would imagine that Philip had committed some terrible outrages at Pherae : and yet he only restored the liberty of that city, by expelling its tyrants. And as to the massacre of Elis, it is not to be imputed immediately to Philip. He had, indeed, as chief of the allies in the sacred war, and head of the Amphictyons, suggested the resolution of proscribing the Phocians and all the favourers of their impiety. Some of these, who had fled into Crete with their general Phalecus, joined with a body of men who had been banished from Elis, made an inroad into Peloponnesus, and attempted an attack upon their countrymen ; who, with the assistance of the Arcadians, obliged this rebellious army to surrender at discretion ; and, in obedience to the decree of the Amphictyons, put it to the sword.

TOUR.

First,

First, then, Athenians, be firmly persuaded of this: that Philip is committing hostilities against us, and has really violated the peace: that he has the most implacable enmity to this whole city; to the ground on which this city stands; to the very gods of this city: (may their vengeance fall upon him!) But against our constitution is his force principally directed: the destruction of this is, of all other things, the most immediate object of his secret schemes and machinations. And there is, in some sort, a necessity that it should be so. Consider, he aims at universal power: and you he regards as the only persons to dispute his pretensions. He hath long injured you: and of this he himself is fully conscious: for the surest barriers of his other dominions are those places which he hath taken from us: so that if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would not think himself secure in Macedon. He is then sensible, both that he entertains designs against you, and that you perceive them: and, as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he judges that you hold him in the abhorrence he deserves. To these things (and these of such importance) add, that he is perfectly convinced, that altho' he were master of all other places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure, while your popular government subsists:

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subsists: but that, if any accident should happen to him, (and every man is subject to many,) all those who now submit to force, would seize the opportunity, and fly to you for protection: for you are not naturally disposed to grasp at power, or usurp dominion; but to prevent usurpation, or to wrest their unjust acquisitions from the hands of others, to curb the violence of ambition, and to preserve the liberty of mankind, is your peculiar excellence. And therefore it is with regret he sees in that freedom you enjoy a spy upon the incidents of his fortune: nor is this his reasoning weak or trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be regarded as the implacable enemy of our free and popular constitution. In the next place, we should be fully persuaded, that all those things which now employ him, all that he is now preparing, he is preparing against this city. There can be none among you weak enough to imagine, that the desires of Philip are centered in [E] those paltry villages of Thrace (for what name else can we give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and all those places now said to be in his possession?) that he endures the

[E] *These paltry villages, &c.* See the notes of the oration on the state of the Chersonesus, p. 187.

severity of toils and seasons, and exposes himself to the utmost dangers for these; and has no designs upon the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver-mines, and other revenues, and the situation, and the glory of Athens, (which never may the conquest of this city give to him or any other!) but will suffer us to enjoy these; while, for those trifling hoards of grain he finds in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in all the horrors of a dungeon. It cannot be! Even in his march thither he had these in view: these are the chief objects of all his enterprizes.

Thus must we all think of him. And let us not oblige that man, who hath ever been our most faithful counsellor, to propose the war in form: that would be, to seek a pretence to avoid it, not to pursue the interest of our country. To yourselves I appeal: if, after the first, or the second, or the third of Philip's infractions of his treaty, (for there was a long succession of them,) any man had moved you to declare hostilities against him, and he had given the same assistance to the Cardians, as now, when no such motion came from any Athenian, would not that man have been torn to pieces? would you not have cried out, with



one voice, that it was this which made him ally to the Cardians? Do not then seek for some person whom you may hate for Philip's faults; whom you may expose to the fury of his hirelings. When your decree for war hath once passed, let there be no dispute, whether it ought or ought not to have been undertaken. Observe his manner of attacking you: imitate it in your opposition: supply those who are now opposing him with money, and whatever else they want: raise your supplies: prepare your forces, gallies, horse, transports, and all other necessaries of a war. At present, your conduct must expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to witness, that you are acting as if Philip's wishes were to direct you. Opportunities escape you; your treasures are wasted; you shift the weight of public business upon others; break into passion; criminate each other. I will now shew whence these disorders have proceeded; and point out the proper remedy.

You have never, Athenians, made the necessary dispositions in your affairs, or armed yourselves in time; but have been always led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms you, your preparations are consumed;

fumed; and all is tumult and confusion. But this is not the way. It is impossible ever to secure the least success by occasional detachments. No: you must raise a regular army; provide for its subsistence; appoint state-treasurers, and guard the public money with the strictest attention: oblige those treasurers to answer for the sums expended; and your general, for his conduct in the field: and let this general [F] have no pretence to sail to any other place, or engage in any other enterprize, than those prescribed. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine himself to his own territory; or you will engage him upon equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now ask, "what is Philip doing? whither is he marching?" so there may come a time when he will be solicitous to know whither our forces have directed their march, and where they are to appear.

If it be objected, that these measures will be attended with great expence, and many toils and perplexities, I confess it. (It is ne-

[F] *Have no pretence, &c.* See note on Phil. 1, p. 32.

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cessary, absolutely necessary, that a war should be attended with many disagreeable circumstances.) But let us consider what consequences must attend the state, if we refuse to take this course; and it will appear that we shall really be gainers, by a seasonable performance of our duty. Suppose some God should be our surety, (for no mortal could be depended on, in an affair of such moment,) that altho' you are quite inactive and insensible, yet he will not at last lead his armies hither; still it would be ignominious, it would (I call every power of heaven to witness!) be beneath you, beneath the dignity of your state, beneath the glory of your ancestors, to abandon all the rest of Greece to slavery, for the sake of private ease. I, for my part, would rather die, than propose such a conduct: if however there be any other person to recommend it to you, be it so: make no opposition; abandon all affairs: but if there be no one of this opinion; if, on the contrary, we all foresee, that the farther this man is suffered to extend his conquests, the more dangerous and powerful enemy we must find in him; why is our duty evaded? why do we delay? or when will we be disposed to exert ourselves, Athenians? Must some necessity press us? What one may call the necessity of freemen, not only presseth us now,

now, but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. How do these differ? To freemen, the most urgent necessity is dishonour; a greater cannot, I think, be assigned: to slaves, stripes and tortures. Far be this from us! It ought not to be mentioned!

And now, the neglect of those things, to which your lives and fortunes should be devoted, it must be confessed, is by no means justifiable; far from it! some pretence, however, may be alledged in its excuse. But to refuse even to listen to those things which demand your utmost attention, which are of the greatest moment to be fully considered, this deserves the most severe censure. And yet you never attend but upon occasions like this, when the danger is actually present; nor in time of disengagement do you ever think of consulting: but, while he is preparing to distress you, instead of making like preparations, and providing for your defence, you are sunk in inactivity: and, if any one attempts to rouse you, he feels your resentment. But, when advice is received that some place is lost, or invested, then you attend, then you prepare. The proper season for attending and consulting was then, when you refused: now, when you are prevailed upon



to hear, you should be acting, and applying your preparations. And by this supineness is your conduct distinguished from that of all other nations: they usually deliberate before events: your consultations follow them.—

There is but one course left, which should long since have been pursued; but still may be of service.—This I shall lay before you,

There is nothing which the state is more concerned to procure on this occasion than money. And some very favourable opportunities present themselves, which, if wisely improved, may possibly supply our demands. In the first place, [G] they, whom the KING regards as his faithful and strenuous adherents, are the implacable enemies of Philip, and actually in arms against him. Then [H] the man

[G] *They whom the King regards, &c.* He probably means the Thebans, who had given Ochus powerful assistance in the siege of Pelusium; and who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which he had taken from them. TOUR.

[H] *The man who was, &c.* As Philip seems to have already projected an expedition into Asia, he received with open arms all the malecontents of Persia, and held secret intelligence with the rebel Satraps. Hermias, the tyrant of Atarna, a city of Mysia, was of this number; and had been in confidence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the Persian army, drew him to an interview,

man who was Philip's assistant and counsellor in all his designs against the KING hath been lately seized; so that the KING will be informed of his practices, not by our accusations, to which he might suppose our private interest prompted us, but by the very agent and conductor of them. This will give weight to your assertions: and there will be nothing left for your ministers to urge, but what the KING will gladly attend to: "that we should unite to chastise the man who hath injured us equally: that Philip will be much more formidable to the KING, if his first attack be made on us: for that, if he should be permitted to gain any advantage here, he will then march against him, free from all apprehensions." For all these reasons, I think you should send ambassadors to treat with the KING; and lay aside those idle prejudices, which have so often been injurious to your interests; "that he is a barbarian, our common enemy, and the like." For my own

interview, by feigned promises; where he seized him, and sent him in chains to Ochus. Instead of ἀράπρασος, some copies have ἀράπρασος, brought back; in which case it must be understood of Memnon or Artabazus, two rebellious Satraps, who had taken refuge in Philip's court, but, by the mediation of Mentor, were reconciled to the King of Persia.

Ulp. Tour,

part, when I find a man apprehending danger from a prince, whose residence is in Susa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing him the enemy of our state, [I] who formerly re-established its power, and [K] but now made us such considerable offers, (if you rejected them, that was no fault of his,) and yet speaking in another strain of one who is at our gates, who is extending his conquests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of the Greeks, I am astonished; and regard that man, whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger in Philip.

There is another affair, wherein the public hath been injured, which hath been attacked most unjustly and indecently; which is the

[I] *Who formerly re-established its power.* That is, when Conon, by the assistance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedemonian fleet at Cnidos, and restored the liberty and splendor of his country.

[K] *And but now made us, &c.* Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce Egypt, which had revolted from him, solicited succours from the principal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes consented: but from Athens and Lacedemon he could obtain only vain professions of friendship. He had, without doubt, offered large advantages to such people as would concur with him. Demosthenes here insinuates an accusation of the imprudence of Athens, in rejecting these offers.

Tour.  
constant

constant pretence of those who refuse to perform their duty to the state; to which you will find the blame of every omission, which every man is guilty of, constantly transferred. I cannot speak of it, without great apprehensions. Yet I will speak: for I think I can serve my country, by advancing [L] some things,

[L] *Some things in behalf of the poor, &c.* The theatrical distributions afforded a perpetual occasion of public contests between the several orders of the state. The poor were ever dissatisfied that the richer citizens shared the largesses, which they considered as their own peculiar right: and the rich beheld with impatience the dissipation of the public funds; which threw the whole weight of the supplies on them. But there was still a greater cause of complaint. The revenues of the state were not always sufficient to defray the immense expences of feasts and entertainments. And, in this case, some factious leader, who was willing to gain popularity, would propose to tax the rich; or perhaps, by some infamous calumnies, would raise a prosecution, which would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined, were alarmed at such proceedings: they inveighed loudly against the authors of them, and sometimes ventured to accuse them in form, and to bring them to a trial. When their baseness and evil designs were publicly exposed, the people were ashamed to avow their intentions of supporting such flagrant injustice. Their clamours were loud against the person accused. But, as in all judicial processes they gave their votes by balot, they then had an opportunity of saving their friend.

All that the orator here says in defence of the theatrical appointments, is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite



things, both in behalf of the poor, against the rich, and of the rich, against the necessitous; if we first banish those invectives, unjustly thrown out against the theatrical funds; and those fears, that such an appointment cannot subsist without some dismal consequences; an appointment which, above all others, may be most conducive to our interests, and give the greatest strength to the whole community.

Attend then, while I first plead for those who are thought necessitous. There was a time, not long since, when [M] the state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents: and yet none of those who were to command, or to contribute to the equipment opposite to his usual openness and freedom; and which plainly betray a consciousness of his being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be excused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions of the people, and giving up a favourite point, I cannot pretend to determine. But it is certainly not very honourable to Demosthenes, to suppose (with Ulpian) that his former opposition was merely personal; and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.

[M] *The state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents.* We must understand this of those revenues raised out of Attica only: for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Aristides, amounted to 460 talents annually. And Pericles raised them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their revenues,

equipment of a gally, ever had recourse to the pretence of poverty to be exempted from their duty: but vessels were sent out, money was supplied, and none of our affairs neglected. After this (thanks to fortune!) our revenues were considerably improved; and, instead of one hundred, rose to four hundred talents; and this, without any loss to the wealthy citizens,

venues, we should consider the prices of things. In the time of Solon, an ox was sold at Athens for five drachmae: as we learn from Plutarch, in the life of Solon. A hog, in the time of Aristophanes, was worth three drachmae: as appears from one of his comedies called *the Peace*.

OLIVET.

A Drachma, according to Arbuthnot, was equal to  $7\frac{3}{4}$  d. of our money. A hundred drachmae made a mina, or 3l. 4s. 7d. We may also, from the same author, add to the foregoing note these particulars. In the time of Solon, corn was reckoned at a drachma the medimnus, or 4s. 6d. *per quarter*. In the time of Demosthenes it was much higher, at five drachmae the medimnus, which makes it *per quarter* 1l. 2s.  $7\frac{3}{4}$  d. In Solon's time, the price of a sheep was  $7\frac{1}{2}$  d. A soldier's daily pay was a drachma. The yearly salary of a common schoolmaster at Athens was a mina. In the early times of the republic, 500 drachmae was thought a competent fortune for a gentleman, 16l. 2s. 11d. To Aristides's two daughters, the Athenians gave 3000 drachmae, 96l. 17s. 2d. The arts and sciences were rated very high; and, tho' the price of a seat in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  d. yet the performers were rewarded magnificently. When Amoebaeus sung in the theatre of Athens, his pay *per diem* was a talent.

but rather with advantage : for they share the public affluence, and justly share it. Why then do we reproach each other ? why have we recourse to such pretences to be exempted from our duty ? unless we envy the poor that supply with which fortune hath favoured them. I do not, and I think no one should blame them : for in private families I do not find the young so devoid of respect to years, or indeed any one so unreasonable and absurd, as to refuse to do his duty, unless all others do quite as much : such perverseness would render a man obnoxious to the laws against undutiful children : for to nothing are we more inviolably bound than to a just and chearful discharge of that debt, in which both nature and the laws engage us to our parents. And as we, each of us, have our particular parents, so all our citizens are to be esteemed the common parents of the state : and, therefore, instead of depriving them of what the state bestows, we ought, if there was not this provision, to find out some other means of supplying their necessities. If the rich proceed upon these principles, they will act agreeably not to justice only, but to good policy : for to rob some men of their necessary subsistence, is to raise a number of enemies to the commonwealth.

To

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To men of lower fortunes I give this advice: that they should remove those grievances which the wealthiest members so loudly and so justly complain of: (for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and shall not scruple to offer such truths as may be favourable to the rich.) Look out, not thro' Athens only, but every other nation, and, in my opinion, you will not find a man of so cruel, so inhuman a disposition, as to complain, when he sees poor men, men who even want the necessaries of life, receiving those appointments. Where then lies the difficulty? whence this animosity? [N] When they behold certain persons charging private fortunes with those demands which were usually answered by the public; when they behold the proposer of this immediately rising in your esteem, and (as far as your protection can make him) immortal; when they find your private votes entirely different from your public clamours; then it is that their indignation is raised: for justice requires, Athenians, that the advantages of society should be shared by all its members. The rich should have their lives and fortunes well secured; that so, when any danger threatens their country, their opulence may be

[N] *When they behold certain, &c.* See note on p. 265.

applied



applied to its defence. Other citizens should regard the public treasure as it really is, the property of all; and be content with their just portion; but should esteem all private fortunes as the inviolable right of their possessors. Thus it is, a small state rises to greatness, a great one preserves its power,

But it may be said, that possibly these are the duties of our several citizens: but, that they may be performed agreeably to the laws, some regulations must first be made.—The causes of our present disorders are many in number, and of long continuance. Grant me your attention, and I will trace them to their origin.

You have departed, Athenians, from that plan of government which your ancestors laid down. You are persuaded by your leaders, that to be the first among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to redress the injured, is an unnecessary and vain expence. You are taught to think, that to lie down in indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon all your interests one by one, a prey to the vigilance and craft of others, is to be perfectly secure, and surprisingly happy. By this means, the station which you should have maintained

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maintained is now seized by another, and he is become the successful, the mighty potentate. And what else could have been expected? for as the Lacedemonians were unfortunate, the Thebans engaged in the Phocian war; and we, quite insensible; he had no competitor, for a prize so noble, so great, so illustrious, which for a long time engaged the most considerable states of Greece in the severest contests. Thus is he become formidable, strengthened by alliances, and surrounded by his troops; while all the Greeks are involved in so many, and so great difficulties, that it is hard to say where they may find recourse. But, of all the dangers of the several states, none are so dreadful as those which threaten our's: not only because Philip's designs aim principally at us, but because we, of all others, have been most regardless of our interests.

[o] If then, from the variety of merchandizes and plenty of provisions, you flatter yourselves that the state is not in danger, you judge unworthily and falsely. Hence we might determine whether our markets were well or ill supplied: but the strength of that state, which

[o] *If then, from the variety, &c.* See note on the oration on the state of the Chersonesus, p. 196.

is

is regarded by all who aim at the sovereignty of Greece as the sole obstacle to their designs, the well-known guardian of liberty, is not surely to be judged of by its vendibles. No: we should enquire whether it be secure of the affections of its allies; whether it be powerful in arms. These are the points to be considered: and in these, instead of being well provided, you are totally deficient. To be assured of this, you need but attend to the following consideration. At what time have the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion? I believe it will not be affirmed, that they have ever been in greater than at present. For, in former times, Greece was always divided into two parties, that of the Lacedemonians, and our's. All the several states adhered to one or the other of these. The KING, while he had no alliances here, was equally suspected by all. [P] By espousing

[P] *By espousing the cause of the vanquished, &c.* Lacedemon first entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tissaphernes; which enabled Alexander to conquer Athens. Conon obtained from Artaxerxes Mnemon the succours necessary to revenge his country, and to re-establish it. And it was with reason that the kings of Persia attended to the preservation of a due balance between the Grecian states, lest the prevailing power might turn it's thoughts to Asia, and attempt an invasion there.

TOUR.

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the cause of the vanquished, he gained some credit, until he restored them to the same degree of power with their adversaries; after that, [Q] he became no less hated by those whom he had saved, than by those whom he had constantly opposed. But now, in the first place, the KING lives in amity with all the Greeks; (indeed, without some immediate reformation in our conduct, we must be excepted.) In the next place, there are several cities which affect the characters of guardians and protectors. They are all possessed with a strong passion for pre-eminence; and some of them (to their shame!) desert, and envy, and distrust each other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthians, Lacedemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians, have all

[Q] *He became no less hated, &c.* Lacedemon had no sooner subjected the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but she ravaged the Persian provinces in Asia Minor, and joined with the rebellious Satraps. And as soon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes from the Spartan yoke, they espoused the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from Artaxerxes, and usurped a great part of the kingdom of Cyprus. Benefits could not bind these states. Interest alone formed their engagements, and interest dissolved them. The picture here exhibited of the conduct of the Greeks towards the kings of Persia, is by no means flattering, in point of morals. But it is not in modern times only that we find morals must be silent, when politics speak.

TOUR.

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erected themselves into so many distinct sovereignties. But, amidst all these parties, all these governing states, into which Greece is broken, there is not one (if I may speak freely) [R] to whose councils fewer Grecian affairs are submitted, than to our's: and no wonder; when neither love, nor confidence, nor fear, can induce any people to apply to you. It is not one single cause that hath effected this; (in that case, the remedy were easy;) but many faults, of various natures, and of long continuance. Without entering into a particular detail, I shall mention one, in which they all center: but I must first entreat you not to be offended, if I speak some bold truths without reserve.

Every opportunity which might have been improved to your advantage hath been sold. The ease and supineness in which you are in-

[R] *To whose councils, &c.* The ruling states of Greece accounted it their greatest glory to see and hear a number of ambassadors in their assemblies, soliciting their protection and alliance. The conquests which Philip made in Thrace, had put an end to many applications of this sort, which had formerly been addressed to the Athenians. And their indolence made people decline any engagements with them. Foreigners were persuaded, that they who were insensible to their own interests were not likely to grant the due attention to those of others.

dulged

dulged have disarmed your resentment against the traitors: and thus others are suffered to possess your honours.—But at present I shall only take notice of what relates to Philip. If he is mentioned, immediately there is one ready to start up, and cry, “ we should not “ act inconsiderately; we should not involve “ ourselves in a war.” And then he is sure not to forget the great happiness of living in peace, the misfortune of being loaded with the maintenance of a large army, the evil designs of some persons against our treasures; with others of the like momentous truths.

But these exhortations to peace should not be addressed to you: your conduct is but too pacific: let them rather be addressed to him who is in arms. If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty on your part. Then it cannot be thought a misfortune to provide for our security at the expence of some part of our possessions: the consequences that must arise, if this provision be neglected, rather deserve that name. And as to the plundering of your treasury, this must be prevented, by finding some effectual means to guard it; not by neglecting your interests. Nor can I but express the utmost indignation, when I find some of

you complaining that your treasures are plundered, tho' it is in your power to secure them, and to punish the guilty; and yet looking on with indifference, while Philip is plundering every part of Greece successively; and this, that he may at last destroy you.

And what can be the reason, Athenians, that when Philip is guilty of such manifest violations of justice, when he is actually seizing our cities, yet none of these men will acknowledge that he acts unjustly, or commits hostilities; but assert, that they who rouse you from your insensibility, and urge you to oppose these outrages, are involving you in war? This is the reason: that whatever accidents may happen in the course of the war, (and there is a necessity, a melancholy necessity, that war should be attended with many accidents,) they may lay the whole blame upon your best and most faithful counsellors. They know, that if, with a steady and unanimous resolution, you oppose the insolent invader, he must be conquered, and they deprived of a master, whose pay was ever ready. But if the first unhappy accident calls you off to private trials and prosecutions, they need but appear as accusers, and two great points are secured; your favour, and Philip's gold: while  
you

you discharge the vengeance due to their perfidy, against your faithful speakers. These are their hopes: these the grounds of their complaints, that certain persons are involving you in war. For my own part, this I know perfectly; that altho' it has never been proposed by any Athenian to declare war; yet Philip has seized many of our territories, and but just now sent succours to the Cardians. But if we will persuade ourselves that he is not committing hostilities, he would be the most senseless of mortals, should he attempt to undeceive us: for when they who have received the injury deny it, must the offender prove his guilt? But when he marches directly hither, what will we say then? He will still deny that he is at war with us; (as he did to the people of Oreum, until his forces were in the heart of their dominions; as he did to those of Pherae, until he was upon the point of storming their walls; as he did to the Olynthians, until he appeared in their territories at the head of an army.) Will we then say, that they who urge us to defend our country are involving us in a war? If so, we must be slaves. There is no medium! Nor is your danger the same with that of other states. Philip's design is not to enslave, but to extirpate Athens. He knows, that a

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state,



state, like your's, accustomed to command, will not, or, if it was inclined, cannot submit to slavery: he knows, that if you have an opportunity, you can give him more disturbance than any other people: and therefore, if ever he conquers us, we may be sure of finding no degree of mercy.

Since, then, you are engaged in defence of all that is dear to you, apply to the great work, with an attention equal to the importance of it: let the wretches who have openly sold themselves to this man be the objects of your abhorrence: let them meet with the utmost severity of public justice. For you will not, you cannot conquer your foreign enemies, until you have punished those that lurk within your walls. No: they will ever prove so many obstacles to impede our progress, and to give our enemies the superiority.

And what can be the reason that he treats you with insolence, (for I cannot call his present conduct by another name,) that he utters menaces against you; while he at least condescends to dissemble with other people, and to gain their confidence by good offices? Thus, by heaping favours upon the Thessalians, he led them insensibly into their present slavery.

slavery. It is not possible to enumerate all the various artifices he practised against the wretched Olynthians: (such, among others, was the putting them in possession of Potidaea.) In his late transactions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his party, by yielding Boeotia to them, and by freeing them from a tedious and distressing war. And thus, after receiving their several insidious favours, some of these people have suffered calamities but too well known to all: others must submit to whatever may befall them. What you yourselves have formerly lost I shall not mention; but in the very treaty of peace, in how many instances have we been deceived? how have we been despoiled? Did we not lose Phocis and the straights? did not we lose our Thracian dominions, Doriscum, Serrium; and even our ally Cersobleptes? is he not in possession of Cardia? and does he not avow his usurpation? Whence is it, then, that his behaviour towards you is so different from that towards others? because, of all the Grecian states, our's is the only one, in which harangues in favour of enemies are pronounced with impunity: and the venal wretch may utter his falsehoods with security, even while you are losing your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip

at Olynthus, until the people were gained by Potidaea. In Thessaly it was not safe to speak for Philip, until that people had been gained by the expulsion of their tyrants, and by being reinstated in the council of Amphietyons. Nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes, until he had given them up Boeotia, and exterminated the Phocians. But, at Athens, without the least danger may Philip be defended, altho' he has deprived us of Amphipolis, and the territory of Cardia; altho' he threatens our city by his fortifications in Euboea; altho' he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence some of his advocates have risen from penury to affluence; from obscurity and contempt to honour and eminence: while, on the contrary, you have sunk from glory to disgrace; from wealth to poverty: for the riches of a state I take to be the number, fidelity, and affection of its allies: in all which you are notoriously deficient. And by your total insensibility, while your affairs are thus falling into ruin, he is become successful, great, and formidable to all the Greeks, to all the Barbarians; and you deserted and inconsiderable; sumptuous indeed in your markets; but, in every thing relating to military power, ridiculous.

There

There are some orators, I find, who view your interests and their own in a quite different light. To you they urge the necessity of continuing quiet, whatever injuries you are exposed to: they themselves find this impossible, tho' no one offers them the least injury. [s] I speak to you, Aristodemus! Suppose a person should, without severity, ask you this question. How is it, that you, who are sensible (for it is a well-known truth) that the life of private men is serene and easy, and free from danger; that of statesmen, invidious and insecure, subject to daily contests and disquiets; should yet prefer the life encompassed with dangers, to that of peace and disengagement? What could you say? Suppose we admit the truth of the very best answer you could make; that you were prompted by a desire of honour and renown: is it possible, that you, who engaged in such painful undertakings, who despised all toils and dangers, for the sake of these, should advise the state to give them up for ease and indulgence? You cannot, surely, say, that it

[s] *I speak to you, Aristodemus!* He was by profession a player; and was one of the ten ambassadors which the Athenians had sent to the court of Macedon, to treat about the peace. At his return, Demosthenes proposed a decree for crowning this very man for his good services, whom he here inveighs against with so much bitterness.



was incumbent upon you to maintain a degree of eminence in the city; and that the city was not concerned to maintain her eminence in Greece! Nor do I see how the public safety requires that we should confine ourselves to our own concerns; and yet, that an officious intrusion into those of others should be necessary for your safety. On the contrary, you are involving yourself in the greatest dangers, by being unnecessarily assiduous; and the city, by being quite inactive. “ But then you have  
 “ an illustrious reputation, derived from your  
 “ family, which it would be shameful not to  
 “ support: while, on the contrary, nothing  
 “ has been transmitted from our fathers, but  
 “ obscurity and meanness.” This is equally false. Your father was like you, and therefore base and infamous. To the honour of our ancestors, let all Greece bear witness; [T] twice rescued, by their valour, from the greatest dangers.

[T] *Twice rescued, &c.* First at Marathon, and afterwards at Salamis. Isocrates mentions a third time, when they delivered Greece from the Spartan yoke. Demosthenes [frequently speaks of this in the highest terms, but] here rather chuses to lessen the glory of his country, than to recal an event which reflected on the Lacedemonians, now in alliance with Athens.

TOUR.

There

There are persons, then, who do not act with the same firmness and integrity in the conduct of their own affairs, and those of the state. Is not this the case, when some of them, after escaping from prison, have raised themselves so high, as to forget their former condition; and yet have reduced a state, whose pre-eminence in Greece was but now universally acknowledged, to the lowest degree of infamy and meanness?—I could say more on these and other points: but I forbear: for it is not the want of good counsel that now distresses, or ever hath distressed you. But when your true interests have been laid before you, and that you have been unanimous in your approbation, you can, with equal patience, attend to those who endeavour to discredit, to overthrow all that hath been advanced. Not that you are ignorant of their characters; (for you can, at first glance, distinguish the hireling and agent of Philip from the true patriot) but that by impeaching your faithful friends, and by turning the whole affair into ridicule and invective, you may find a pretence for the entire neglect of your duty.

You have now heard truths of the highest moment, urged with all freedom, simplicity, and

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and zeal. You have heard a speech, not filled with flattery, danger, and deceit; calculated to bring gold to the speaker, and to reduce the state into the power of its enemies. It remains, therefore, that the whole tenour of your conduct be reformed: if not, that utter desolation which will be found in your affairs must be imputed wholly to yourselves.

*End of the* **FOURTH PHILIPPIC.**

PHILIPIC THE FOURTH  
and zeal. You have heard a speech, not filled  
with flattery, danger, and deceit; calculated  
to bring gold to the speaker, and to reduce  
the fire into the power of its enemies. It  
remains, therefore, that the whole tenour of  
your conduct be reformed: If not, that which  
destruction will be found in your affairs.

THE TWELFTH

## ORATION against PHILIP:

COMMONLY CALLED THE

ORATION on the LETTER.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of THEOPHRASTUS,

The Year after the foregoing ORATION.

To which is prefixed,

PHILIP'S LETTER to the ATHENIANS.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE former oration inspired the Athenians with the resolution of sending succours to all the cities that were threatened by Philip's arms: and their first step was to dispatch to the Hellespont a convoy with provisions; which weighed anchor in view of Selymbria, a city of the Propontis, then besieged by the Macedonians; and was there seized by Amyntas, Philip's admiral. The ships were demanded by the Athenians, and returned by Philip, but with declarations sufficiently alarming.

The obstinate valour of the Perinthians had forced Philip to turn the siege into a blockade. He marched off with a considerable body of his army, to attack other places; and made an incursion into the territories of Byzantium. The Byzantines shut themselves up within their city, and dispatched one of their citizens to Athens, to desire the assistance of that state; who with some difficulty prevailed to have a fleet of forty ships sent out, under the command of Chares.

## INTRODUCTION.

*As this general had not the same reputation in other places, as at Athens, the cities by which he was to pass refused to receive him: so that he was obliged to wander for some time along the coasts, extorting contributions from the Athenian allies; despised by the enemy, and suspected by the whole world. He appeared at last before Byzantium; where he met with the same mortifying treatment as in other places, and was refused admission: and shortly after was defeated by Amyntas in a naval engagement, in which a considerable part of his fleet was either sunk or taken.*

*Philip had for some time perceived, that, sooner or later, he must inevitably come to a rupture with the Athenians. His partizans were no longer able to lull them into security. Their opposition to his designs, however imperfect and ineffectual, was yet sufficient to alarm him. He therefore determined to endeavour to abate that spirit which now began to break thro' their inveterate indolence; and for that purpose sent them a letter, in which, with the utmost art, he laid open the causes of complaint he had against them, and threatened them with reprisals. This letter was not received at Athens till after the news of Chares's defeat.*

*Philip*

## INTRODUCTION.

*Philip had now laid siege to Byzantium; and exerted all his efforts to make himself master of that city. On the other hand, the Athenians were disheartened by the ill success of their commander, and began to repent of having sent any succours: when Phocion, who always assumed the liberty of speaking his sentiments freely, assured them, that, for once, they themselves were not in fault; but that their general only was to blame. He was immediately desired to take on himself the charge of relieving Byzantium; and set sail with a numerous body of forces. He was received with the greatest demonstrations of joy: and his whole conduct expressed the utmost wisdom and moderation. Nor was his valour less conspicuous: he sustained many assaults with an intrepidity worthy of the early ages of the commonwealth; and at last obliged Philip to raise the siege.*

*Phocion then departed amidst the general acclamations of the people whom he had saved. He proceeded to the relief of the colonies of the Chersonesus, who were ever exposed to the attacks of the Cardians. In his way, he took some vessels laden with arms and provisions for the enemy: and obliged the Macedonians, who had attempted Sestos, to abandon their enterprize, and shut themselves up in Cardia.*



## INTRODUCTION.

*And thus, after various expeditions highly honourable both to himself and to his country, Phocion returned home, where he found the Athenians engaged in a debate on Philip's letter: on which occasion Demosthenes pronounced his last oration against Philip. To have answered the letter particularly would have been very difficult: for tho' Athens had the better cause, yet many irregularities had really been committed; which Philip knew how to display in their full force. The orator therefore makes use of his art to extricate himself from the difficulty; avoids all formal discussions of facts; and applies himself at once to raise the lively passions: affects to consider this letter as an open declaration of war; enflames the imaginations of his hearers with this idea; and speaks only of the means to support their arms against so powerful an enemy.*

PHILIP'S

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\* PHILIP'S LETTER  
TO THE  
ATHENIANS.

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PHILIP to the senate and people  
of ATHENS: greeting.

**A**S the embassies I have frequently sent  
to enforce those oaths and declarations  
by which we stand engaged, have pro-  
duced no alteration in your conduct, I thought  
it necessary thus to lay before you the several  
U 2 particulars

\* This letter is a master-piece in the original. It has  
a majestic and persuasive vivacity; a force and justness of  
reasoning, sustained thro' the whole; a clear exposition of  
facts, and each followed by its natural consequence; a de-  
licate irony: in short, a noble and concise stile, made for  
kings

particulars in which I think myself aggrieved. Be not surprized at the length of this letter: for, as I have many causes of complaint, it is necessary to explain them all distinctly.

First then, [B] when Nicias the herald was forcibly taken out of my own territory; instead of punishing the author of this outrage, as justice required, you added to his wrongs, by keeping him ten months in prison: [c] and the letters entrusted to him, by us, you read

kings who speak well; or have taste and discernment at least to make choice of those who can make them speak well. If Philip was himself the author of this letter, as it is but just to believe, since we have no proof to the contrary, we may reasonably pronounce of him, as was said of Caesar, *that he wrote with that spirit with which he fought*. Eodem animo dixit, quo bellavit. Quint. inst. l. 10. c. 1.

TOUR.

[B] *When Nicias the herald, &c.* Probably he had been seized upon his journey from Thrace to Macedon, by Diopithes, at the time of his invading Philip's Thracian dominions, as mentioned in the preface to the oration on the state of the Chersonesus.

TOUR.

[c] *And the letters entrusted to him, by us, &c.* The Athenians hoped, by opening his packet, to get some light into Philip's secret schemes and practices against them. There were found in it some letters directed to Olympias, Philip's queen, which they treated with a most scrupulous respect, and took care she should receive them in the same condition in which they had been intercepted.

TOUR.

publicly

publicly in your assembly. Again: [D] when the ports of Thassus were open to the Byzantine galleys, nay, to any pirates that pleased, you looked on with indifference; altho' our treaties expressly say, that such proceedings shall be considered as an actual declaration of war. About the same time it was that Diopithes made a descent upon my dominions, carried off in chains the inhabitants of [E] Crobyle and Tiristasis, ravaged all the adjacent parts of Thrace, and at length proceeded to such a pitch of lawless violence, as to seize [F] Amphilocus, who went in quality of an ambassador, to treat about the ransom of prisoners; whom, after he had reduced him to the greatest difficulties, he compelled to purchase his freedom, at the rate of nine talents. And this he did with the approbation

[D] *When the ports of Thassus were open, &c.* The Athenians had engaged, by an article of their treaty, that the Thassians, who were their subjects, should not receive any ships that committed piracies on the subjects or allies of Philip. This article had not been strictly observed; perhaps on account of Philip's own infidelity. TOUR.

[E] *Crobyle and Tiristasis.* The first of these places is quite unknown. Tiristasis is placed by Pliny in the Thracian Chersonesus. TOUR.

[F] *As to seize Amphilocus.* It is impossible to save the honour of Diopithes, but by denying the fact; at least in the manner that Philip represents it. TOUR.



of his state. Yet the violation of the sacred character of heralds and ambassadors is accounted, by all people, the height of impiety: nor have any expressed a deeper sense of this, than you yourselves: [G] for when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death, the people proceeded

[G] *For when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death, &c.* Philip, here, beats the Athenians with their own weapons, and cites, very much to the purpose, the example of a memorable vengeance, which they had taken about an age before, upon the Megareans. They had accused this people of favouring a revolt of their slaves, and of profaning a tract of consecrated land; and, upon this account, excluded them from all advantages of commerce in the ports and markets of Athens. Thucydides stops here: but Pausanias adds, that Anthemocritus went from Athens in quality of an herald, to summon the Megareans to desist from their sacrilege, and that, for answer, they put him to death. The interest of the Gods served the Athenians for a pretence; but the famous Aspasia, whom Pericles was so violently in love with, was the true cause of their rupture with Megara. Some young Athenians, heated by wine, had taken away from Megara a remarkable courtesan, called Simaetha; and the Megareans, by way of reprisal, seized two Athenian ladies of the same character, that were in Aspasia's train. Pericles espoused his favourite's quarrel; and, with the power which he then possessed, easily persuaded the people to whatever he pleased. They thundered out a decree against the Megareans, forbidding all commerce with them upon pain of death: they drew up a new form of an oath, by which every general obliged himself to invade the territories of Megara twice every year. This decree  
kindled

proceeded so far [H] as to exclude them from the mysteries; and erected a statue before the gates, as a monument of their crime. And is not this shocking; to be avowedly guilty of the very same crimes, for which your resentment fell so severely upon others, when you yourselves were aggrieved?

In the next place, Callias, your general, hath made himself master of all the towns upon the bay of Pagasae; tho' comprehended in the treaty made with you, and united in alliance to me. Not a vessel could steer its course towards Macedon, but the passengers were all treated by him as enemies, and sold: and

kindled the first sparks of contention, which at length flamed out, in the Peloponnesian war. It was the work of three courtezans. The most illustrious events have sometimes as shameful an origin. TOUR.

[H] *To exclude them from the mysteries; and erected, &c.* All the Greeks had, ordinarily, a right to be initiated into the mysteries which the Athenians celebrated at Eleusis, in honour of Ceres and Proserpine. But upon the death of Anthemocritus the Megareans were excluded; and a statue or tomb erected in honour of this herald, on the road leading from Athens to Eleusis, near the gate called Dipylon. According to Aristophanes (in *Acharn. Act. 2. Sc. 5.*) the Megareans denied this murder, and threw the whole blame of it upon Aspasia and Pericles. TOUR.

this his conduct hath been applauded by the resolutions of your council. So that I do not see how you can proceed further, if you actually declare war against me. For when we were at open hostilities, you did but send out your corsairs, sell those who were sailing to my kingdom, assist my enemies, and infest my territories. Yet now, when we are professedly at peace, so far have your injustice and rancour hurried you, that [I] you have sent ambassadors to the Persian to persuade him to attack me: which must appear highly surprising: for [K] before that prince had subdued

[I] *You have sent ambassadors to the Persian, &c.* Diodorus informs us, that about this time the satraps of the lesser Asia had obliged Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus. The historian does not say that the Athenians invited them: but Philip complains of it here; and Pausanias observes, that in this expedition the Persian forces were commanded by Apollodorus, an Athenian general. We may observe, with what disrespect Philip (whose ancestors, in their greatest prosperity, never aspired higher than to the alliance of some satrap) here speaks of the GREAT KING—The Persian! TOUR.

[K] *Before that prince had subdued Egypt and Phoenicia, it was resolved, &c.* Artaxerxes Ochus, who governed Persia at that time, before his reduction of these revolted provinces, had marched into the lesser Asia, against Artabazus, a rebellious satrap. The approach of the Persians alarmed the Greeks: and Athens conceived a design of attacking them in their own country. This gave occasion

subdued Egypt and Phoenicia, it was resolved, that, if he attempted any new enterprizes, you would invite me, as well as all the other Greeks, to an association against him. But now, with such malice am I pursued, that you are, on the contrary, confederating with him against me. In former times, I am told, [L] your ancestors objected it as an heinous crime to the family of Pisistratus, that they had led the Persian against the Greeks: and yet you are not ashamed to commit the very same action, for which you were continually inveighing against those tyrants.

occasion to the oration of Demosthenes, entitled, *Περὶ τῶν Συμμοριῶν*. Philip pretends that they had resolved to admit him into the confederacy which was then forming in favour of the Greeks, with whom he affects to rank, and by his expressions removes every idea of foreigner and barbarian, which are the representations that the orator frequently makes of him. TOUR.

[L] *Your ancestors objected it as an heinous crime to the family, &c.* The comparison which Philip makes here, between the sons of Pisistratus and the orators who advised an alliance with Persia, is founded upon an history too well known to be enlarged upon. It is undoubtedly by no means just: for, in different conjunctures, the good citizen may employ the same forces to save his country, that the wicked one had formerly employed to destroy it. However, the turn he gives it was the fittest in the world to affect the people, who thought it their greatest honour to express an inveterate hatred to the Persians.

But



But your injustice hath not stopped here. Your decrees command me to [M] permit Teres and Cerfobleptes to reign unmolested in Thrace, as being citizens of Athens.—

I do not know that they were included in our treaty, that their names are to be found in the records of our engagements, or that they are Athenians. But this I know, that Teres served in my army against you; and that when Cerfobleptes proposed to my ambassadors to take the necessary oaths, in order to be particularly included in the treaty, your generals prevented him, by declaring him an enemy to the Athenians. And now is this equitable or just? when it serves your purposes, to proclaim him the enemy of your state; when I am to be calumniated, to give him the title of your citizen; [N] when Sitalces was slain, to whom

[M] *To permit Teres and Cerfobleptes to reign, &c.* History speaks only of Cerfobleptes. They had suffered him to be overthrown by Philip: and, when they found how nearly they themselves were affected by his fall, employed those decrees to endeavour to restore him. TOUR.

[N] *When Sitalces was slain, &c.* This Sitalces was the grandfather of Cerfobleptes. In the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, he rendered the Athenians such important services, that they, by way of acknowledgment, admitted his son Sadocus into the number of their citizens. In the eighth year of this war, Sitalces was killed in a battle against the Triballi. His nephew Seuthes seized the

whom you granted the privileges of your city, instantly to enter into an alliance with his murderer; yet to engage in a war with me, on account of Cersobleptes? and this, when you are sensible, that not one of these your adopted citizens have ever shewed the least regard to your laws or determinations. But bring this affair to a short issue. [o] You granted the rights of your community [p] to Evagoras

the kingdom, in prejudice of his children: and hence became suspected of being the cause of his death. Philip argues, from this suspicion, as if it was an undoubted truth.

TOUR.

[o] *You granted the rights of your community, &c.* What idea must we form of the splendor of that city, where even kings solicited for the rank of private citizens! The other states of Greece affected the same kind of grandeur. At a time, when ambassadors from Corinth were congratulating Alexander on his victories, they made him an offer of the freedom of their city, as the greatest mark of honour possible. Alexander, now in the full splendor of his fortune, disdained to return them any answer but a contemptuous smile. This stung the ambassadors to the quick; and one of them was bold enough to say, *Know, Sir, that the great Hercules, and you, are the only persons whom Corinth has ever deigned to distinguish in this manner.* This softened the prince: he received them with all possible marks of respect, and accepted of a title which had been so dignified.

TOUR.

[p] *To Evagoras of Cyprus.* The Athenians erected a statue to Evagoras, the elder of that name, and declared him a citizen of Athens, for having assisted Conon in restoring

Evagoras of Cyprus, to Dionysius the Syracusan, and to their descendants. Prevail therefore upon the men who have deposed each of these to restore them to their dominions, and you shall recover from me [Q] all those territories of Thrace, which Teres and Cersebleptes commanded. But if you have nothing to urge against those who expelled them, and yet are incessantly tormenting me, am not I justly warranted to oppose you?—I might urge many other arguments upon this head; but I chuse to pass them over.

storing their liberty. He caused Salamis to revolt from the Persians, and subdued most part of the island Cyprus; but was afterwards reduced, and fell by the hands of Nicocles. His son, Evagoras the younger, however, asserted his claim to the kingdom of Cyprus, and was supported by the Athenians against Protagoras, the successor of Nicocles. But his attempts were not successful. Protagoras supplanted him at the court of Persia, where he had been in full favour. He was cited to answer to some heads of an accusation; and, upon his justifying himself, he obtained a government in Asia, well worth his little kingdom. But his bad conduct soon obliged him to abdicate, and fly into Cyprus; where he perished wretchedly.

TOUR.

[Q] *All those territories of Thrace.* In the original τὴν Θράκην, ὅσων, &c. By the ironical pomp of this expression, he sets their dominions (which were really inconsiderable) in the most contemptuous light. TOUR.

[R] The

to the ATHENIANS.

301

[R] The Cardians, I freely declare, I am determined to support; as my engagements to them are prior to our treaty; and as you refused to submit your differences with them to an arbitration, tho' frequently urged by me: nor have they been wanting in the like solicitations. Should not I therefore be the basest of mankind, to abandon my allies, and to shew greater regard for you, my inveterate opposers, than for my constant and assured adherents?

Formerly (for I cannot pass this in silence) you contented yourselves with remonstrating upon the points above-mentioned. But lately, upon the bare complaint of the Peparethians, that they had been severely treated by me, you proceeded to such outrage, as to send orders to your general to revenge their quarrel. Yet the punishment which I inflicted was no way equal to the heinousness of their crime: as they had, in time of peace, seized Halonesus, nor could be prevailed upon, by all my solicitations, to give up either the island or the garrison. The injuries I received from the Peparethians were never thought of; but their punishment commanded all your attention, as it afforded a pretence for

[R] *The Cardians, &c.* See the preface to the oration on the state of the Chersonesus.

accusing



accusing me; altho' I did not take the island either from them, or from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If then you confess that you delivered it to Sostratus, you confess yourselves guilty of sending out pirates: if he seized it, without your consent, how have I injured you, by taking possession of it, and by rendering it a secure harbour? Nay, so great was my regard to your state, that I offered to bestow you this island: [s] but this was not agreeable to your orators: they would not have it accepted, but resumed. So that, if I complied with their directions, I proclaimed myself an usurper: if I still kept possession of the place, I became suspected to the people. I saw thro' these artifices, and therefore proposed to bring our differences to a judicial determination; and if sentence was given for me, to present you with the place; if in your favour, to restore it to the people. This I frequently desired: you would not hear it: the Peparethians seized the island. What then was I to do? should I not punish the violators of oaths? was I tamely to bear such an audacious insult? If the island was the property of the Peparethians, what right have the Athe-

[s] *But this was not agreeable to your orators: they, &c.* Demosthenes in particular opposed their receiving a restitution under the name of a present.

nians

nians to demand it? if it be your's, why do you not resent their usurpation?

So far, in short, have our animosities been carried, that, when I had occasion to dispatch some vessels to the Hellespont, I was obliged to send a body of forces thro' the Chersonesus, to defend them against your colonies, who are authorized to attack me [T] by a decree of Polycrates, confirmed by the resolutions of your council. Nay, your general has actually invited the Byzantines to join him, and has every where publicly declared, that he has your instructions to commence hostilities, at the first favourable opportunity. All this could not prevail upon me to make any attempt upon your city, or your navy, or your territories; altho' I might have had success in most, or even all of them. I chose rather to continue my solicitations to have our complaints submitted to proper umpires. And which, think ye, is the fittest decision; that of reason or of the sword? Who are to

[T] *By a decree of Polycrates.* This orator had great credit at Athens, and on many occasions favoured the designs of Philip. Possibly he acted otherwise upon this occasion, the better to conceal his attachment; or that he might afterwards sell his integrity at a dearer rate.

TOUR.

be

be judges in your cause, yourselves or others? What can be more inconsistent, than that the people of Athens, [u] who compelled the Thassians and Maronites to bring their pretensions to the city of Stryma to a judicial decision, should yet refuse to have their own disputes with me determined in the same manner? particularly, as you are sensible, if the decree be against you, still you lose nothing; if in your favour, it puts you in possession of my conquests.

But what appears to me the most unaccountable is this: when I sent you ambassadors, chosen from all the confederated powers, on purpose, to be witnesses of our transactions; when I discovered the sincerest intentions of entering into reasonable and just engagements with you, in relation to the affairs of Greece; you even refused to hear these ambassadors on that head. It was then in your power to remove all their apprehensions, who suspected any

[u] *Who compelled the Thassians and Maronites, &c.* The first of these people inhabited an island in the Egean sea; the other, a maritime place in Thrace. The Thassians had founded Stryma, according to Herodotus; but, as it was in the neighbourhood of Maronea, probably the Maronites had, in quality of protectors, or benefactors, acquired some pretensions to it.

TOUR.

danger

danger from my designs; or to have openly convicted me of consummate baseness. This was the interest of the people; but the orators could not find their account in it; for they are a set of men, to whom (if I may believe those who are acquainted with your polity) [x] peace is war, and war is peace; as they are always sure to make a property of the generals, either by aiding their designs, or by malicious prosecutions. Then they need but throw out some scandalous invectives against persons of worth and eminence, citizens or foreigners, and they at once acquire the character of patriots, among the many. I could have easily silenced their clamours against me, by a little gold; and even have converted them into praises: but I should blush to purchase your friendship from such wretches. To such insolence have they

[x] *Peace is war, and war is peace, &c.* Aristotle, in his Rhetor. l. 3. c. 10. quotes this [nearly] as an example of an agreeable antithesis: which, joined to the force, and, what is more, to the order of the arguments contained in this letter, inclines me to think that Aristotle was his secretary on this occasion. But my conjecture, whether well or ill founded, does not detract from Philip, in point of genius and spirit. The true talent of a king is to know how to apply the talents of others to the best advantage. And we do not want other proofs of Philip's abilities in writing; witness his letter to Aristotle, on the birth of Alexander.

TOUR.

X

proceeded



proceeded upon other occasions, that they even dared to dispute my title to Amphipolis; which is founded, I presume, upon reasons beyond their power to invalidate: for if it is to belong to those who first conquered it, what can be juster than our claim? [y] Alexander, our ancestor, was the original sovereign; [z] as appears from the golden statue which he erected at Delphos, from the first fruits of the Persian

[y] *Alexander, our ancestor, was the original sovereign.* Philip asserts boldly, without giving himself much trouble even to preserve probability: for in the time of Alexander, the cotemporary of Xerxes, there was no city, nor any fortified post, in the place where Amphipolis was afterwards raised: nor was it till thirty years after the defeat of the Persians that Agnon founded it. TOUR.

[z] *As appears from the golden statue, &c.* Herodotus speaks of this statue, and places it near the colossal statue, which the Greeks raised, according to custom, out of the Persian spoils. The proximity of these statues serves Philip as a foundation for giving his ancestors an honour which really belonged to the Greeks. Solinus mentions, that Alexander, a very rich prince, made an offering of a golden statue of Apollo in the temple of Delphos, and another of Jupiter in the temple of Elis; but not that the Persian spoils were any part of these offerings.——

This Alexander, surnamed ΦΙΛΑΛΛΗΝ, friend of Greeks, had the reputation of an able politician, but not of a good soldier, or great commander. He served the Persians a long time, rather by force than inclination; and, before the battle of Salamis, declared, of a sudden, for the Greeks.


TOUR.

spoils

spoils taken there. But if this admits of contest, and it is to continue the property of those who were last in possession, it is mine by this title too; (for [A] I took it from the Lacedemonian inhabitants, who had dispossessed you;) and all cities are held either by hereditary right, or by the right of conquest. And yet you, who neither were the original possessors, nor are now in possession, presume to lay claim to this city, under pretence of having held it for some short time; and this, when you have yourselves given the strongest testimony in my favour: for I frequently wrote to you upon this head; and you as often acknowledged me the rightful sovereign: and by the articles of our late treaty, the possession of Amphipolis, and your alliance, were both secured to me. What title therefore can be better established? It descended to us from our ancestors; it is our's by conquest; and, lastly, you yourselves have acknowledged the justice of our pretensions; you who are wont to assert your claim, even when it is not supported by right.

[A] *I took it from the Lacedemonian inhabitants, who had dispossessed you, &c.* Brasidas, the Lacedemonian general, took Amphipolis from the republic of Athens: and, by the assistance of Sparta, it afterwards maintained its independence, until it fell into the power of Philip. TOUR.

I have now laid before you the grounds of my complaints. Since you have been the first aggressors; since my gentleness, and fear of offending have only served to encrease your injustice, and to animate you in your attempts to distress me; I must now take up arms; and I call the gods to witness to the justice of my cause, and the necessity of procuring for myself that redress which you deny me.



*End of the* **LETTER.**

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\* T H E

ORATION on the LETTER.

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**N**OW, Athenians! it is fully evident to you all, that Philip made no real peace with us, but only deferred hostilities. [B] When he surrendered Halus to the Pharfalians, when he completed the

\* It must be confessed, that this oration consists almost wholly of repetitions. This great man seems to have thought himself superior to all vain criticisms; and, only concerned for the safety of Athens, was in no pain about his private glory. He speaks as an orator, whose end is to persuade and convince; not as a declaimer, who seeks only to give pleasure, and excite admiration. He therefore resumes those topics he had already made use of, and gives them new force, by the close and lively manner in which he delivers them.

[B] *When he surrendered Halus to the Pharfalians, &c.* Halus was a town of Thessaly, upon the river Amphrysus. Parmenio besieged and took it: after which Philip put the people of Pharfalia in possession of it.



ruin of Phocis, [c] when he overturned all Thrace, then did he really attack the state, under the concealment of false allegations and unjust pretences; but now he hath made a formal declaration of war, by this his letter. That we are not to look with horror upon his power; that, on the other hand, we are not to be remiss in our opposition, but to engage our persons, our treasures, and our navies; in one word, our whole strength, freely, in the common cause: these are the points I would establish.

First then, Athenians! the gods we may justly regard as our strongest allies and assistants: since in this unjust violation of his treaty, he hath trampled upon religion, and despised the most solemn oaths. In the next place, those secret practices to which his greatness hath hitherto been owing, all his

[c] *When he overturned all Thrace, &c.* This is the language of an orator, who, to represent Philip's outrages with the greater aggravation, takes the liberty of speaking of a part of that country as of the whole. Philip had indeed made himself master of the territories of Teres and Cerfobleptes, both kings in Thrace, and allies of the Athenians. But Pausanias observes, that, before the Romans, no one had ever made an entire conquest of Thrace.

arts of deceiving, all his magnificent promises, are now quite exhausted. The Perinthians, and the Byzantines, [D] and their confederates, have at length discovered, that he intends to treat them as he formerly treated the Olynthians. The Thessalians are no longer ignorant, that he affects to be the master, and not the leader of his allies. The Thebans begin to see danger in his stationing a garrison [E] at Nicaea, his assuming the rank of an Amphictyon, [F]

[D] *And their confederates.* The inhabitants of Chios, Rhodes, and some other places, joined to defeat Philip's designs upon Perinthus and Byzantium. TOUR.

[E] *At Nicaea.* This town was situated near Thermopylae, and was counted among the principal towns of the Locrians, (Epicnemidii) the neighbours and allies of the Boeotians and Thebans. Philip made himself master of it at the time that he seized Thermopylae, under pretence of putting an end to the sacred war. TOUR.

[F] *His bringing into Macedon the embassies from Peloponnesus, &c.* Probably this was at the time when he interested himself in the disputes between Sparta and the Argians and Messenians, as mentioned in the preface to the second Philippic oration.—Strabo mentions an application of the Argians and Messenians to Philip to regulate a contest between them and Lacedemon about their boundaries. And Pausanias declaims against the pride of Gallus, a Roman senator, who thought it derogated from his dignity to decide the differences of Lacedemon and Argos; and disdained to meddle with a mediation, which Philip had formerly not only accepted, but courted.

TOUR.

his bringing into Macedon the embassies from Peloponnesus, and his preventing them in seizing the advantage of an alliance with the people of that country. So that, of those who have hitherto been his friends, some are now irreconcilably at war with him; others no longer serve him with zeal and sincerity; and all have their suspicions and complaints. Add to this, (and it is of no small moment,) that the satraps of Asia have just now forced him to raise the siege of Perinthus, by throwing in a body of hired troops: and [G] as this must make him their enemy, and as they are immediately exposed to danger, should he become master of Byzantium, they will not only readily unite their force with our's, but prevail upon the king of Persia to assist us with his treasure; who, in this particular, far exceeds all other potentates; and whose influence in Greece is so great, that formerly, when we were engaged in a war with Lacedemon, [H] he

[G] *As this must make him their enemy.* This proved an exact prediction of what happened some time after. Alexander, in his letter to Darius, alledges, as one of the principal subjects of their rupture, the powerful succours which Perinthus received from the Persian satraps. Arrian. L. I. Tour.

[H] *He never failed to give the superiority to, &c.* History represents the king of Persia as the supreme arbiter

of



he never failed to give the superiority to that party which he espoused: and now, when he unites with us, he will with ease subdue the power of Philip.

I shall not mention, as a balance to these so considerable advantages, that he hath taken the opportunity of the peace to make himself master of many of our territories, our ports, and other like conveniencies. For it is observable, that where affection joins, and one common interest animates the confederating powers, there the alliance is never to be shaken: but where subtile fraud, and passions insatiable, and perfidy and violence have formed it, (and these are the means which he hath used,) the least pretence, the slightest

of the fate of Athens and Lacedemon, during the whole time of their quarrels. Darius Nothus joined with the Lacedemonians; and Lyfander, their general, destroyed Athens. Artaxerxes Mnemon protected Conon, the Athenian general; and immediately Athens resumed her former splendor. Lacedemon afterwards joined in alliance with the great king; and this intimidated the Athenians, and obliged them to seek for peace. Artaxerxes dictated the articles of it, threatening to declare against those who should refuse to subscribe to them. Athens instantly obeyed. Thus it was that a foreign power lorded it over the Greeks, and by means of their divisions had the absolute command of their fate.

TOUR.

accident,



accident, gives it the fatal shock, and, in an instant, it is utterly dissolved. And, from repeated observations, I am convinced, Athenians! that Philip not only wants the confidence and affection of his allies, but, even in his own kingdom, he is by no means happy in that well-established regularity, and those intimate attachments, which might be expected. The power of Macedon, indeed, as an ally, may have some effect; but, if left to itself, is insufficient; and, when compared with his pompous enterprizes, quite contemptible. And then, his wars, his expeditions, all those exploits which have given him this splendor, are the very means of rendering it yet weaker: for you are not to imagine, Athenians! that Philip and his subjects have the same desires. He is possessed with the love of glory: they wish only for security. The object of his passion must be attended with danger; and they but ill endure a banishment from their children, parents, wives; a life worn out with toils, and exposed to continual perils in his cause. Hence we may learn how his subjects in general are affected to their prince. But then, his guards, and officers of his foreign troops: these you will find have some military reputation; yet they live in greater terrors than the obscure and mean.

mean. These are exposed only to their avowed enemies: the others have more to fear from calumny and flattery, than in the field. The one, when engaged in battle, only share the common danger: the others, besides their part, and this not the least of that danger, have also their private apprehensions from the temper of their prince. Among the many, when any one hath transgressed, his punishment is proportioned to his crime: the others, when they have most eminently distinguished themselves, are then, in open defiance of all decency, treated with the utmost insolence and disdain.

That these are incontestable truths, no reasonable man can doubt: for they who have lived with him assure us, that his ambition is so insatiable, that he will have the glory of every exploit ascribed wholly to himself; and is more incensed against such commanders as have performed any thing worthy of honour, than against those whose misconduct hath ruined his enterprizes. But if this be the case, how is it that they have persevered so long in their attachment to his cause? It is for this reason, Athenians! because success throws a shade on all his odious qualities (for nothing veils men's thoughts from observation)

so

so effectually as success): but let any accident happen, and they will all be perfectly discovered. Just as in our bodies; while we are in health, our inward defects lie concealed; but when we are attacked by a disorder, then they are all sensible, in the vessels, in the joints, or wherever we are affected: so in kingdoms and governments of every kind, while their arms are victorious, their disorders escape the common observation; but a reverse of fortune (and this he must experience, as he hath taken up a burden much beyond his strength) never fails to lay them open to every eye.

If there be a man among you, (Athenians!) who regards Philip as a powerful and formidable enemy, on account of his good fortune, such cautious foresight bespeaks a true prudent mind. Fortune, indeed, does greatly influence, or, rather, has the entire direction of all human affairs: but there are many reasons to expect much more from the fortune of Athens, than that of Philip. We can boast an authority in Greece, derived from our ancestors, not only before his days, but before any one prince of Macedon. They all were tributaries of Athens: Athens never paid that mark of subjection to any people. In the next place,



place, the more inviolably we have adhered to piety and justice, the greater may be our confidence in the favour of the gods. But if this be the case, how is it that in the late war his arms had such superior fortune? This is the cause (for I will speak with undaunted freedom): he takes the field himself; endures its toils, and shares its dangers: no favourable incident escapes him, no season of the year retards him. While we (for the truth must not be concealed) are confined within our walls, in perfect inactivity, delaying, and voting, and wandering thro' the public places, in search of news. Can any thing better deserve the name of new, than that one sprung from Macedon should insult Athens, and dare to send such letters as you have just heard recited? that he should have his armies and his orators in pay? (Yes, I call heaven to witness, there are those among us, who do not blush to live for Philip, who have not sense to perceive that they are selling all the interests of the state, all their own real interests, for a trifling pittance!)—While we never once think of preparing to oppose him; are quite averse to hiring troops, and want resolution to take arms ourselves. No wonder, therefore, that he had some advantage over us in the late war. On the contrary, it is really surprizing that we, who  
are



are quite regardless of all that concerns our cause, should expect to conquer him, who leaves no means omitted that may assure his success.

Let these things be duly weighed, Athenians! and deeply impressed upon your minds. Consider, that it is not at your option, whether to profess peace or no; for he hath now made a declaration of war, and hostilities are commenced. Spare no expences, public or private: let a general ardor appear for taking arms: appoint abler commanders than you have hitherto chosen: for it must not be imagined, that the men who, from a state of prosperity, have reduced us to these difficulties, will again extricate us, and restore us to our former splendor: nor is it to be expected, that, if you continue thus supine, your cause will find other assertors. Think, how infamous it is, that you, whose ancestors were exposed to such incessant toils, and so great dangers, in the war with Lacedemon, should refuse to engage with resolution in defence of that rightful power which they transmitted to us! how shameful, that this Macedonian should have a soul so daring, that, to enlarge his empire, his whole body is covered with wounds; and that the Athenians, they whose  
hereditary

hereditary character it is to yield to none, but to give law to all their adversaries, are now supine and enervated, insensible to the glory of their fathers, and regardless of the interest of their country!

That I may not detain you, my sentence is this: that we should instantly prepare for war, and call upon the other states of Greece to join in the common cause; not by words, but actions; for words, if not attended with actions, are of no force. Our professions particularly have always had the less weight; as we are confessedly superior to the rest of Greece, in prompt address, and excellence of speaking.

*End of the ORATION on the LETTER.*

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Greece in general, and existence of  
freedom.



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## CONCLUSION.

**H**AVING thus far traced the progress of Philip's attempts on Greece, it may be no improper conclusion to continue the account down to his final triumph over the liberty of that country.

*We have seen the Athenians at last exerting themselves in a manner worthy of that renowned people. And Philip, now returning from his Scythian expedition, in which he had engaged, when foiled in his attempts on Perinthus and Byzantium, found himself considerably distressed and harassed by the hostilities of Athens. To extricate himself from these difficulties, he formed a bold and subtle project of entering Greece: and so laid his scheme, as to make the Athenians themselves the instruments of his designs.*

*By his intrigues he procured Aeschines to be sent as their deputy to the council of Amphictyons. This was in reality of the highest consequence:*

Y

for



for no sooner had the deputy taken his seat, but a question was moved, whether the Locrians of Amphissa had not been guilty of sacrilege, in plowing the fields of Cirrha, contiguous to the temple of Delphos? Sentiments were divided. Aeschines proposed a view: this was decreed: and when the Amphictyons came to take it, the Locrians, jealous of their property, and no doubt enflamed by those who were in the secret of the whole design, fell on those venerable persons, and obliged them to consult their safety, by flight. Such an outrage was judged to demand the severest punishment: and it was decreed, that all Greece should join in inflicting it. But when the army came to the place of rendezvous, their appearance gave no great prospect of success. His agents and partizans then arose, and by their artful representations prevailed upon the Amphictyons to declare Philip general of the Grecian forces, and to invite him to execute their decrees. As the event was expected, his army was ready. He marched into Greece: but instead of attacking the Locrians, he immediately seized Elataea, a city of Phocis, of the utmost moment, as it awed Boeotia, and opened him a passage into Attica.

This step struck Greece with astonishment. Athens particularly received the news with inexpressible

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*expressible confusion. The people ran dismayed to an assembly, and called on Demosthenes by name, to give his opinion in this critical juncture. His usual eloquence was exerted to animate their drooping courage; and by his advice ambassadors were sent thro' Greece, and particularly to Thebes, to engage the states to rise at once, to oppose the Macedonian torrent before it bore down all. Demosthenes himself headed the embassy to the Thebans. He found a powerful antagonist in Python, Philip's agent: yet, in spite of his remonstrances, he so fired that people, that they at once forgot all the favours Philip had conferred on them, and joined against him with the utmost cordial zeal. The confederates met at Eleusis. The Pythian priestess uttered the most terrible predictions, and threatened them with the severest fate; but Demosthenes took care to prevent the effect of this, by treating her oracles with contempt; which he declared were dictated by Philip, and calculated to serve his interests.*

*This prince now saw all his arts defeated; and therefore resolved upon an engagement, as his last resource. He therefore advanced to Cheronaea, in the neighbourhood of which city the confederates were encamped, under the command of Chares and Lyficles, two Athenian generals,*

by no means worthy of commanding so illustrious an army. The next day, by sun-rise, both armies were in the field. Alexander, then but nineteen years old, surrounded by a number of experienced officers, commanded the left wing of the Macedonians. He began the onset; and was bravely opposed by the Sacred Band of the Thebans. On the right Philip himself commanded; where the Athenians made their attack with such vigour as obliged his soldiers to give ground. The advantage was pursued with the most imprudent and intemperate heat. But while the Athenians were rushing on without any order, Philip bore down upon them with his phalanx, and obtained an easy, tho' a bloody victory. At the same time, and with a like effusion of blood, Alexander triumphed over the Thebans.

Thus were the confederates totally overthrown, and the liberty of Greece lost for ever.



F I N I S.

